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Glossary 
Analyst The actor supporting or guiding the decision aiding process. 
Client The client is the person that requested the decision process, 
and provides the necessary means to conduct it. The client is 




The constructive approach is based on the hypothesis that a 
stakeholder can be led by the decision aiding process to 
modify his or her preferences, either through lack of initial 
opinions, or through valid arguments presented during the 
process. 
Decision aiding Decision aiding consists of activities, tools and approaches 
designed to improve the quality of decision making to which it 
is applied. 
Decision maker Belton and Steward [2002:p14] defines the stakeholder that 




A framework of criteria against which to measure the 
contribution of decision aiding tools and approaches to high 
quality decision making. 
Descriptive decision 
aiding approach 
With the descriptive approach, the assumption is made that a 
latent system of preference relations exists in the mind of the 
decision maker before the decision aiding commenced. This 
system is however not explicit to the decision maker. The task 
of decision aiding is to clarify or describe (without influencing) 
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Energisation 
framework 
A framework of energisation objectives that ultimately leads to 
sustainable development, against which to measure the project 
objectives of an energisation project.  
Energisation 
objectives 
The primary objectives of energisation that ultimately leads to 
sustainable development. Note that off-grid objectives form a 
subset of energisation objectives. 
External uncertainties Uncertain events that might affect project outcomes but over 
which decision-makers have little or no control. 
Hard uncertainty In hard uncertainty 1) the set of all possible outcomes of an 
action is unknown and can only be hypothesized, or 2) if all the 
outcomes are known, the probability distributions of all the 
outcomes are unknown or not fully definable. 
High quality decision 
making 
High quality decision making results in decisions that lead to 
the achievement of the project’s primary objectives. 
Hybrid Mini-grid See mini-grid 
Internal uncertainties Uncertain events that might affect the outcomes of a project 
and are under the control of the decision-makers. 
Mini-grid A hybrid mini-grid distributes energy from a combination of 
local off-grid generation sources, for example mini-hydro, PV, 
wind or diesel, to several households located close to each 
other and the source. 
Multi-criteria analysis A multi-criteria analysis “aims to make explicit a coherent 
family of criteria (not reduced to a single element at the outset) 
that will serve as an intelligible, acceptable, and exhaustive 
instrument of communication allowing conception, justification, 
and transformation of preferences within the decision process.” 
[Roy 1996] 
Non-grid See off-grid 
Off-grid Electricity generation and distribution systems that are not 
connected to the national grid, i.e. either stand-alone or mini-
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Off-grid objectives The primary objectives of off-grid electrification that ultimately 
contribute to sustainable development. Note that off-grid 
objectives form a subset of energisation objectives. 
Project “a group of activities to produce a project purpose in a fixed 
time frame” [EC 2002:p3] 
Project objectives The ultimate goals towards which a project aims. These 
objectives do not necessarily have to align with sustainable 
development. 
Programme “a series of projects whose objectives together contribute to a 
common overall objective at sector, country or even multi-
country level.” [EC 2002:p3] 
Risk See soft uncertainty 
Single criteria 
analysis 
In a single criterion analysis, the (possibly very heterogeneous) 
consequences of each potential action are quantified in the 
units of a single significance axis chosen beforehand. 
Soft uncertainty Soft uncertainty or risk is used to define situations where all the 
possible outcomes of an action, as well as the outcomes’ 
probability distributions, are known, 
Solar Home System A stand-alone electricity supply system that typically consists of 
a 100Ah battery, 50Wpeak PV panel and power electronics. 
Stakeholders Standard stakeholders impact / are affected by the problem 
and participate in the process that resolves it, fiduciary 
stakeholders represent clients and participate in the problem 
resolution without been directly affected be the problem, and 
silent stakeholders refer to those that are affected by the 
problem, but has no control over or participation during the 
resolution process. Stakeholders refer to all three groups. 
Sustainable 
development 
“Sustainable development is essentially about improving 
quality of life in a way that can be sustained, economically and 
environmentally, over the long term supported by the 
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Abstract 
Most completed South African off-grid electrification projects have failed to contribute 
significantly to the sustainable development of the communities they supply. The 
hypothesis of this research is that the root causes of these failures can often be found in 
the pre-implementation decision making (planning) processes, specifically in three areas: 
1. Decision aiding approaches and tools, aimed at supporting the decision making 
process, are either not used or do not support high quality decisions. 
2. Uncertainties that can impact the project negatively are often not acknowledged 
(identified) initially, and can therefore not be addressed proactively. 
3. The primary project objectives often do not align with sustainable development 
objectives, which mean that even if all the project objectives are achieved (i.e. a 
successful project) the project still does not contribute to sustainable development.   
The process of validating this hypothesis results in several outputs aimed at improving 
the contribution of future off-grid electrification projects to sustainable development: 
• A framework of primary energisation objectives for sustainable development is 
developed, which defines what the outcomes of a successful off-grid electrification 
project should be. 
• High quality decision making is defined, and a framework of decision aiding 
characteristics that support high quality decision making is developed against which 
decision aiding approaches and tools can be evaluated. 
• The concept of soft and hard uncertainties is introduced, and it is shown that most of 
the social and institutional unacknowledged uncertainties in South African off-grid 
projects are hard. Hard uncertainties are impossible to represent probabilistically, and 
are difficult to include in traditional single-dimensional (mostly cost-based) decision 
aiding approaches and tools. 
• A degree of surprise tool, based on Shackle’s measure of a decision maker’s degree 
of surprise at a future outcome becoming reality, is developed to act as an example 












p14 - Abstract 
• Soft uncertainty in the decision process is quantified for two examples: renewable 
energy system sizing, where an adequacy confidence index is proposed, and 
renewable energy resource estimation, where the accuracy and applicability of 
RETScreen and Homer within a South African climatic context are analysed. 
• Finally, the above outputs are integrated into an existing decision aiding process and 
applied in order to demonstrate the value of decision aiding which includes 
uncertainty acknowledgement and objectives alignment. 
The applicability of the results of this research is not limited to off-grid electrification, and 
can be of value within any developmental project aligned with sustainable development, 













1.1 Non-performance of off
South Africa has made remarkable progress in widening access to electricity, through a 
National Electrification Program (NEP) that commenced in the late 1980s and is still 
active.  Prior to 1990, less than a third of South African households had access to 
electricity, while a decade later that proportion had doubled. At the height of the NEP 
program in the middle 1990s close to 500 000 new households were being connected 
per year.  
1.1.1 Decreasing annual connection rates
However, since the early 2000s the programme has slowed down as shown in 
1-1, with only around 160
growth in total households since 2000, as published by Statistics SA, has however varied 
between 218 000 and 448 000 households per year, which means that since around 
2003 the percentage of total South African hous
decreasing [Bekker et al 2008
Figure 1-1: Annual new household electricity connections in South Africa [Bekker et al 2008]
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What caused this decrease in annual connections? After all, South African government 
appears to be strongly committed to electrification, as is evident from a number of 
government statements and publications. President Thabo Mbeki, for example, 
committed to the goal of universal access to electricity by 2012 in his parliamentary State 
of the Nation Address in 20041:  
‘...with a strengthened local government working with our state enterprise, 
Eskom, we will, within the next eight years, ensure than each household has 
access to electricity’ [Mbeki 2004].  
More evidence is found in the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME)’s strategic 
report published in 2006: 
“The INEP plans to electrify 500 000 households annually (subject to the 
allocation of adequate funds) with effect from 2007/8 financial year at an 
estimated cost of R2.5 billion per annum.” [DME 2006:p5] 
Electrification stakeholders appear to agree that the explanation for the decreasing 
connection rates can be found in the fact that all the ‘easy’ households have already 
been connected, necessitating an electrification programme focus shift towards less 
easily accessible households: 
“7we continue to progress in the national electrification programme, although this 
has slowed down due to sparsely populated areas.” [DME 2005:p3] 
 “7the most reachable communities have been electrified and the less accessible 
communities/households now remain to be electrified, i.e. all the low hanging fruit 
have been picked.” [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 2007] 
“The average cost of infrastructure development and the cost per connection will 
increase as we electrify communities in more remote rural areas.” [Eskom 
2007:p87] 
“Challenges of poor and the absence of bulk infrastructure, especially in rural 
areas, have put a strain on the performance of the programme. During the year 
under review, an amount of R282 million had to be channelled from electricity 
connections towards bulk infrastructure, resulting in a reduced number of 
connections planned for the year.” [DME 2007:p7] 
                                               
1
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As implied by two of the preceding statements, logically it makes sense that less easily 
accessible households will predominantly be in rural areas. Urban areas are generally 
more accessible due to higher household densities and proximity to Eskom’s existing 
grid, created during ‘first-wave’ electrification2.  
It is however an over-simplification to position the shift towards less easily accessible 
household electrification within a general shift from predominantly urban electrification 
initially towards current rural electrification. As can be seen from Figure 1-2 rural annual 
connection rates exceeded urban ones during the middle 1990s, only been overtaken by 
urban connections after 1997 until 20023. 
 
Figure 1-2: Annual number of urban and rural connections [NER 2003] 
The challenge of how to increase annual connection rates appears to exist in how to 
adapt the existing electrification technologies, skills, methodologies and institutional 
structures to the changing focus of electrification, i.e. from accessible urban and rural 
communities that could be grid-connected cost-effectively, towards remote low density 
rural communities that are too expensive to connect to the grid despite innovations like 
Single Wire Earth Return (SWER) lines, necessitating off-grid electrification solutions. 
                                               
2
 The ‘first wave’ of electrification usually involves the electrification of the economy as a whole. 
The ‘second wave’ generally responds to the problem of including areas of national economies 
that did not meet ‘first wave’ criteria for electrification (typically financial criteria). For a more 
complete description within the context of electrification policy refer to [Bekker et al 2008b] 
3
 After South African municipalities were restructured in 2000 the institutionally defined distinction 
between rural and urban areas fell away (refer to [Stats SA 2003]), although official electrification 
statistics continued to distinguish between rural and urban until 2003 (from 1996), when the DME 













p18 – Section 1.1 
1.1.2 Brief background to off-grid electrification in South Africa 
By the early 1990s a significant number of domestic photo-voltaic (PV) systems (in the 
region of 40 000 to 60 000 systems according to the ERC [2004:p2]) had already been 
installed in rural South Africa on a commercial basis. The subsequent extension of the 
grid to rural areas through the electrification programme substantially undermined this 
market. 
In addition a few subsidized off-grid electrification pilot projects occurred in the 1990s, 
including farmworker household electrification in the Free-State province4 and a number 
of village electrification projects, for example Folovhodwe, Maphephethe and KwaBhaza. 
Many problems were experienced in these projects, for example at Folovhodwe, where 
lack of maintenance and other factors resulted in only 13 SHSs out of the original 582 
still being in good working condition after six years of operation (Table 1-1). 
Table 1-1: The decline in the functionality of the SHSs at Folovhodwe, reproduced from [Bikam and Mulaudzi 
2006] (from Appendix B) 
 
It was only from 1999 that the first programmes and pilot projects aimed at government 
subsidized, large-scale off-grid electrification were launched in South Africa, notably the 
Solar Home System (SHS) concession programme, and two hybrid mini-grid system 
demonstration projects. Figure 1-3 indicates the geographical locations of the off-grid 
electrification projects that will be discussed in this research. 
                                               
4
 Local authorities in the Free-State region subsidised the installation of 1700 farmworker 











Figure 1-3: The geographical locations of the
well as the SHS concession 
1.1.2.1 The SHS concession programme 
Towards the end of the 1990s the DME decided to allocate a number of remote rural 
concession areas to private off
installations.  
The first implementation of this concession policy involved a joint venture between 
Eskom and Shell International Renewables, announced in October 1998 and launched in 
March 1999, to install SHSs in the Flagstaff region of the 
joint venture undertook to electrify some 50 000 rural households using SHSs over the 
following 5 years [DME 2001:p94].
The DME invited submissions in January 1999 for additional off
based on which six add
contracts between the consortia
and Eskom were however only signed in May 2002, after extended institutional delays in 
finalising the programme structure, the roles of different stakeholders, contract terms and 
subsidy structures.  
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This allowed the first phase installation of SHSs to commence in concession areas5. Two 
of the six selected consortia did not start operations, while the remaining four companies 
were expected to connect 50 000 customers per concession area over an initial period of 
5 years [Banks 2007]. 
In February 2004 subsidy funds were stopped at short notice, halting new SHS 
installations. Negotiations between stakeholders led to a new agreement that was signed 
in October 2004 for phase two of the concession program. This new contract ended in 
April 2006 without a new one in place, again halting new SHS installations. In November 
2007, after several meetings, the consortia were informed by the DME that the contract 
will not be renewed “at this time” [Banks 2008]. From May 2006 up to the time of writing 
(February 2010) no further subsidy funding has been received by the consortia from 
national Government. The KfW (KES) concession in the Eastern Cape is the exception: 
the German development bank KfW is funding the installation of SHSs in this concession 
area via the DME, with installations commencing in January 2009 and numbering around 
3000 by February 2010 [Boussard 2010].      
The total number of SHSs installed by the consortia between March 1999 and October 
2007 are reported in Table 1-2. From this table it is evident that in total not even 40 000 
SHSs have been installed by October 2007 [Banks 2008], significantly less than the 
target of 50 000 SHSs per consortium originally aimed for.   
Table 1-2: Consortia, concession areas and total number of installations by June 2004 and October 2007 
Consortia Concession Area 
Total installations by 
June 2004 [Create 
Acceptance 2007] 
Total installations by 
October 2007 [Banks 
2008] 
Nuon-Raps (NuRa) Northern KwaZulu-Natal 6541 10393 
Solar Vision Northern Limpopo 4758 9200 
EDF-Total (KES) Interior KwaZulu-Natal 3300 9000 
Renewable Energy Africa Central Eastern Cape 0 - 
Shell-Eskom (Replaced by the 
3 companies below in 05/06) 
Northern Eastern Cape and 
Southern KwaZulu-Natal 
5800 5800 
Summer Sun  - 1600 
Shine the way  - 1600 
Elita Co-op  - 1700 
Total  20399 39293 
                                               
5
 The NuRa consortium started installing SHSs in December 2001, supported by a Programme for 
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A number of studies have been done on the social, economic and environmental impacts 
that SHSs have made on the South African households where they have been installed. 
Although a number of positive impacts have been reported, problems exist: 
 “It is still doubtful if very poor rural people can afford even this highly subsidised 
service of PV just for lighting and media use.” [Create Acceptance 2007: p6] 
“Social changes brought by innovations such as solar power are small and 
imperceptible and probably only cumulative in the presence of other catalysts.” 
[ERC 2004:p vii] 
1.1.2.2 The hybrid mini-grid system demonstration projects 
The South African Minister for Minerals and Energy mandated the NER to investigate 
and propose to government an appropriate regulatory framework for off-grid 
electrification. This mandate included that the NER, along with the Independent 
Development Trust (IDT), facilitate the piloting of hybrid mini-grid systems in South 
Africa, with the view to inform a national rollout of these systems. 
The Hluleka Nature Reserve and the adjacent community of Lucingweni, in the Eastern 
Cape Province near Coffee Bay, were chosen as sites to install such pilot hybrid mini-
grid energy systems. Implementation of the projects was completed respectively in 2002 
and 20046. 
By May 2007 the two mini-grid installations were in a serious state of disrepair, as shown 
in Figure 1-4 for Lucingweni. By this time Hluleka had been using diesel generation 
(which the hybrid system originally replaced due to its cost and environmental impact) for 
more than a year, while the Lucingweni community was once again reliant on traditional 
sources of energy, like biomass and paraffin (for more information, please refer to the 
detailed off-grid project evaluations in Appendix B). 
                                               
6
 At Hluleka an energy system was installed with two 2.5kW Proven wind generators and a Shell 
Solar PV array of 56 100W PV modules, with batteries for reserve energy. A diesel generator was 
retained on site as backup. The Lucingweni energy system consisted of 560 100W solar PV 
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Figure 1-4: The Lucingweni hybrid mini-grid system in May 2007. Around 40% of the total PV panels were 
either stolen or inoperable due to vandalism. 
1.1.3 The argument so far 
• Off-grid electrification technologies have the potential to play an important part in 
reaching South African electrification goals. 
From the published electrification statistics it is clear that South Africa’s national 
electrification program is losing momentum. This is despite the fact that almost a 
third of the country’s households are still without electricity within the context of a 
government policy goal of universal access to electricity.  
A significant reason for this loss of momentum appears to lie in the challenges of 
electrifying increasingly remote, low household density rural communities. Off-grid 
electrification technologies like SHSs and hybrid mini-grid systems are potentially 
well suited to overcome the challenge of electrifying these communities.  
• Up to the present South African programmes and pilot projects aimed at 
government-subsidised, large-scale off-grid electrification have not been performing: 
they have clearly failed from a connection target perspective, and have had limited 
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From a connection target perspective, the SHS programme, with a 5-year target of 
providing 50 000 households with SHSs in each of the targeted concession areas, 
has not even reached 40 000 households in total by the end of 2007, and is 
currently dormant.  
Regarding the benefits, the literature reports that the SHS programme has only been 
partly successful in extending the benefits of electricity to households. 
A visual inspection of the PV arrays at the hybrid mini-grid project at Lucingweni is 
enough to conclude that this project has failed. The same applies for Hluleka, where 
5 years after installation the nature reserve was again using diesel for electricity 
generation. 
1.2 Causes and potential solutions for this non-performance 
In the light of the above, two questions now require further analysis: 
• Why is off-grid electrification not performing?  
• What can be done to increase the likelihood of successful off-grid electrification? 
1.2.1 Causes of off-grid electrification project non-performance in literature  
A good place to start looking for answers to the first question is in published literature. 
The almost two decades of electrification experiences in South Africa has resulted in 
numerous research outputs, many of which touched on the problems that led to failure or 
lower-than-expected performance of projects in this field. 
A wide spectrum of problems is reported. A study of the Eskom-Shell Joint Venture SHS 
concession’s experiences for example identified the long-term integrity of systems from a 
technical maintenance perspective, the risk of non-payment and theft of system 
components as important issues [Afrane-Okese 2003:p40]. 
Addressing the identified problems, for example the problem of system theft, often leads 
to new problems: 
 “This technology sophistication (technical security protection against SHS 
component theft) in deep remote areas has led to many system failures which 
has aggravated the maintenance requirements beyond the capability of the 
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which has consequently resulted in increased non-payment.” [Afrane-Okese 
2003:p41] 
Inaccurate load data during the design stage, lack of operation maintenance and human 
inertia to change were identified as the problems with the mini-grid project at Hluleka: 
“It became immediately apparent after the system was installed that the 
accommodation figures provided by the nature reserve management had been 
incorrectly calculated” 
“Despite repeated training 7 The staff (is) reactive in their approach towards 
maintaining the system.” 
 “Guests are being allowed to enter the reserve with pump powered portable 
swimming pools, large freezers, fridges and various other appliances. Distribution 
boards are bypassed in order to have these appliances function on site.” [NER 
2003b:p4-5] 
Another problem identified in many projects appears to be that the expectations of the 
different stakeholders are not managed, and that the importance of stakeholder 
interaction is often not recognised: 
“I am angry at Eskom-Shell because instead of giving us the real thing (grid 
electrification), they have made us ‘playthings’. Eskom-Shell is just tempting us 
with this SHS thing and not giving us the full service of what proper electricity 
should be doing in terms of meeting our needs.” Customer comment reported in 
[Afrane-Okese 2003:p43] 
“The over eagerness of some of the government officials and manufacturers' 
representatives in getting the project established, lead to unrealistic presentations 
and promises.” [Sparknet 2003] 
“The service provider does not understand the needs and conditions of the 
customers and the customers do not understand the technology and the often 
complicated agreements that go with it.” [Create Acceptance 2007:p11] 
The lack of transparency and communication within electrification planning are also often 
blamed: 
“When the concession areas were awarded, the service providers thought that 
the basis for allocating the concessions was the fact that electrification was not to 
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the grid. 7 When clients are expecting grid electricity they are generally not 
willing to accept SHSs.” [Create Acceptance 2007:p10] 
Institutional delays and uncertainties appear to be a serious cause of project failure: 
It was therefore a relief that the government increased its pace in [releasing 
subsidies for the SHS concession programme]. If government and donor funding 
wait too long, the [Eskom-Shell joint venture] may incur a bad reputation for the 
technology and it may be too difficult to repair the image damage.” [Afrane-Okese 
2003:p47]  
“The withdrawal of the capital subsidy [SHS subsidy withdrawn in February 2004 
and again in April 2006] is a major issue threatening the viability of the business 
plan and questions government’s commitment to this RE model 7 Some 
impoverished rural municipalities 7 were not able to pay the service subsidy and 
some paid it irregularly, leaving customers stranded. 7 This uncertainty of 
service subsidy also affects the business plan of the service provider.” [Create 
Acceptance 2007:p10] 
A range of other problems, like the often-unsustainable short-term target driven nature of 
especially donor-driven electrification [WEC 1999:p103], additionally contributes to off-
grid electrification non-performance. 
1.2.2 The nature of the causes of non-performance 
1.2.2.1 Multi-dimensional and interlinked in nature 
The preliminary literature survey clearly indicates the multi-dimensional and interlinked 
nature of the causes of off-grid electrification non-performance. Magilindane [2003] 
reached the same conclusion: 
“7a plethora of individual and mutually inclusive factors constrain the widespread 
use of SHS.” [Magilindane 2003] 
Therefore, an analysis that aims to find solutions to the non-performance of off-grid 
electrification, and resulting approaches and tools, need to take this multi-dimensional 
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1.2.2.2 In essence unacknowledged uncertainties 
It is apparent from the preliminary survey that most of the causes identified are, in 
essence, project uncertainties that were not acknowledged during the planning stages of 
the project. If these uncertainties were acknowledged, they could then be managed or 
addressed in such a way that they did not lead to non-performance.  
This last statement is in agreement with the definition of good decision making, as 
offered in literature. According to Belton and Steward [2002], a good decision should be 
“well considered, justifiable and explainable”. The word “well considered” entails 
comprehensively taking the different uncertainties into account. 
The management of uncertainties can be done most easily when these uncertainties can 
be controlled directly. For example, the uncertainty or risk of non-payment can be 
addressed by installing prepayment meters, and the risk of technological reliability by 
implementing adequate maintenance structures and more robust designs. 
Even in cases where uncertainties are further removed from the control of the 
programme / project, they can still be managed: for example the risks of human inertia to 
change and of unrealistic customer expectations can be managed by better stakeholder 
interaction and information sharing. 
It might be impossible to address uncertainties that fall completely outside the control of 
the programme / project, for example institutional risks like unstable subsidy provision. 
However, even in these cases making the uncertainty explicit during the project planning 
stages will lead to better-informed decisions. 
1.2.2.3 Mainly uncertainties of a non-techno-economic nature 
What also became apparent from the preliminary survey is that the majority of 
uncertainties identified are social or institutional in nature, compared to a minority of 
technological and economic uncertainties. 
1.2.2.4 Project objectives were not necessarily aimed at sustainable development 
The primary project objectives in both the SHS concession programme and the mini-grid 
demonstration projects appeared not to directly include sustainable development 
objectives. So, for example, it appeared that the main objective of the concession 
programme was to reach connection targets, and for the mini-grid projects to 
demonstrate the practicality of a mini-grid solution. The underlying assumption in both 
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communities targeted; however, it appears that not formally focussing on sustainable 
development objectives in projects might undermine their success.   
1.2.2.5 Formal decision aiding approaches and tools were not used 
The preliminary survey found only very limited evidence of the use of formal decision 
aiding approaches and tools, which would have supported and structured the decision 
making (planning) process, potentially avoiding many problem causes like 
unacknowledged uncertainties and misdirected objectives.  
1.2.3 Increasing the likelihood of successful off-grid electrification projects 
1.2.3.1 Classification of off-grid project uncertainties as hard or soft 
According to Young [2001], uncertainty can only be practically dealt with in the decision 
making process by recognizing the variations in the nature of the different elements of 
uncertainty.  
Building on work by other authors, Young defines two types of uncertainty, hard and soft. 
With hard uncertainty the set of all possible outcomes of an action is unknown and can 
only be hypothesized, or if all the outcomes are known, the probability distributions of all 
the outcomes are unknown or not fully definable.  
Soft uncertainty is used to define situations where all the possible outcomes of an action, 
as well as the outcomes’ probability distributions, are known. 
The correlation between hard uncertainties and off-grid non-performance 
Most of the social and institutional uncertainties identified in the preceding literature 
overview, like human behavioural inertia to change or government subsidy stability, can 
be categorised as hard uncertainty according to this classification. 
On the other hand, technological and economic uncertainties are mostly soft 
uncertainties, for example load characteristics, technical failure rate, and project cost and 
timing.  
A correlation between unacknowledged hard uncertainties and off-grid electrification 
project non-performance appears to exist, because 
• the main causes of off-grid non-performance appear to be unacknowledged 
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• non-techno-economic uncertainty is typically defined as hard. 
1.2.3.2 Improve the alignment between project objectives and sustainable development 
objectives 
Addressing the problem of project objectives not being aligned to sustainable 
development objectives should also increase the likelihood of successful off-grid 
electrification projects in South Africa.  
1.2.3.3 Encouraging the use of adequate decision aiding approaches and tools 
Using adequate decision aiding approaches and tools (where by “adequate” is meant 
decision aiding that adequately supports all the aspects of a decision that leads to a 
successful project) will increase the likelihood of successful projects. Such “adequate” 
decision aiding will have to include the acknowledgement of uncertainties and alignment 
of objectives, along with other factors like recognising the multi-dimensional and 
interlinked nature of the causes of problems in projects. 
A preliminary literature survey could find no existing tools or approaches explicitly aimed 
at acknowledging off-grid electrification project uncertainties, or aimed at aligning project 
objectives with sustainable development objectives within the energisation context. A 
number of tools were identified that could potentially be adapted to this task, including 
the RETScreen and Homer renewable resource estimation tools (for soft uncertainty 
acknowledgement), Shackle’s model as implemented by Young [2001] (for hard 
uncertainty acknowledgement) and the Logical Framework approach (for objectives 
alignment).  
1.2.4 Concluding the argument 
In the light of the above analyses, it is reasonable to argue that,  
• assuming that the above-identified nature of the causes of non-performance within 
South African off-grid electrification projects reported in literature is accurate,  
a set of decision aiding approaches and tools with the following characteristics will be 
beneficial in increasing the likelihood of these projects contributing to sustainable 
development: 
• of sufficient quality to adequately support all the aspects of a decision that will result 
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o capable of making explicit the soft and hard uncertainties affecting the 
project,  
o capable of aligning project objectives with sustainable development 
objectives, and 
o capable of recognising the multi-dimensional and interlinked nature of off-
grid projects 
• applicable for use within the context of South African off-grid electrification projects.  
1.3 Hypothesis and research questions 
Following from the above argument, the hypothesis that this research sets out to test can 
now be defined in three parts: 
There is a strong correlation between failure of South African off-grid 
electrification projects to achieve sustainable development objectives, and 
unacknowledged7 uncertainties within the initial decision making / planning 
processes of these projects. 
A high quality decision making process that is capable of acknowledging both 
hard and soft uncertainties will assist off-grid projects in reaching their primary 
project objectives (but not necessarily sustainable development objectives, unless 
these two sets of objectives align). 
Applying existing high quality decision aiding tools and approaches, with 
improved uncertainty acknowledgment and objectives alignment capabilities, to 
off-grid projects will increase such projects’ impact on sustainable development. 
Several research questions arise from these hypotheses, and will be used to guide the 
research needed to test their validity. For the first part of the hypothesis the questions are 
as follows: 
                                               
7
 It is important to differentiate between acknowledging uncertainties (i.e. being aware of it) and 
addressing uncertainties (i.e. doing something about it). The hypothesis in this thesis focus on 
acknowledging uncertainties – what to do once these uncertainties have been acknowledged is 
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• What off-grid electrification objectives align with the principles of sustainable 
development? 
• What are the factors already identified in literature that inhibited South African off-
grid electrification projects from reaching sustainable development objectives?  
• What uncertainties underlie the set of objective-inhibiting factors identified earlier, or 
have been identified in literature specifically relevant in the South African off-grid 
electrification context? 
• What impacts did the early acknowledgement / non-acknowledgement of these 
uncertainties have on South African off-grid electrification projects reaching their 
sustainable development objectives? 
The second part of the hypothesis will be tested using the following questions: 
• What are the advantages of differentiating between soft and hard uncertainties? 
• What are the characteristics of high quality decision making? 
• What are the criteria of a decision aiding process which supports high quality 
decision making, and do these criteria include hard and soft uncertainty 
acknowledgement? 
• Is high quality decision making sufficient to ensure that off-grid projects achieve 
sustainable development objectives, and if not, what are the additional 
requirements? 
The third part of the hypothesis will be tested using the following questions: 
• What decision aiding tools and approaches currently exist that will support high 
quality decision making to a large extent within the context of South African off-grid 
electrification projects? 
• How can the uncertainty acknowledgment and objectives alignment capabilities of 
these existing tools and approaches be improved? 
• Would these improved decision aiding tools and approaches, if applied originally, 
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1.4 Research methodology / Conceptual map 
The testing of the three parts of the hypothesis will be divided between four chapters, 
each answering two to four research questions, as shown in Figure 1-5. Each chapter will 
be introduced with a more detailed conceptual map of how the research questions will be 
answered. This map will also explain how the appendixes link to the main text. 
 
Figure 1-5: A conceptual map of the different parts of the research hypothesis, the research questions 
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2 Off-grid electrification that aligns with sustainable 
development 
Off-grid electrification projects do not necessarily result in sustainable development. A 
lack of adequate planning, badly executed project implementation, political or business 
objectives etc. can all detract from the developmental impact of such projects. In order to 
evaluate the contribution of off-grid projects to sustainable development, some form of 
standard is required against which such projects can be compared. 
This chapter develops such a standard, in the form of an energisation framework, against 
which completed South African off-grid electrification projects are then evaluated for their 
sustainable development impact, as shown in the conceptual map in Figure 2-1.  
In this chapter the first two research questions leading towards testing part one of the 
research hypothesis are answered. 
 
Figure 2-1: Conceptual map showing how the different sections of Chapter 2 and the appendixes relate to 
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2.1 Sustainable development 
2.1.1 What is sustainable development? 
A well-known definition of sustainable development, originally proposed by the UN World 
Commission on Environment and Development’s Brundtland report [Brundtland 1987], is 
“development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs.” 
One of the primary aims of the Brundtland report was to propose measures “to deal 
successfully with the problems of protecting and enhancing the environment” [Brundtland 
1987:pix]. However, the outcomes of sustainable development are not restricted only to 
the environmental dimension, but also include the social and economical dimensions, 
supported by institutional structures as illustrated by the following quote: 
 “Sustainable development is essentially about improving quality of life in a way 
that can be sustained, economically and environmentally, over the long term 
supported by the institutional structure of the country.” [IAEA 2005:p16] 
2.1.2 Why use sustainable development as measurement standard? 
Sustainable development acts as a general guiding principle within South African policy, 
as indicated by the fact that the adjective “sustainable” is used thirty times in the Energy 
Policy White Paper [DME 1998], and by the following selection of quotes from the South 
African constitution: 
“7 secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development.” [SA Gov 
1996:section 24] 
“7 provide municipal services in an equitable and sustainable manner.” [SA Gov 
1996:section 155] 
“7 in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth 7” [SA Gov 
1996:section 224] 
As South African off-grid energisation actions typically occur within the context of 
government policy, it is clear that sustainable development is a valid foundation on which 
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2.1.3 What existing sustainable development frameworks are applicable? 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with a number of other 
institutions, developed a set of energy indicators against which the sustainable 
development impact of activities can be measured, presented in [IAEA 2005].  
Although the IAEA’s energy themes and their related indicators, summarised in Table 
2-1, are aimed at energy-related activities on a national level, they will serve as a starting 
block from which a sustainable development framework for off-grid electrification will be 
adapted: 
“No set of energy indicators can be final and definitive. To be useful, indicators 
must evolve over time to fit country-specific conditions, priorities and capabilities.” 
[IAEA 2005:pv] 
Table 2-1: Sustainable development indicators for energy-related activities on a national level, divided into 
dimensions, themes and sub-themes, as proposed by the IAEA [2005] 
Social dimension 





Share of households (or population) without electricity or 
commercial energy, or heavily dependent on non-commercial 
energy. 
Affordability Share of household income spent on fuel and electricity. 
Disparities 
 
Household energy use for each income group and corresponding 
fuel mix. 
Health Safety Accident fatalities per energy produced by fuel chain. 
Economic dimension 




Overall Use Energy use per capita 
Overall 
productivity 
Energy use per unit of GDP 





Industrial energy intensities 
Agricultural energy intensities 
Service/commercial energy intensities 
Household energy intensities 
Transport energy intensities 
Diversification 
(fuel mix) 
Fuel shares in energy and electricity 
Non-carbon energy share in energy and electricity 
Renewable energy share in energy and electricity 
Prices End-use energy process by fuel and by sector 
Security 
Imports Net energy import dependency 
Strategic Fuel 
stocks 
Stocks of critical fuels per corresponding fuel consumption 
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Environmental dimension 
Theme Sub-theme Energy Indicator 
Atmosphere 
Climate Change 
GHG emissions from energy production and use per capita 
and per unit of GDP 
Air quality 
Ambient concentrations of air pollutants in urban areas 
Air pollutant emissions from energy systems 
Water Water quality 
Contaminant discharges in liquid effluents from energy 
systems including oil discharges 
Land 
Soil Quality Soil area where acidification exceeds critical load 
Forest Rate of deforestation attributed to energy use 
Solid waste generation and 
management 
Ratio of solid waste generation to units of energy produced 
Ratio of solid waste properly disposed of to total generated 
solid waste 
Ratio of solid radioactive waste to units of energy produced 
Ratio of solid radioactive waste awaiting disposal to total 
generated solid radioactive waste 
Institutional dimension 
2.2 Towards a measurement framework 
2.2.1 The scope of the new framework 
The measurement standard that will be developed in this chapter will be defined within 
the context of energisation (i.e. making available energy by using any carrier, be it 
electricity, biomass, LPG etc.) rather than specifically electrification (i.e. making available 
energy by using electricity as carrier). 
By focussing on energisation, this research acknowledges electrification as part of the 
broader energisation context.  A number of sources in the literature support this 
perspective, for example in the Renewable Energy White Paper: 
“An electrification programme, particularly if it has a strong non-grid component, 
has to form part of a holistic approach to energy provision, if it is to succeed.” 
[DME 2003:p38] 
2.2.2 Objectives rather than sub-themes 
The sub-themes defined within the above-described IAEA framework will be replaced 
with project objectives. This aims to improve the clarity of the adapted framework, and 
increase the framework’s usefulness within the decision aiding tools developed later in 
this research.  
The decision to use objectives is informed by Keeney and Raiffa’s [1976] statements 
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[2001] conclusion regarding the importance of clear objectives for electrification project 
evaluation:  
“The identification and structuring of objectives essentially frames the decision 
being addressed.” [Keeney and Raiffa 1976] 
“The results of the majority of the socio-economic studies [on the impact of rural 
electrification] give rise to the conclusion that the objectives of rural electrification 
projects should be made very clear for both assessment and evaluation reasons.” 
[Zomers 2001:p47] 
2.2.3 Different types of objectives 
At this point it is useful to note that this research differentiates between primary, 
supportive and ultimate objectives.  
Primary objectives are potentially directly impacted by the action of energisation, for 
example the objective of decreased indoor air pollution which is directly impacted by the 
change from biomass to electricity or gas as cooking energy source.  
Supportive objectives are defined as project objectives that need to be met to a lesser 
or greater extent in order for energisation to reach its primary objectives, for example 
access to markets to support the primary objective of small and medium enterprises 
(SMME) development.  
Ultimate objectives are defined as wider objectives that are supported by energisation 
primary objectives, often along with non-energisation objectives, for example the ultimate 
objective of decreasing rural to urban migration that is supported by a variety of 
energisation primary objectives along with non-energisation objectives.   
2.2.4 Ensuring a coherent measurement framework 
An important question related to the proposed measurement framework, and a question 
that will surface again later in this research, is how to ensure that the framework of 
objectives / criteria8 being identified is comprehensive or exhaustive, yet useful.  
                                               
8
 A criterion is ”some sort of standard by which one particular choice or course of action could be 
judged to be more desirable than another.” [Belton and Steward 2002:p1] In the context of this 
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Belton and Steward [2002:p55-58] offers an answer to this question, through their 
guidelines on building what they call a “coherent family” of criteria or objectives. Eight 
guidelines are proposed: 
• Value relevance - “Are the decision-makers able to link the concept to their goals, 
thereby enabling them to specify preferences which relate directly to the concept?” 
For example, a goal like health is too vague to allow direct valuation by decision-
makers, and might be specified more clearly as a decrease in disease caused by 
indoor air-pollution. 
• Understandability - “It is important that DMs have a shared understanding of 
concepts to be used in an analysis” 
• Measurability - “P decompose criteria to a level which allows this.” 
• Non-redundancy – “Is there more than one criterion measuring the same factor?” 
• Judgemental independence – “Criteria are not judgementally independent if 
preferences with respect to a single criterion, or trade-off between two criteria, 
depend on the level of another.” 
• Balancing completeness and conciseness 
• Operationality – The set of criteria should be “usable with reasonable effort – that 
the information required does not place excessive demands on the decision-
makers.” 
• Simplicity versus complexity – “7 the modeller should strive towards the simplest 
[set of criteria] which adequately captures the problem.” 
Related to ensuring coherent measurement frameworks, it is important to acknowledge 
the always-changing nature of reality, which also applies to the principles of sustainable 
development. So, for example, certain of the IAEA’s themes might become irrelevant with 
time (e.g. energy security in a future scenario where local energy sources are more than 
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The use of a formal measurement framework allows for this always-changing nature of 
reality: even though its robustness9 might be limited in the face of future changes, it is 
flexible and can easily be updated to the current context.  
2.2.5 Level of detail of proposed framework 
The use of energy indicators, rather than just objectives or sub-themes, makes possible 
detailed comparisons between intra-project pre- and post-implementation conditions, or 
inter-project outcomes. This chapter’s evaluation of South African off-grid electrification 
projects will however focus only on identifying factors that prevented energisation 
objectives from being met. For this reason a broad categorisation of objectives, which 
excludes indicators, will be adequate to serve as measurement standard. 
However, indicators and basic associated measurement scales will also be developed in 
this chapter as part of the proposed framework, as they will be useful in providing a more 
complete understanding of the objectives, required within the decision aiding processes 
developed later.  
2.2.6 Qualitative rather than quantitative indicators 
The IAEA’s quantitatively measured energy indicators will be replaced with qualitatively 
measured indicators wherever possible during development of the proposed framework. 
This decision is motivated by the following reasons:  
a. Aim of the framework within the research context: In the research contained in this 
research the proposed framework will only be used to compare intra-project pre- and 
post-implementation conditions. Because of this, basic qualitative measurement 
scales, for example less / no change / more, will be adequate. Quantitative 
measurement, although useful especially for inter-project comparison, will be of little 
value within this research context. 
b. Availability and relevance of data: Energy indicators on a national level can in 
general be measured quantitatively, as national energy statistics are available to 
some extent. In contrast, very little quantitative data are typically available for off-grid 
                                               
9
 “P a robust solution will perform well under a range of unknown futures, while a flexible solution 
could easily be adapted to changing future conditions at minimal loss of performance in relation to 
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energisation activities, especially during the early stages of an off-grid energisation 
programme as in South Africa.  
The data that are available will also mostly be from localised project evaluations, 
which are of limited use for inter-project comparisons due to the many local 
variables that influence the data.  
• Simplicity: As mentioned earlier, the application of the proposed framework will not 
be limited to the project evaluation contained in this chapter, but will also be useful 
within decision aiding processes discussed later. The more data the framework 
require before it can be used, the less likely it is to be used by actors in these 
processes. Vincke [1992] supports this perspective, by suggesting that qualitative 
variables should be preferred over quantitative ones, as decision-makers are often 
unable to provide answers to the latter. 
2.3 Development of an energisation framework 
A primary objectives framework for energisation10 will now be developed, based on the 
IAEA’s energy framework, adapted to the specific context of energisation, and shaped by 
the discussions in the previous section.   
2.3.1 Choice of dimensions 
The IAEA divides the objectives framework against which the energy indicators measure 
into four dimensions: social, economical, environmental and institutional, as shown in 
Table 2-1. Note also that the IAEA’s institutional dimension is not divided further into 
themes and sub-themes, due to the following motivations: 
“First, [the themes within the institutional dimension] tend to address issues that 
are, by nature, difficult to measure in quantitative terms. ... Second, the variables 
measured by institutional indicators tend to be structural or policy responses to 
sustainable development needs.”[IAEA 2005:p20] 
This research concludes that institutional objectives are not primary but rather supporting 
in nature, as the above statement suggests, and will therefore not include an institutional 
                                               
10
 For ease of use, this “primary objectives framework for energisation” will be abbreviated to 
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dimension in the energisation framework. This dimension will however be important when 
defining supportive objectives. This same argument applies to a technical dimension, as 
proposed in Ilskog [2008]: once again technical objectives are supporting rather than 
primary in nature. 
According to Zomers [2001:p46], rural electrification objectives can be classified within a 
political dimension in addition to the economic, social and environmental dimensions. 
Sebitosi and Pillay [2005:p2047] also identifies cases where the primary objectives of 
electrification are political: 
“P at community level infrastructure and services like electrification are often, 
erroneously, treated as commodities. In this regard electrification becomes an 
end rather than a means. In African politics it doubles as the proverbial ‘carrot 
and stick’: rewarding politically friendly communities and denied to communities 
that are perceived to be politically hostile.” [Sebitosi and Pillay 2005:p2047] 
Electrification solely for political objectives however rarely results in sustainable projects 
according to Zomers:  
“Projects created only for the sake of politicians to score points or for donors to 
locate suitable funding opportunities, are not likely to be sustainable.” [Zomers 
2001:p55] 
Yet political objectives do not always result in unsustainable outcomes: outcomes within 
the political dimension that do align with sustainable development include increased 
political stability and decreased discontent (as identified in Mason [1990]). A statement 
from a teacher at the KwaBhaza energisation project (discussed in Appendix B) 
illustrates this: 
“We like this [energisation] project; it shows that the government has not forgotten 
about us.” [Kloot 1999:p68] 
It can be argued that these outcomes are purely the result of objectives in the social, 
economic and environmental dimensions being met, in which case an additional political 
dimension will be redundant. Zomers [2001:p72] suggest that this is not the case, with 
the above outcomes potentially resulting solely from the fact that rural communities often 
see electrification as a “symbol of progress” or a “light in the darkness”, and associate 
electricity “’in itself’ with well-being.”  
Evaluation of South African off-grid electrification projects however shows that, while in 
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political stability, in the long term only tangible social, economic or environmental benefits 
will guarantee these outcomes. 
In the light of this a political dimension is seen as redundant within the energisation 
framework, and will not be included. Objectives such as increased political stability and 
decreased discontent can be seen as ultimate objectives, within which context a political 
dimension will be useful. 
In conclusion then, only three dimensions will be used for the energisation framework: 
social, economic and environmental. 
2.3.2 Choice of themes, objectives and indicators 
Themes, objectives and indicators were selected for inclusion in the proposed 
energisation framework based on the IAEA’s indicator framework, and a detailed 
literature study. In order not to break the continuity of the research’ argument, the details 
of the process that led to the selection is described in Appendix A; only the results of this 
process are shown in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: The energisation framework: primary sustainable development objectives and indicators within the 
context of energisation projects, developed as standard against which to compare project objectives, and 
intra-project pre- and post-implementation conditions 
Social dimension 




Adequacy of energy from modern sources for 
basic needs of a) indoor lighting, b) media, c) 
communication, d) cooking, e) space heating, 
f) water heating and g) refrigeration 
Not available 
Available but inadequate 
Available and adequate  
Affordability of 
energy 
a) Average customers’ ability to pay 
b) Poorest customers’ ability to pay 
Not able to pay 
Able to pay 
Addressing 
disparities 
Disparities in access to and affordability of 
modern energy sources between a) different 






The occurrence of a) paraffin poisoning, and b) 
fire-related injuries 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Indoor air 
quality 
The occurrence of indoor particulate emission-
related illnesses 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Security Adequacy of exterior lighting 
Not available 
Available but inadequate 




The amount of energy-related physical labour 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
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Economic dimension 





The use of a) radio, b) TV and c) Internet 
within the target area of the energisation 
project 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Increased time 
availability 
The amount of free time daily compared to 
before energisation 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
SMME 
development 
The number of SMMEs within the target area 
of the energisation project 
Less than before 
No change 




The average household income within the 
target area of the energisation project 
Less than before 
No change 
More than before 
Environmental dimension 




Green house gas contribution from energy 
sources 
Less than before 
No change 
More than before 
Water Water quality 
The impact of the use of modern energy 
sources on drinking and general water quality 
Worse than before 
No change 
Better than before 
Land Deforestation 
The impact of the use of modern energy 
sources on deforestation 
Worse than before 
No change 
Better than before 
2.4 Evaluation of projects against the energisation framework 
2.4.1 Off-grid electrification as a subset of energisation 
This research focuses on off-grid South African electrification projects, which as a rule 
utilise renewable energy-based electrification technologies (SHSs and mini-grids) that 
currently produce costly energy compared to grid-connection. This high cost of energy, 
along with the limited ability of the customer to pay for it, leads to restricted electrical 
energy allocations per customer, which typically does not allow for high-energy 
household requirements like cooking, space and water heating and refrigeration: 
“The SHS is good but it cannot cook, it cannot provide warmth, it cannot 7 It can 
only power lighting, radio and black and white TV but not all at the same time.” 
SHS customer comment recorded in [Afrane-Okese 2003:p46]  
These electrical energy restrictions, inherent to the renewable energy-based 
electrification technologies that are used, limit the potential of these technologies to meet 
the primary energisation objectives defined earlier. So, for example, the primary 
objectives of deforestation and air quality are directly related to the use of firewood, a fuel 
used mainly for thermal applications like cooking and heating. If the electrification 
solution does not impact thermal applications, it is clear that firewood use will continue, 
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In the light of this, an evaluation of existing off-grid electrification projects should focus on 
those primary energisation objectives that the off-grid technologies have the possibility of 
contributing to, rather than on the complete set of objectives. 
As previously stated, this restricted focus implies the realisation that an off-grid 
electrification program that does not form part of a wider energisation process can be 
severely limited in its sustainable development contribution.  
2.4.2 Criteria for inclusion of projects in evaluation 
The following criteria were used to select which South African off-grid electrification 
projects to include in this section’s evaluation: 
• The lessons learned from the project should be applicable to large-scale off-grid 
electrification. 
• The project must have included an implementation phase. This evaluation 
consequently excludes the E7-led mini-grid demonstration project and the KwaZulu-
Natal mini-grid study done by NuRa for the NER. The experiences and conclusions 
from both of these will be commented on in a later chapter. 
• The project must be documented comprehensively enough in existing literature to 
allow accurate identification of factors that prevented primary objectives from being 
met.  
• An attempt should be made to include projects that represented each of the four 
delivery models generally used in off-grid electrification projects, as categorised in 
[Nieuwenhout et al 2000:p15]: 
1. Cash sales by commercial dealers 
2. Donations, where users pay at most a small contribution to the total costs 
3. Credit-based schemes 
4. Energy service companies with fee-for-service systems. 
2.4.3 Evaluation of projects 
Based on the above criteria, the following six projects were selected: 
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• KwaBhaza energisation project 
• Folovhodwe project 
• The DME’s SHS concession program 
• Hluleka nature reserve hybrid mini-grid demonstration project 
• Lucingweni hybrid mini-grid demonstration project 
A detailed project evaluation was done for each of these projects, focussing specifically 
on: 
a. the factors which prevented the project from meeting energisation primary objectives 
as defined in the energisation framework, while acknowledging that off-grid 
electrification objectives by necessity form a subset of these energisation objectives, 
and  
b. the lessons that were learned from these projects, as reported in literature and 
through interviews.  
In order not to break the continuity of the research argument, only a brief background to 
each project will be provided here, along with a summary of the factors that prevented 
off-grid electrification objectives from being met. For the full project evaluation, please 
refer to Appendix B. 
2.4.3.1 Maphephethe pilot SHS project 
Maphephethe is a rural village in KwaZulu-Natal province, characterised by dispersed 
settlement patterns. The total number of homesteads in the village is estimated at around 
2200. Grid electrification was available only at the edges of the village at the time of the 
project.  
Maphephethe was identified as a suitable site for a pilot project which commenced in 
January 1996, aimed at developing and testing a replicable mode of practice for installing 
SHSs in South Africa. The Solar Electric Light Fund (SELF), a US-based NGO, initiated 
the project while Solar Engineering Services (SES) implemented it. 
The project was completed within two years, having installed 50 SHSs. A number of 
additional energisation projects were undertaken in this village, including projects 
focussed on solar cooking, the use of biogas digesters, and the establishment of a 
PV/biogas hybrid supply at the Myeka High School, which supported among other the 
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Figure 2-2: Factors identified in literature that prevented the Maphephethe pilot SHS project from meeting 
certain primary energisation objectives (reproduced from Appendix B). 
2.4.3.2 KwaBhaza energisation project 
Eskom identified six remote rural sites for energisation within a framework set out in the 
Energisation Pilot Project Proposal [Eskom 1997], with SHSs provided by Eskom and 
LPG gas provided by one of a number of South African LPG companies. Due to 
institutional and financial problems the energisation pilot project was finally only 
implemented fully at KwaBhaza in KwaZulu-Natal.  
A 50Wp SHS for light and media, and a two-plate LPG stove and two 4.5kg LPG 
cylinders were to be supplied to households as a subsidised energisation package. 
Installations started in July 1998, and a total of 120 systems have been installed in at 
KwaBhaza through this energisation project. It was anticipated that the project would 
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Figure 2-3: Factors identified in literature that prevented the KwaBhaza energisation project from meeting 
certain primary energisation objectives (reproduced from Appendix B). 
2.4.3.3 Folovhodwe project 
Folovhodwe is a village in the Limpopo province, which in 1996 contained around 670 
households, located around 10 km from the nearest grid. The community was originally 
approached in August 1995 for interest in participating in a SHS pilot project, but 
expectation of imminent grid electrification led to the abandonment of the proposed SHS 
pilot project. 
In 1997 the Bavarian government approached the DME with a proposal to establish a 
demonstration Solar Village using SHS technology. The Bavarian government was to 
fund most of the hardware, with the DME funding the balance. The Folovhodwe village 
was identified as a suitable site, as it was (after all) unlikely to receive grid electricity in 
the short- or medium-term. 
By February 1999 the previously electrified local clinic’s PV system was repaired and 
upgraded, and all 582 formally inhabited houses in the village supplied with 50Wp SHSs. 
No connection or service fees were received from individual households until November 
1999, when RAPS, on the request of the DME, tried to solve the problems related to 
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By the middle of 2004 only 13 SHSs out of the original 582 were still in good working 
condition, as shown in Chapter 1’s Table 1-1. 
 
Figure 2-4: Factors identified in literature that prevented the Folovhodwe project from meeting certain primary 
energisation objectives (reproduced from Appendix B). 
2.4.3.4 The DME’s SHS concession program 
Towards the end of the 1990s the DME decided to allocate a number of remote rural 
concession areas to private off-grid service provider companies for subsidised SHS 
installations. The first joint venture was launched in March 1999, with additional consortia 
identified in May 1999. Interim contracts between the consortia and NERSA and Eskom 
(operating under a mandate from the DME) were however only signed in May 2002, after 
extended institutional delays. Each consortium was expected to connect 50 000 
customers over the 5-year contract period. 
In February 2004 capital subsidy funds were stopped at short notice by the DME, halting 
new SHS installations. Negotiations between stakeholders led to a new contract signed 
in October 2004, but subsidies were again stopped in April 2006. By October 2007 less 
than 40 000 SHSs have been installed in total by all the consortia, against a target of 
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Figure 2-5: Factors that prevented the DME off-grid concession program from meeting certain primary 
energisation objectives (reproduced from Appendix B). 
2.4.3.5 Hluleka nature reserve hybrid mini-grid demonstration project 
The Hluleka Nature Reserve along the Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape, along with the 
adjacent community of Lucingweni, was identified as a suitable hybrid mini-grid 
demonstration site in a project managed by the NER and implemented by Shell Solar SA. 
When identified as a demonstration project location, the Hluleka reserve’s 12 guest 
cottages, offices and guest quarters were already fully reticulated, and connected to two 
75 kW diesel generators. The hybrid mini-grid energy system that replaced this system 
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The hybrid mini-grid was completed by December 2002 and operated, with a number of 
often lengthy interruptions due to technical problems, until the reserve closed for 
renovation in mid 2006, by which time the first PV panels have already been stolen. In 




Figure 2-6: The PV array at Hluleka, photographed in June 2003 (top left), July 2006 (top right) and May 
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Figure 2-7: Factors that prevented the Hluleka project from meeting certain primary energisation objectives 
(reproduced from Appendix B). 
2.4.3.6 Lucingweni hybrid mini-grid demonstration project 
The Lucingweni village in the Eastern Cape was identified as a suitable hybrid mini-grid 
demonstration site in a project managed by the NER and implemented by Shell Solar SA. 
The village, consisting of 220 dwellings, used mostly wood and paraffin as energy 
sources before the project was implemented. The new hybrid mini-grid system consisted 
of 56kW PV panels, six 6kW wind generators and a 2.2 MWh battery bank, and was 
designed to supply 70 street lights, a community centre, water pumping, 4 shop 
refrigerators, and a radio, TV, decoder, cell phone charger and 4 lights in each dwelling. 
No energy limiting devices were installed in the dwellings, other than a 2A current limiter. 
The Lucingweni mini-grid system was switched on towards the end of 2005, even though 
the project was not fully completed by that stage. The system operated for a few months, 
but was quickly overloaded. Theft started at a slow pace in early 2007, and soon 
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Figure 2-8: Factors that prevented the Lucingweni project from meeting certain primary energisation 
objectives (reproduced from Appendix B). 
2.4.4 Summary of objectives-inhibiting factors 
The evaluation done in Appendix B now enables the identification of those factors that 
prevented South African electrification projects from reaching their objectives. 
Categorising these factors into groups will aid later analysis, but identifying suitable 
categories are challenging due to the interlinked nature of the identified factors. Initially 
the five sustainability dimensions proposed by Ilskog [2008] were considered: technical, 
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These categories were however unsuitable for the identified factors: for example, the 
factor of grid encroachment has its cause in institutional structures, but its impact is 
economic (wasted expenditure when off-grid infrastructure is made redundant by the 
arrival of the grid) or social (customer discontent if the village down the road gets grid 
while the customer is paying for a SHS). Another example is the factor of lack of 
community / customer sense of ownership, which is social in cause, yet economic 
(customer doesn’t pay) or technical (system theft or vandalism) in impact. 
An electrification context-specific categorisation was found to better suit the identified 
factors, where the categories are delivery model, tariff policy, community, institutional 
and technical.  
Each of the identified factors will be commented on in detail in the following chapters. 
Table 2-3: Factors identified during the project evaluation in Appendix B that inhibited South African off-grid 
projects from reaching certain primary energisation objectives. 
Delivery model 
• Lack of disposal strategy  
• Inflexible system options 
• Challenging rural logistics 
• High renewable energy costs 
• Electrification not part of broader service provision 
• Lack of sustainable maintenance 
Tariff policy 
• Efficient energy use not incentivised 
• Inconsistent subsidies 
• Subsidy implementation inequality 
• Inflexible tariff schemes 
Community 
• Limited understanding of technology  
• Unrealistic customer expectations 
• Customer inertia to change 
• Lack of community / customer sense of ownership 
Institutional 
• Lack of political will and focus  
• Lack of institutional home / project champion 
• Grid planning unpredictability 
Technical 
• Poor quality load data 
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2.5 In summary 
This chapter set out to answer two of the four research questions that will ultimately test 
the first part of the research hypothesis. The following answers were found to these 
research questions: 
What off-grid electrification objectives align with the principles of sustainable 
development? 
The primary objectives of energisation that leads to sustainable development were 
identified through the development of the energisation framework, shown in Table 
2-2. It was shown that off-grid electrification objectives form a subset of these 
energisation objectives, restricted by the energy limits that off-grid technologies 
impose due to their high cost.     
What are the factors already identified in literature that inhibited South African off-
grid electrification projects from reaching sustainable development objectives? 
A literature study along with the evaluation of completed South African off-grid 
projects against primary energisation objectives, presented in Appendix B, led to the 
identification of a list of objective-inhibiting factors, shown in Table 2-3. 
This chapter provides evidence of the relevance of this research, which rests on the 
assumption that South African off-grid projects up to date have not contributed 
significantly towards sustainable development: of the six completed projects that were 
evaluated, three projects are no longer operational (Folovhodwe, Hluleka and 
Lucingweni), one failed to meet its targets by a large margin and have now been stopped 
until further notice (the SHS concession programme), while the contributions to 
sustainable development of the remaining two projects were limited by the low uptake 
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3 Objectives non-achievement due to unacknowledged 
uncertainties 
A list of factors have now been identified that inhibited sustainable development 
objectives from being met in off-grid projects.  
This chapter will investigate whether a significant number of these factors have as 
underlying causes uncertainties that were not acknowledged during the decision making 
process, and could therefore not be addressed.  
This correlation (or lack thereof) between the identified objective-inhibiting factors and 
unacknowledged uncertainties will be sufficient to test the first part of the research 
hypothesis: 
There is a strong correlation between failure of South African off-grid electrification 
projects to achieve sustainable development objectives, and unacknowledged 
uncertainties within the initial decision making / planning processes of these projects.  
Two research questions will be used to structure this chapter, as shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1: Conceptual map showing how the different sections of Chapter 3 and the appendixes relate to 
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3.1 From objective-inhibiting factors to project uncertainties 
3.1.1 The scope of uncertainty 
Before project uncertainties are identified, it will be valuable to define clearly what falls 
within and outside the concept of uncertainty. Loosemore et al. [2006:p8-9] identified four 
useful criteria to distinguish between what is an uncertainty (or risk), and what is not: 
1. Uncertainties imply unpredictable outcomes: “[It is] the absence of information about 
future events which makes them unpredictable. A certain future event which is 
predictable is not a risk but is a problem which needs resolving.”  
2. Uncertainties relate to events, not impacts or consequences. This criterion highlights 
the danger of focusing on the consequences of risk events rather than on the risk 
events themselves. 
3. Uncertainties relate to the future: “7past events are not examples of risks, but are 
actual problems or crises that need to be resolved. Risk management is therefore a 
proactive process of looking forward and is fundamentally different from crisis 
management, which is reactive and backward looking.” 
4. Uncertainties are closely linked to project objectives. If a potential future event has no 
way of affecting the objectives of a project negatively, the future event is not an 
uncertainty within the context of the specific project. 
3.1.2 Using objective-inhibiting factors to identify uncertainties 
The factors identified in Table 2-3 offer a good foundation from which to derive project 
uncertainties, but these factors themselves cannot necessarily be defined as 
uncertainties. Some will fail the first criterion proposed by Loosemore et al. to distinguish 
between what is an uncertainty and what not, namely the requirement for unpredictable 
outcomes. Examples of this are the factors of high renewable energy cost, challenging 
rural logistics and lack of disposal strategy, which are not uncertainties, but rather facts 
and problems that need to be resolved. 
Many of the factors identified will also fail the second criterion defined by Loosemore at 
al., which states that uncertainties relate to events, not impacts or consequences. The 
objective-inhibiting factors were summarised from literature, and are often written as 
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Although the identified objective-inhibiting factors can assist in the identification of project 
uncertainties, it is clear that some further analysis is required. A review of literature for 
already defined uncertainties will inform this analysis. 
3.1.3 South African off-grid project uncertainties identified in literature 
3.1.3.1 KwaZulu-Natal mini-grid feasibility study 
Banks and Aitken [2004:p99-101] identified a set of risk areas related to the 
establishment of a mini-grid household electrification project in KwaZulu-Natal, which can 
be useful in informing the development of a set of uncertainties linked to the identified 
objective-inhibiting factors.  
The uncertainties that Banks and Aitken identified included the following: 
• Policy change. The impact of this event specifically involved long-term 
maintenance, for example if the concession programme was not able to continue. 
• Demand for power lower than expected, with the impact being low revenues. 
• Demand for power higher than expected / higher than system capacity, which will 
result in overload trips, excessive diesel consumption and rapid aging of 
batteries. 
• Ability or willingness to pay incorrectly assessed / changed, which will result in 
low penetration rate, low consumption, payment defaults, weakened operators 
financial position, and reduced benefit dissemination.  
• Lower than expected revenues, caused largely by non-technical losses. 
• Poor acceptance of technology, both at a utility / decision maker level (causing 
confusing public messages) and a community level (leading to low uptake and 
resistance to the service packages offered). 
• Grid encroachment, resulting in lost customers and revenue and stranded assets. 
• Technical failure of components in the field. 
• Lightning damage 
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• Risks associated with a project with several partners, for example time required to 
identify partners, agree on responsibilities and draft contracts, and different 
motivations. 
• HIV/AIDS, which can affect customers and repayment rates, and staff turnover 
and absenteeism. 
• Standard business risks, for example exchange and interest rate risks and labour 
unrest.  
3.1.3.2 The e7’s renewable mini-grid assessment 
Another study of interest is the e7 renewable mini-grid assessment [E7 2003]. This study 
was initiated in 2003 by ScottishPower plc, a member of e7 (electricity companies that 
operate on the national territories of the G7 countries), and investigated the suitability of 
off-grid hybrid mini-grid systems in South Africa in order to inform future roll-outs.  
The study identified two villages in the Eastern Cape as suitable sites for mini-grid 
systems, and a pre-feasibility study was undertaken, which recommended a feasibility 
study. This study was however not undertaken due to a change in electrification plans for 
the identified sites, even though one of the original site-selection criteria was a definite 5-
year period of off-grid connection, confirmed through a memorandum of understanding 
signed with Eskom (but not with the DME) [E7 2003:p27], and meetings with the local 
role-players. Subsequent to the initial site selection, “site selection was carried out in 
several other areas of the Eastern Cape. These were also not taken to a further level of 
development due to similar uncertainty over future grid electrification.” [E7 2003:p34] 
The uncertainty regarding policy is also highlighted in the e7 report: 
“Government support for non-grid rural energy projects was in transition during 
the timeframe of this work, therefore it was not possible for a new mini-grid 
initiative to be clearly aligned with national policy and support mechanisms.” [E7 
2003:p33] 
3.1.3.3 The DME’s Hluleka and Lucingweni evaluation report 
A number of risks that should have been identified earlier in the Hluleka and Lucingweni 
projects are listed in the draft DME evaluation report on these projects [DME 2007b:p39], 
divided into market and technical risks. The market risks identified include community 
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system 7 not thought out at the inception of the project” and “payment and revenue 
collection 7 not put in place at the inception of the project.”  
The most relevant technical risks from those identified include that “maintenance and 
operation of the system was not put in place, no budget allocated and no local personnel 
trained to operate and maintain the system” and that “the use of wind speed data of Port 
Elizabeth was very risky.” Note that maintenance, operation and training is grouped in 
this research as delivery model rather than technical factors (refer to Table 2-3).  
The report concludes: 
 “A thorough risk analysis should have been undertaken before committing funds 
to the project [and] a thorough feasibility study should have been undertaken to 
determine the load and assess available renewable resources. The use of 
RETScreen alone to size the system was risky [as] the software is intended for 
rough sizing in the pre-feasibility phase.” [DME 2007b:p39] 
Section 5.3.1 explores in detail the question of how “risky” the use of estimation software 
like RETScreen is. 
3.1.4 Developing a set of project uncertainties 
The KwaZulu-Natal and e7 mini-grid studies, and the DME’s evaluation report, are similar 
in their ultimate primary objectives to the evaluated projects from which the objectives-
inhibiting factors have been identified. The uncertainties identified in the studies should 
therefore also apply to the evaluated projects, based on the fourth criterion of Loosemore 
et al. which notes that uncertainties are closely linked to project objectives. 
Uncertainty events can now be identified, based on Loosemore et al.’s criteria of what 
uncertainties are and the areas of risk identified in literature, and informed by the 
identified objectives-inhibiting factors. The identified list of uncertainties does not 
presume to be fully representative, but should rather be seen as a demonstration set of 
uncertainties, specifically based on the evaluated South African projects. In essence, 
given a different project context but the same methodology, the identified list might 
appear very different. 
• Grid encroachment. The impact of uncertainty regarding the imminent arrival of the 
grid has caused a variety of problems in the evaluated projects, for example 
Maphephethe and KwaBhaza, which led to primary objectives not being met. The 
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“Planning risks seem to be a generic problem for mini-grids in South Africa, as 
the strong grid and extensive household and institutional electrification 
programme mean that mini-grid sites remain vulnerable to grid extension, even 
after discussions with planners and the utility have clarified that sites are ‘off-
grid’.” Banks and Aitken [2004:p130] 
The experiences of the e7 project highlight the importance of this uncertainty. 
• Implementation agency non-committal. A study of existing literature reveals that a 
lack of commitment from the implementation agency has caused many problems in 
the evaluated projects. Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] links “a lack of institutional 
ownership” to unsustainable maintenance processes at Lucingweni, and then goes 
further by linking the ultimate failure of that project to a weak institutional framework. 
According to these authors, the weak framework was caused mainly by lukewarm 
support from the DME and a lack of an “institutional home” and project champion for 
off-grid electrification. 
Banks [2007] identifies the “slow and ongoing” RED restructuring process as a cause 
of institutional uncertainty for all contracting parties and as a diversion of focus for 
key decision makers in the SHS concession programme. Gaunt [2008] confirms this, 
when he discusses the “serious negative consequences” of indecision and 
uncertainty in his analysis of the restructuring within the South African electricity 
distribution industry. 
Lack of implementation agency commitment also resulted in significant process 
delays, for example where the six consortia identified by the DME in May 1999 only 
received interim contracts in May 2002. This impacted service delivery and the 
financial sustainability of the consortia: Afrane-Okese [2003] partly blames the slow 
release of subsidies for the financial problems which led to the ultimate liquidation of 
the Eskom-Shell joint venture.  
Many of the above problems appear to be rooted in the appropriateness of the DME 
as an off-grid electrification implementation agency, given that the DME’s focus is 
towards policy rather than implementation, which might sit more comfortably with the 
DPLG or the DPE. For now, these problems can be grouped under the uncertainty 
introduced by implementation agency non-committal towards off-grid electrification 
projects and the technology used. 
This uncertainty includes the risk of ‘policy change’ identified by Banks and Aitken 
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withdrawn from the selected concessionaire – an uncertainty that might significantly 
impact the concessionaires’ businesses and the service delivery to their customers.  
• Customers do not accept technology. The project evaluation highlights the 
importance of electrification technology acceptance by customers and communities. 
Factors that negatively influence this acceptance, according to the evaluation, include 
grid encroachment, high renewable energy costs, inflexible system options, subsidy 
implementation inequality, inflexible tariff schemes, unrealistic customer expectations, 
customer inertia to change and a limited understanding of the technology by the 
customers and community. The evaluation also showed that electrification as part of 
broader service provision aids technology acceptance.  
• Customers unable to pay. The financial sustainability of the project (and the utilities 
implementing it in the case of the concession programme) is to a large extent 
dependant on the customers’ ability (and willingness, as highlighted by the next 
uncertainty) to pay for the service. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS, along with inflexible 
tariff schemes, impacts this uncertainty. 
• Customers unwilling to pay. This uncertainty is closely linked to the customers or 
community’s acceptance of the technology, and is therefore negatively impacted by 
much the same factors as the technology acceptance uncertainty. 
• Low uptake among customers. The uncertainty regarding how many customers will 
adopt the off-grid electrification technology has been shown in the evaluation to be 
influenced by grid encroachment, high renewable energy cost, whether the project is 
part of a broader service provision strategy, inflexible system options, customer 
inertia to change and a limited understanding of the technology. 
• Theft and vandalism. The project’s system ownership model impacts strongly on the 
future occurrence of theft and vandalism. This is clear when the experiences at 
KwaBhaza (strong customer ownership and no theft) is compared to those at 
Lucingweni or Folovhodwe (little ownership and significant theft). The link between 
ownership and theft is widely acknowledged in literature, as shown in the quote 
below, which also highlights some of the other factors influencing this uncertainty: 
“7the major causes of theft and vandalism are the following: 
• Lack of ownership of system by the community 
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• Lack of involvement of the community in the planning and 
implementation of the projects 
• Non-functioning of the system due to either poor installation or lack of 
maintenance 
• Lack of awareness on the use of the system 
• Poor management by those responsible.” [DME 2007b:p30] 
Subsidy implementation inequality (which might manifest as jealousy against 
neighbouring communities) and unrealistic (or realistic, but disappointed) customer 
expectations appears to also play a role in the occurrence of vandalism. 
• Incorrect estimation of system consumption. The potential inability of the system to 
provide adequate energy or power to customers is a significant risk when renewable 
technologies are used, due to the sizing restrictions imposed by the high cost of 
renewable energy. Factors which impact this uncertainty include whether 
electrification forms part of a broader service provision strategy and whether efficient 
energy use is incentivised, which will reduce consumption. Limited understanding of 
the technology by the customer and poor quality load data also plays a role. 
• Inadequate maintenance. The experiences at Hluleka and Lucingweni highlight the 
importance of planning and implementing ongoing maintenance during the initial 
phases of projects, while Folovhodwe again highlights the impact that non-payment 
can have on maintenance structures. The challenges associated with rural logistics 
significantly impact this uncertainty, as do the availability of parts and pre-rollout 
testing and complexity of the systems, as illustrated in some of the other projects 
evaluated.  
This uncertainty includes what Banks [2007:p122] defined as the risks of a ‘project 
based’ approach, i.e. “a high risk of medium/long term failure as project resources fall 
away after the initial installation phase”, as maintenance is an important long-term 
component of the project. 
• Subsidy decrease, discontinuation or inequality. As illustrated by the SHS concession 
programme, subsidy instability impacts not only the amount of systems rolled out, but 
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• Technical design/configuration errors and component failure. Failure of the off-grid 
electrification systems due to factors like component reliability, lightning damage and 
system design and configuration mistakes prevent all the primary objectives from 
being met. The evaluation of Hluleka and Lucingweni highlights the impact of such 
system design and configuration mistakes.  
• Inaccurate estimation of renewable resource availability. As all the systems 
considered for off-grid systems, with the exception of diesel, are dependant on 
renewable energy sources like the wind and sun, the accuracy with which the local 
availability of these sources are predicted can significantly impact project success. 
• Exchange and interest rate changes. Although Banks and Aitken [2004] group this 
uncertainty under  ‘standard business risks’, the impact of exchange and interest rate 
changes can be severe due to the already high cost of renewable technologies, and 
the fact that a large percentage of the system cost is made up of imported 
components, for example the PV panels. This uncertainty is therefore presented as 
separate from ‘standard business risks’.   
The identified uncertainties are summarised in Table 3-1at the end of section 3.3. 
3.2 The decision making process 
The research hypothesis refers to the concept of the decision making process, which has 
not yet been defined within the context of this research. Therefore, before this chapter 
concludes by testing the first part of the hypothesis, a brief description of this concept is 
required.  
3.2.1 The decision making process and the final decision 
Decision making theory is the subject of research within a wide range of fields, from the 
management sciences to robotics. As a consequence perspectives on the decision 
making process and its relationship to the final decision also vary widely, informed by the 
specific decision making context. 
The perspective of the decision making process held by authors like Roy [1996] and 
Belton and Steward [2002] appear to be well suited to the context of decision making 
within electrification projects, which typically involve multiple actors and objectives.    
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the playing out of “confrontations and interactions” between different actors, 
under a variety of “compensating and amplifying effects present within the 
framework of their operating environment”. [Roy 1996:p4] 
According to Roy these different actors can hold diverse value systems11 and 
informational systems12, and might not even agree on the definition of the decision 
problem. 
Roy [1996:p31] sees the final decision as a “synthesis of an interconnected web of 
decisions” made during the decision making process, and therefore states that “the 
concept of a decision cannot be completely separated from that of a decision process.”  
The different stages of the decision making process is not directly relevant to this 
research, but is included as background context as Appendix C. 
3.2.2 Different actors in the decision process 
It is important at this stage to define the roles of the different actors in the decision 
process, in order to provide a basis for later discussions around providing aid to the 
decision making process. 
The general term actor referred to above will be defined for the purpose of this research 
as being an individual or group of individuals that either directly of indirectly influence the 
decision by his or her value system, or are affected by the decision even though he or 
she had no influence on it.  
Roy [1996:p32] notes that “for a group of individuals (entity or community) to be 
considered as a single actor, no distinctions should exist in the value systems, 
informational systems, and relational networks13 of the different members of the group.” 
Roy and Hemmati [2002:p2] both agree that stakeholders are those actors that have a 
strong interest in the decision and can or do influence it directly through the value 
                                               
11
 “P the somewhat implicit system that underpins the very basis of the value judgements of an 
individual or group” [Roy 1996:p31] 
12
 The systems that provide the information considered and used during the decision process. 
13
 The “somewhat solid framework of influences, alliances, coalitions, pressures, 7 between a 
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systems that they possess. Hemmati however also includes those that have no influence 
in the decision, but are affected by it, as stakeholders. Roy instead defines these affected 
actors without influence as third parties.  
The classification of stakeholders as standard, fiduciary and silent, used by Banville et al. 
[1998] however offers greater accuracy of description, and will be used in this research: 
standard stakeholders impact / are affected by the problem and participate in the 
process that resolves it, fiduciary stakeholders represent clients and participate in the 
problem resolution without been directly affected be the problem, and silent 
stakeholders refer to those that are affected by the problem, but has no control over or 
participation during the problem resolution process (i.e. Roy’s third parties). 
Stakeholders refer to the three groups combined. 
Belton and Steward [2002:p14] defines the stakeholder that finally has the responsibility 
for the decision as the decision-maker, although this does not imply that the opinions 
and preferences of other stakeholders are excluded in the decision making process. 
The decision process is often aided in some form or another, for example through tools 
and approaches that provide structure to the process, inform stakeholders, or allow 
stakeholder preferences to emerge. The actors supporting or guiding this decision aiding 
process are referred to analysts or facilitators: 
“The term analyst tends to be used when there is a strong emphasis on that 
person working independently to gather information and to capture expertise; a 
facilitator is more commonly recognised as someone who also bring the skills of 
managing group processes.” [Belton and Steward 2002:p8] 
Roy [1996] comments on the neutrality of the analyst, pointing out that it is impossible for 
the analyst to remain completely outside the decision process if he wishes to affect it, 
and as such he becomes of necessity a stakeholder. “His role is to explain, to justify, to 
recommend, but he must do this independently of his own value system.” 
Lastly, the client is the person that requested the decision process, and provides the 
necessary means to conduct it. The client is not necessarily a stakeholder, and does not 
have to exist in the process.  
3.3 The impact of unacknowledged uncertainties 
The extent to which the uncertainties identified earlier have been acknowledged within 
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projects can now be investigated. The aim of this investigation will be to test the 
correlation between a lack of uncertainty acknowledgement and the failure to achieve 
sustainable development objectives. 
3.3.1 Uncertainty acknowledgement during decision making 
Information about the decision making processes that were engaged in during the initial 
stages of the evaluated projects are scarce, as the emphasis of project literature was 
mostly on problems experienced during implementation, or post-implementation 
evaluation.  
The literature review however indicated that the decision making process preceding 
implementation at KwaBhaza was relatively comprehensive, although the perspective 
was one of marketing rather than social development. The process was guided by 
Eskom’s Project Proposal through three phases: project introduction to the community 
and market research, community interaction and marketing, and installation. 
Literature and interviews further indicated that no systematic decision making process 
(even in the form of a feasibility study) was followed during the initial stages of the 
Hluleka / Lucingweni projects [Afrane-Okese 2005]. The following statement confirms 
this:  
“In the two cases of Hluleka and Lucingweni Hybrid System, undertaking pilot 
projects of these nature [sic], a careful analysis of the risks was not undertaken 
as suggested. This is demonstrated by the problems that were encountered in the 
implementation of both projects7” [DME 2007b:p39] 
In the cases of the other projects, the information that could however be found have been 
used below, focusing on the extent to which uncertainties have been acknowledged, and 
the impact that this acknowledgement had on the achievement of sustainable 
development objectives. 
3.3.1.1 Grid encroachment 
Many of the evaluated projects acknowledged the uncertainty of grid encroachment by 
including a 5-year off-grid window period as part of their site identification criteria (e.g. 
Maphephethe), and sometimes in addition the criterion that the site must be further than 
5km from the existing grid (e.g. KwaBhaza).  
As was highlighted by the e7 project, however, such criteria were of little value in the face 
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confirms this: the first SHS household was connected to the grid in 1998 [Green and 
Zwebe 2006:p13], within two years after the project started.  
3.3.1.2 Implementation agency non-committal.  
This uncertainty impacted especially the Hluleka and Lucingweni projects, and it is clear 
from previously reviewed literature that this uncertainty was largely unacknowledged in 
the initial stages of these projects. 
There is too little information to conclude that the uncertainty of institutional non-
committal has not been acknowledged in the SHS concession programme. If it has 
however been acknowledged, its impacts have clearly not been sufficiently addressed, 
as is shown in the analysis in section 3.1.4. 
3.3.1.3 Customers do not accept technology 
The project evaluations in literature report that information dissemination, community 
participation and acceptance of the technology were important initial project aims both at 
Maphephethe and KwaBhaza (e.g. demonstration houses and an energy day).  
The result of this acknowledgement of the customer technology acceptance uncertainty 
was that in both communities the SHS technology was in general well-accepted 
(although some members in the KwaBhaza project still suspected political motives in the 
electrification drive, blamed by Kloot [1999] on the initial strong emphasis on marketing 
rather than information sharing). Related to the Maphephethe project, Green and Zwebe 
[2006] reports favourable perceptions towards SHSs within the community even after the 
grid had arrived.  
At Hluleka it is clear that the impact of customer inertia to change, as a part of the 
customer technology acceptance uncertainty, had not been acknowledged, as no plan 
other than circuit breakers was in place to accommodate or change the habits of guests 
that brought their own large freezers and portable swimming pool pumps. This led to the 
guests bypassing distribution boards and the circuit-breakers, which in turn contributed to 
the problems related to lack of energy. 
3.3.1.4 Customers unable to pay 
The uncertainty regarding the customers’ ability to pay was apparently acknowledged 
during the initial stages of the Maphephethe project, as Sparknet [2003] reports that the 
community was involved in decisions regarding the financing mechanisms and 
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Zwebe [2006:p12] report that 13 systems have been removed for non-payment, 
presumably out of the original installed total of 50 systems.  
In contrast, KwaBhaza’s acknowledgement of the same uncertainty led to the use of 
flexible repayment systems which acknowledged the erratic nature of income in rural 
areas, and resulted in a positive situation where at least 80% of household repayments 
were up to date, with no SHS having been removed due to non-payment by 2003 
[Sparknet 2003]. 
The difference between the results of the acknowledgments of this uncertainty between 
the two projects however does not just lie in the effectiveness of the method of mitigation, 
but also in the fact that a capital subsidy was made available at KwaBhaza. 
At Folovhodwe the financial aspects of the project appears to have received very little 
attention during project planning, as is indicated by the fact that a payment system was 
only implemented (unsuccessfully) a year after the systems were installed. Bikam and 
Mulaudzi [2006] reports that many members within the community could not afford the 
monthly service payments, a fact which ultimately led to total project failure, which might 
have been avoided had the ability of customers to pay been considered initially. 
3.3.1.5 Customers unwilling to pay 
Folovhodwe again serves as a good example of the danger of ignoring this uncertainty 
during the initial decision making process. Although a stakeholder interaction process 
was engaged in at this project, the literature reports that this process was not well 
planned, and resulted in unrealistic expectations within the community, for example that 
the SHSs will be without cost to the customers. When the customers were finally 
informed that they were to pay a monthly fee, they were unwilling, and this unwillingness 
(and inability) finally led to project failure. 
3.3.1.6 Low uptake among customers 
An attempt was made to address this uncertainty at Maphephethe by offering a 
guaranteed SHS buy-back scheme should grid-electrification occur. Uptake in this project 
was however still low, as no subsidy was offered to alleviate the high cost of the SHS 
system.  
In subsequent projects like KwaBhaza and the SHS concession programme, the use of a 
capital subsidy significantly increased the uptake among customers. At Folovhodwe this 












p68 – Section 3.3 
community. Unfortunately the lack of a sense of ownership which this donation resulted 
in, along with other problems, still caused ultimate project failure.  
3.3.1.7 Theft and vandalism  
The low incidence of PV panel theft at Maphephethe and KwaBhaza is in strong contrast 
to the widespread theft at Folovhodwe, and is ascribed by Sparknet [2003] to community 
buy-in in the projects and customer ownership of the systems in the first two projects. 
Community buy-in is largely a product of inclusion of the community during initial decision 
making processes, as concluded for example by Woudstra and Zoller [2004], and this 
inclusion was done at both Maphephethe and KwaBhaza. 
Although the NER [2003b] reports that emphasis was placed on stakeholder participation 
during the planning process at Lucingweni, Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] disagrees, 
and reports that the community had little sense of “buy-in” or ownership in the hybrid 
system, caused by limited community interaction and a lack of continued community 
awareness building. In addition the community was only marginally involved in the actual 
project construction work, and was not provided with LPG-based thermal services and 
potable water from boreholes even though this was originally promised. Dissatisfaction 
within the community, and little sense of system ownership, appears to be among the 
main reasons why the community condoned the eventual theft and vandalism of the 
system. 
The delivery model used defines the customers’ sense of ownership to a large extent, 
and therefore also impacts the theft uncertainty – the acknowledgement of this 
uncertainty, given the limitations imposed by the delivery model, is clearly illustrated by 
the NuRa utility: acknowledging the limitations of the fee-for-service model in instilling a 
sense of system ownership, NuRa implemented a penalty to the customer of R500 to 
replace a stolen PV panel. This appears to be successful except near the Mozambique 
border, where other factors than ownership play a role [Aitken 2008].     
3.3.1.8 Insufficient energy or power.  
The Hluleka and Lucingweni projects can be seen as examples where the uncertainty of 
insufficient energy and power had been largely unacknowledged.  
At Lucingweni, even though the systems sizing were in theory sufficient, insufficient 
energy resulted from lack of customer energy efficiency practices and the lack of 
effective current and energy monitoring devices, which made illegal connections and 
circuit breaker bypassing possible. Technical design and configuration mistakes 
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address even had the uncertainty been adequately acknowledged during planning. The 
fact that the electricity supply to customers at Lucingweni was connected before revenue 
collection systems had been implemented, and that energy was free until the system 
failed, in addition took away any incentive for the community to practice energy 
efficiency. 
At Hluleka incorrect load data and overbooking made the system sizing insufficient even 
if no other problems occurred – most of the above problems of energy inefficiency and 
technical configuration mistakes however also occurred at Hluleka. 
3.3.1.9 Inadequate maintenance 
At Maphephethe and Folovhodwe the uncertainty of maintenance sustainability was 
acknowledged and addressed in the short term by training SHS installers. No provision 
was however made for long-term maintenance: at Maphephethe the installers moved on, 
leading to a situation where a new project had to be launched 8 years after the project 
started to try and solve the maintenance issues, and at Folovhodwe the inadequate 
financial planning, lack of maintenance contracts etc. led to total failure of the project 
after 4 years.  
 At Hluleka and Lucingweni the uncertainty of maintenance was acknowledged to a 
limited extent (the NER made high-level recommendations regarding maintenance 
responsibilities and agreements), but not addressed. Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] 
reports that the local technical capacity was insufficient, and therefore depended on 
outside experts, resulting in high costs and long system down-times when faults 
occurred. 
One of the main motivations for using the fee-for-service with utilities model for the SHS 
concession programme was that it resulted in sustainable maintenance [Banks and 
Aitken 2004:p97]. This uncertainty was clearly considered before project implementation, 
and appears to have been addressed successfully. 
3.3.1.10 Subsidy decrease, discontinuation or inequality  
The seriousness of the impact of this uncertainty is illustrated in a number of the 
evaluated projects.  
The first example occurred at KwaBhaza, where the R1500 subsidy (and loan 
underwriting) from the DME’s implementation agency REFSA, promised to the 
community by Eskom, failed to materialise due to “bureaucratic power struggles” [Kloot 
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indicated by the fact that “energisation was going ahead on the understanding that 
Eskom would ‘crisis manage’ when the time came.” [Kloot 1999:p56] The crisis 
management entailed that Eskom finally had to provide the (by then R1700) subsidy to 
prevent project failure. 
As important, the inconsistent availability of the DME’s capital subsidy subsequent to 
2002, and the current lack of clarity on the future of the off-grid programme, have 
seriously impacted customer confidence and production planning and ongoing product 
improvement by the service providers. 
Prasad and Visagie [2005], Banks [2007] and Niemand and Banks [2006] highlight the 
problems that utilities in the SHS concession programme experienced due to delays and 
geographical and time-based variations in the application of Free Basic Electricity 
(FBE)14 subsidies by local municipalities. These variations led to customer 
dissatisfaction, and contributed to significant non-payment problems. 
There is no indication that these uncertainties were acknowledged in the SHS 
concession programme. It is however interesting to note that the ongoing operation of 
the concession utilities is not necessarily impacted by this instability: 
 “7critically, several of the companies are either big enough, or very close to 
being large enough to reach operational profitability – so there is reasonable 
expectation that they will continue to operate and deliver services – irrespective of 
the outcome of further subsidy deliberations.” [Banks 2007:p119] 
3.3.1.11 Technical design/configuration errors and component failure  
Afrane-Okese [2003:p35] notes that the installation phase of the initial Eskom-Shell joint 
venture project was rushed due to political and service delivery pressures. The technical 
uncertainties were therefore inadequately acknowledged, which resulted in inadequate 
field-testing of the product before roll-out, and little contractual protection of the joint 
venture against low product quality. 
It is also clear in the Hluleka and Lucingweni projects that little attention was given to the 
impact of technical design/configuration uncertainties, something which should have 
                                               
14
 South Africa’s FBE policy was announced in 2000, and promulgated in 2002, and specified the 
provision of a ‘self-targeted’ subsidy consisting of 50kWh per month of free electricity to poor 
households, identified for example by the willingness of these households to accept a limited 
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been an important focus especially since new technology was being demonstrated. This 
lack of uncertainty acknowledgement led to long periods of no power (while the inverter 
problems were being resolved), reduced energy (from the PV array at Hluleka due to the 
inverter problems, and the wind generators at Lucingweni due to the wrong inverter being 
used) and system damage (incorrect integration of the diesel generator at Hluleka).  
3.3.1.12 Inaccurate estimation of renewable resource availability, and exchange 
and interest rate changes  
Although the impact of these uncertainties can be large, there are no clear examples in 
literature related to South African off-grid projects to correlate non-acknowledgement of 
these uncertainties to project failure.  
3.3.2 The first part of the hypothesis tested 
The results of the previous section’s analysis are summarised in Table 3-1.  
From the analysis and this summary it is clear that in all the projects that convincingly 
failed to achieve their primary sustainable development objectives, uncertainties were not 
acknowledged during the initial decision making/planning processes. 
This result provides sufficient evidence to validate the first part of this research’s 
hypothesis: 
There is a strong correlation between failure of South African off-grid 
electrification projects to achieve sustainable development objectives, and 
unacknowledged uncertainties within the initial decision making / planning 
processes of these projects. 
The correlation between acknowledgement of uncertainties and achievement of 
sustainable development objectives is however less clear, as once again illustrated in 
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Table 3-1: Uncertainty acknowledgments in South African off-grid electrification projects.  
Uncertainty largely or totally 
unacknowledged 
Uncertainty acknowledged but 
inadequately addressed 
Uncertainty acknowledged and 
addressed 
Grid encroachment 
 KwaBhaza, Maphephethe  
Implementation agency non-committal 
Lucingweni, Hluleka SHS concession programme  
Customers do not accept technology 
Hluleka KwaBhaza Maphephethe 
Customers unable to pay 
Folovhodwe Maphephethe KwaBhaza 
Customers unwilling to pay 
Folovhodwe   
Low uptake among customers 
 Folovhodwe, Maphephethe 
KwaBhaza, SHS concession 
programme 
Theft and vandalism 
Folovhodwe, Lucingweni  
Maphephethe, KwaBhaza, SHS 
concession programme 
Insufficient energy or power 





SHS concession programme 
Subsidy decrease, discontinuation or inequality 
SHS concession programme  KwaBhaza 
Technical design/configuration errors and component failure 
Hluleka, Lucingweni SHS concession programme  
Inaccurate estimation of renewable resource availability 
Exchange and interest rate changes 
3.4 In summary 
This chapter set out to answer the final two research questions required to test the first 
part of the research hypothesis. The following answers were found to these research 
questions, providing sufficient evidence for the first part of the hypothesis to be confirmed 
valid in section 3.3.2: 
What uncertainties underlie the set of objective-inhibiting factors identified earlier, 
or have been identified in literature specifically relevant in the South African off-
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The project uncertainties, identified from literature and the set of objective-
inhibiting factors, are summarised in Table 3-1.  
What impacts did the early acknowledgement / non-acknowledgement of these 
uncertainties have on South African off-grid electrification projects reaching their 
sustainable development objectives? 
The analysis in section 3.3, summarised in Table 3-1, showed that non-
acknowledgement of uncertainties at an early stage negatively impacted the 
contribution of projects to sustainable development.  
The analysis further indicated that when project uncertainties were 
acknowledged, this did not necessarily guarantee sustainable development 
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4 Achieving objectives through high quality decisions 
In the previous chapter it became apparent that acknowledging project uncertainties do 
not necessarily mean that sustainable development objectives will be achieved. 
What else, in addition to uncertainty acknowledgement, is necessary to ensure that off-
grid electrification projects do achieve sustainable development objectives? This chapter 
attempts to find an answer, structured as the second part of the research hypothesis: 
A high quality decision making process that is capable of acknowledging both 
hard and soft uncertainties will assist off-grid projects in reaching their primary 
project objectives (but not necessarily sustainable development objectives, unless 
these two sets of objectives align). 
The chapter is divided into different sections that analyse individual parts of this 
hypothesis, guided by four research questions, as shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1: Conceptual map showing how the different sections of Chapter 4 and the appendixes relate to 
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4.1 Different conceptualisations of uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the decision making process can most efficiently be dealt with if the 
sometimes-subtle variations in the nature of this uncertainty are acknowledged, as noted 
by Young [2001] within the context of environmental decision making: 
“...many decisions surrounding the environment are conditioned by the presence 
of uncertainty. The recognition that there are a number of different modes of 
uncertainty radically alters the way in which environmental uncertainty can be 
dealt with both on a epistemological15 and practical level7” [Young 2001:p1] 
This section explores different conceptualisations or modes of uncertainty, and highlights 
the concepts of hard uncertainties and soft uncertainties (or risks), as defined by Young, 
which this research propose to be potentially valuable within the decision making 
processes of off-grid electrification projects.  
4.1.1 Internal and external uncertainties 
The first variation that will be presented within the concept of uncertainty is the split 
between those uncertainties that are internal to a project (i.e. uncertain events that might 
affect the outcomes of a project and are under the control of the decision-makers) and 
those external to a project (i.e. uncertain events that might affect project outcomes but 
over which decision-makers have little or no control).  
Examples of internal uncertainties include whether the product will fulfil market needs, 
whether the project time and cost requirements will be met, or whether the product is 
ready for market use in terms of reliability and ease of use. External risks might include 
actions by competitors, government, customers and the weather. 
In order to avoid potential confusion, note that the concept of internal and external 
uncertainties not only relates to projects, but can also be applied to decision making 
processes, as used by Belton and Steward [2002:p61]. Internal decision making process 
uncertainties in this case relate to factors like imprecise data or ambiguity of meaning 
within the decision aiding model, while external decision making process uncertainties 
might include both internal and external project uncertainties. 
                                               
15
 “The branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and 
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The split between internal and external uncertainties are not specifically useful within the 
context of this research, which focus on uncertainty acknowledgement, as it is crucial to 
acknowledge both internal and external uncertainties. The two types of uncertainty are 
however dealt with very differently when attempting to address project uncertainties, and 
are therefore included here for completeness.   
4.1.2 The nature of reality underlying uncertainty   
In moving towards a more accurate distinction between the different conceptualisations 
of uncertainties, it is informative to review Davidson [1996]. The paper defines two 
distinct conceptions of the nature of reality underlying uncertainty within economic theory, 
and offers a basis for a distinction between different types of uncertainty, as used by 
Young [2001].  
The first conception is that of an immutable reality, with the future predetermined 
(ergodic16) and thus known or knowable, even if sometimes “in the short run, the future is 
not completely known due to some limitation in human information processing and 
computing power.” [Davidson 1996:p485].  
As Young [2001:p40] notes, “this concept of reality lends itself to a solely probabilistic 
interpretation of uncertainty, in which all future outcomes are captured either by an 
objective probability distribution or a subjective distribution” This immutable reality 
dictates that the objective and subjective probabilities will tend to converge in the long 
term even if they differ initially. In essence, therefore, “uncertainty only exists because of 
the failure of humans to process information which, while not known, is knowable.” 
[Young 2001:p40] 
The second conception is that of a transmutable and non-ergodic reality, where “the 
future can be permanently changed in nature and substance by actions of individuals, 
groups (e.g. unions, cartels), and/or governments, often in ways not completely 
foreseeable by the creators of change. It is also possible that changes that are not 
predetermined can occur even without any human economic action.” [Davidson 
1996:p482]. A probabilistic interpretation of uncertainty within this second reality is 
meaningless. 
                                               
16
 “P the assumption of a predetermined – ergodic – reality permits the modeller to assert that 
sampling from past and present market data is the same thing as obtaining a sample from the 
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4.1.3 Modes of uncertainty within an immutable reality 
Young [2001] notes that the modes of uncertainty identified in literature is generally 
confined within the first conception of reality: risk, which has an objective probability 
distribution, and uncertainty, which in this context refer to subjective probabilities.  
A number of post-2001 examples confirm his statement: 
• Reneke and Wiecek [2002:p1] summarizes the definition of risk as “the randomness 
of [a] system caused by stochastic variability resulting from inherent fluctuations that 
the system experiences with respect to time, space, or its individual characteristics”.  
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is the randomness in a system arising when the 
system cannot be described with complete confidence due to a lack of understanding 
or limitation of knowledge. Note the emphasis on the failure of humans to process 
information which is in essence knowable, i.e. both risk and uncertainty in this context 
are founded in an immutable reality. 
• Loosemore et al. [2006] presents a distinction between risk and uncertainty which is 
also restricted to the perspective of an immutable reality, as shown by the fact that 
both risk and uncertainty are defined by probability (see Figure 4-2 below). 
 
Figure 4-2: The risk-uncertainty continuum, based on [Loosemore et al 2006: figure 1.1] 
4.1.3.1 The disadvantage of restricting uncertainty only to the immutable reality  
Young [2001:p41] argues that restricting the different modes of uncertainty within 
decision making to the immutable reality is problematic, especially in cases where “the 
system is so transmutable and fundamentally uncertain that uncertainty can never be 
reduced to situations of probabilistic risk.” 
This view differs fundamentally from that held by Loosemore et al. [2006:p10], which 
proposes using only one word for all the modes of uncertainty: “the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty is not one of substance, it is one of degree 7 and distinguishing 
between them serves academic rather than practical purposes.”  
The use of a single conceptualisation of uncertainty as proposed by Loosemore et al. 
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single conceptualisation can lead to non-probabilistic uncertainties being ignored as they 
do not fit into standard decision making approaches, even though these uncertainties 
might have a large impact on project objectives. 
For this reason, the conceptualisation of uncertainty as presented by Young (which 
include both immutable and transmutable reality) will now be explored.  
4.1.4 Acknowledging a transmutable reality: hard and soft uncertainty   
Young [2001] defined two types of uncertainty, hard and soft, based on Davidson’s 
conceptions of reality and previous work by a variety of authors. He then applied these 
definitions within the context of environmental policy decision making, using a non-
probabilistic decision aiding approach developed by Shackle17. 
In hard uncertainty 1) the set of all possible outcomes of an action is unknown and can 
only be hypothesized, or 2) if all the outcomes are known, the probability distributions of 
all the outcomes are unknown or not fully definable. The definition of hard uncertainty 
encompasses both the subjective probability area of immutable reality and transmutable 
reality, as shown in Figure 4-3.   
Soft uncertainty or risk is used to define situations where all the possible outcomes of 
an action, as well as the outcomes’ probability distributions, are known, and are therefore 
falls within the area of immutable reality. 
This recognition of uncertainty as occurring both within the immutable and transmutable 
realities, through the concepts of soft and hard uncertainty, potentially allows a much 
wider range of uncertainties to be modelled (and therefore acknowledged in the decision 
making process) than if only probability-based uncertainties were included.  
4.1.4.1 Hard and soft uncertainty classification framework 
Young [2001:p43-46] develops a framework within which hard and soft uncertainty can 
be classified using six criteria, as shown in Figure 4-3.  
                                               
17
 Shackle proposed using degree of surprise rather than probability as a measure of uncertainty, 
thereby making it possible to include uncertainties in both the immutable and transmutable 
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Figure 4-3: The types of uncertainty and their relation to Davidson’s concepts of reality, as proposed by 
Young [2001], along with the criteria used for classification.   
The six criteria are defined as follows: 
• Knowledge of future outcomes – if all the future outcomes of an action are fully 
known it is defined as a soft uncertainty, otherwise as a hard uncertainty.  
• Divisibility - A divisible action, typical in soft uncertainty, is repeatable under the 
same underlying conditions, while a non-divisible action, typical in hard uncertainty, 
is unprecedented or non-repeatable. 
• Seriability - Some non-divisible actions can be pooled with similar actions, and the 
uncertainties redistributed among the group, for example life expectancy used by 
insurance companies. Seriable actions can be addressed using soft uncertainty. 
• Distributionality - In a distributional action, typical in soft uncertainty, the complete 
set of events is known and adds up to unity. 
• Additivity - With an additive event it is possible to add together the probabilities, 
while the number of outcomes will affect the probability of each outcome. Additivity 
does not apply in hard uncertainty.  
• Probability distribution – If the probability distribution of an action is known, it can 
be defined as a soft uncertainty. If the distribution is imprecise or unknown it can be 












p80 – Section 4.1 
4.1.5 Classifying off-grid electrification project uncertainties 
It will be informative to classify the set of project uncertainties identified in the previous 
chapter in Table 3-1 as soft or hard, utilising Young’s classification framework described 
above. If the majority of the identified uncertainties are soft uncertainties, which can 
typically be acknowledged within existing decision aiding approaches, little motivation 
remains to add complexity to the decision process by differentiating between soft and 
hard uncertainties. 
When the criteria of knowledge of future outcomes, divisibility, seriability, distributionality, 
additivity, and probability distribution is applied to the list of uncertainties, only the 
following uncertainties are not clearly hard uncertainties: 
• Technical design/configuration errors and component failure: if this uncertainty was 
only impacted by the reliability of the system components, it would clearly have been 
a soft uncertainty. System design and configuration mistakes however plays a 
significant role especially in demonstration projects, and cannot by precisely 
modelled by a probability distribution. It can therefore be concluded that technical 
failure is a hard uncertainty during initial demonstration projects, and becomes a soft 
uncertainty as experience of the system grows.  
• Inaccurate estimation of renewable resource availability: this uncertainty can be 
divided into three different parts, related to the three sources of data from which the 
renewable resource is estimated: measured historical data at the project location, 
measured historical data at a site which is in some ways similar to the project 
location, and estimated data from software programs like RETScreen which typically 
use generalised satellite-derived data.  
The uncertainty of the first type of data relates to the randomness that the renewable 
source experience due to inherent fluxuations in it, and falls within the domain of 
probability and therefore soft uncertainty. The uncertainty of the second and the third 
sources of data include the not-knowable-until-measured differences between the 
resources at the project location and at the site on which the available data is based. 
This uncertainty includes an unknowable component, and can be categorised as a 
hard uncertainty.  
It can therefore be concluded that where historical data at the same site as the 
project is available, the uncertainty introduced is soft. Where no historical data is 
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• Exchange and interest rate changes: exchange and interest rates are influenced by 
macro-economic indicators and events, but also by human perceptions, which result 
at best in an imprecise probability distribution of future rate actions. For the purpose 
of this research it is therefore considered as a hard uncertainty. 
• Incorrect estimation of system consumption: When historic consumption data is 
available for a group of customers with very similar characteristics to the customers 
currently being electrified, this uncertainty becomes soft – as historic data becomes 
less applicable, the uncertainty will move into a hard classification. 
It can be concluded that the majority of the identified uncertainties are hard during initial 
demonstration projects, with only technical failure, resource estimation and consumption 
estimation becoming soft uncertainties when adequate data exists.  
It is worthwhile noting that most of the identified uncertainties are defined as hard 
uncertainties because of the large impact of social or political factors on them. Scholle 
and Afrane-Okese [2007:p107] alluded to this when they noted within the context of 
socio-economic realities within mini-grid projects that “Many of these issues are neither 
formal nor predictable”. A central aim of the development of the concept of hard 
uncertainties within off-grid electrification projects is that many of these issues will 
ultimately become more formal and, if not predictable, at least manageable.  
4.2 Quality in the decision making process 
The focus of this chapter now shifts towards decision making, and finding a useful 
definition of the characteristics of a high quality decision making process. 
4.2.1 Preliminary definition of high-quality decision making 
Decision making is the activity of reaching a decision, which results in actions and 
ultimately in results. These results can be used to measure the quality of the decision 
making. Within the context of a project, decisions should help achieve the project’s 
primary objectives, and a measure of the quality of decision making will be how well the 
results align with the project’s primary objectives.  A preliminary definition of what a high-
quality decision making process is can therefore be formulated as: 
High-quality decision making results in decisions that lead to the achievement of 
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However, this preliminary definition is limited in that the quality of a process can only be 
measured once the project has been completed and it is clear whether the primary 
objectives have been achieved. For the above definition to be useful during the decision 
process, a more detailed characterisation of a high-quality decision making process is 
needed.  
4.2.2 Characteristics 
4.2.2.1 Characteristics of high-quality decision making in literature 
A review of decision making literature was undertaken to inform the development of an 
adequate, non-redundant set of characteristics of high quality decision making. Although 
a large volume of research is available on decision making in general (on UCT’s 
electronic journal catalogue eight journals has “decision making” in their title, while many 
more relate to the subject through for example operational research or psychology), in 
only a small number of texts was the quality of decision making explicitly analysed.  
One of these texts, by Herek et al. [1987:p204] writing within the context of presidential 
decision making during times of international conflict, defines high-quality decision 
making as characterised by a “relative absence” of Janis and Mann [1977]’s seven 
symptoms of “defective decision making in executive groups”:  
• “Gross omissions in surveying alternatives 
• Gross omissions in surveying objectives 
• Failure to examine major costs and risks of the preferred choice 
• Poor information search 
• Selective bias in processing information at hand 
• Failure to reconsider originally rejected alternatives 
• Failure to work out detailed implementation, monitoring and contingency plans” 
In a more recent text, Belton and Steward [2002:p5] defines a “quality decision making 
process” as resulting in “better considered, justifiable and explainable decisions” that 
provides an audit trail for the final decision. Note that in their writing the word quality 
equates to the concept of high quality used in this research; the equivalent of their lack of 
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The above writings on quality in a decision making process offer a basis for further 
exploration in literature on what characterise quality decision making processes.  
Objectives, alternatives and risks should be well-considered 
The first three of Janis and Mann’s symptoms of defective decision making are avoided if 
the objectives, alternatives and risks of a decision problem are well-considered. 
A set of South African Government guidelines for integrated environmental management, 
based on the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998, confirms the 
importance of all reasonable alternatives being well-considered: 
“The [decision making] process must identify and define all reasonable 
alternatives and provide the decision-makers with an understanding of the trade-
offs that will result from the alternative options.” [DEAT 2004:p9]  
An important part of making a well-considered decision lies in acknowledging the multi-
dimensional nature of the decision making problem, as highlighted by Belton and 
Steward’s [2002:p2] statement that “Every decision we ever take requires the balancing 
of multiple factors 7”. This acknowledgment of multiple dimensions is also a central part 
of the definition of sustainable development offered in NEMA: 
“Sustainable development means the integration of social, economic and 
environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision making so as to 
ensure that development serves present and future generations.” [NEMA 
1998:section 1] 
From the above, a preliminary characteristic of high quality decision making can now be 
defined: 
 Objectives, alternatives and risks should be well-considered, acknowledging the 
multi-dimensional nature of most decision making problems. 
The process should be informed 
According to Janis and Mann’s fourth and fifth symptoms of defective decision making, 
high quality decision making cannot depend on poor or biased data.  
The South African Government guidelines for integrated environmental management 
[DEAT 2004:p9] offers a definition of what the opposite of poor and biased data entail, by 
stating that data should be “sound and useful”, and that “Decisions must take into 
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In essence the data used in decision making should therefore be accurate (“sound”), 
adequate (both “useful” and inclusive of all “relevant forms of knowledge”) and unbiased. 
This leads to the next preliminary decision-making characteristic: 
 The process should be informed with accurate, adequate and unbiased data. 
The process should result in justifiable and explainable decisions, with an audit trail 
In the above text Belton and Steward identified “justifiable and explainable decisions”, 
with an audit trail, as important characteristics of high quality decision making. These 
characteristics are closely linked to the concept of accountability, i.e. where the decision 
makers are held accountable for their decisions by the rest of the stakeholders. 
Alexander [2000] states that accountable decision making tend to result in more 
sustainable outcomes, because: 
• the decisions are more likely to be consistent, instead of arbitrary, since they are 
open to challenge, and set precedents, 
• a wider range of views and experiences are typically taken into account, and 
• mistakes are reduced because decision-makers will typically think harder before 
acting. 
But what are the characteristics of accountable decision making that are closely linked to 
“justifiable and explainable decisions”? Two characteristics are especially of interest in 
literature: inclusiveness through stakeholder participation, and transparency. Two 
references in particular comment at length on these subjects: Hemmati’s [2002] work on 
multi-stakeholder processes, and Kovach et al.’s [2003] works on the accountability of 
large inter- and non-governmental organisations and trans-national corporations.   
Inclusiveness 
Kovach et al. [2003:p1] states that greater inclusiveness of all stakeholders in the 
process (especially the silent stakeholders, as defined in section 3.2.2) results in greater 
ownership, which “tends to lead to more relevant decision making and better 
implementation.”  
This perspective is shared by Hemmati [2002:p3], who states that “a lack of 
inclusiveness has resulted in many good decisions for which there is no broad 
constituency, thus making implementation difficult.” Stakeholder participation, according 
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building of all stakeholders as partners who together define the problems, design 
possible solution, collaborate to implement them, and monitor and evaluate the 
outcome.” 
Transparency 
Regarding the transparency of decision making towards the outside, Hemmati [2002:p57] 
notes that a “lack of disclosure of information of any of the aspects, decisions or steps 
related to [the process] will decrease its credibility and, consequently, its effectiveness.” 
The risks of an obscure decision making process include that these processes can be 
abused, or can be perceived to have been abused. An audit trail will improve the 
transparency of the process to the outside, as suggested by Belton and Steward in the 
context of justifiable and explainable decisions. 
Kovach et al. [2003:p1] links stakeholder satisfaction to transparency, by noting that 
greater transparency is an important part of effective accountability mechanisms, 
resulting in people that are more likely to feel that their needs are taken into account. 
Heinrich [2008:v], while commenting on how poor environmental performance within the 
Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) can be reduced by using a transparent methodology, 
notes how transparency assists in aligning different stakeholders: “The more transparent 
the decision making methodology, the closer the gap between the policy maker and 
society.” 
From the preceding review and discussion two preliminary high quality decision making 
characteristics can be identified: 
 The process should be inclusive, taking a wide range of stakeholder opinions 
into account. 
 The process should be transparent, with an audit trail to ensure that the 
decisions can be explained and justified. 
The process should allow for adaptation and iteration 
Janis and Mann introduced the subject of an adaptive and iterative process by identifying 
“failure to reconsider originally rejected alternatives” as a symptom of defective decision 
making. 
Further literature reviews indicate that the quality of decision making is increased by 
willingness among decision makers to adapt and learn, both from their mistakes and from 
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Kovach et al. [2003:p1], for example, recommend that feedback loops are build into the 
decision making process “so that decision-makers can learn from communities affected 
by their decisions and, in particular, learn from their mistakes in order not to repeat 
them”. 
The South African Government guidelines for integrated environmental management 
lends further support to the statement that the decision making process should 
incorporate past lessons learned, and recommend that the process be flexible / adaptive:  
“The process should be flexible and adjust to the realities, issues and 
circumstances of the activities under review, without compromising the integrity of 
the process; and be iterative, incorporating lessons learned throughout the 
activity life cycle.” DEAT [2004:p9] 
Lastly, Hemmati [2002:p53] recommends a balance between a process with an “agreed, 
foreseeable agenda” and “the ability to respond flexibly to changing situations”. 
From the preceding review two preliminary high quality decision making characteristics 
are identified: 
 The process should be flexible and able to adapt to the context of the process. 
 The process should incorporate lessons learned, both in the past and during the 
current process, through build-in iterative feedback loops. 
The process should result in detailed implementation, monitoring and contingency plans 
The last of Janis and Mann’s symptoms of defective decision making highlights the 
importance of detailed implementation, monitoring and contingency plans. It can be 
argued that detailed implementation and contingency plans are unlikely unless the 
decisions have been well-considered. However, well-considered decisions does not 
automatically lead to detailed plans, therefore this characteristic has been identified as 
separate: 
 The process should result in detailed implementation, monitoring and 
contingency plans. 
4.2.3 Building a comprehensive set of characteristics 
From the preceding literature review the following preliminary characteristics of high 
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 Objectives, alternatives and risks should be well-considered, acknowledging the 
multi-dimensional nature of most decision making problems 
 The process should be informed with accurate, adequate and unbiased data 
 The process should be inclusive, taking a wide range of stakeholder opinions 
into account. 
 The process should be transparent, with an audit trail to ensure that the 
decisions can be explained and justified. 
 The process should be flexible and able to adapt to the context of the process. 
 The process should incorporate lessons learned, both in the past and during the 
current process, through build-in iterative feedback loops. 
 The process should result in detailed implementation, monitoring and 
contingency plans 
Before a final set of characteristics is decided on for further use in the research, the 
above preliminary set of characteristics should be viewed from the perspective of Belton 
and Steward’s guidelines on formulating a coherent family of criteria, which was 
presented in Section 2.2.4: value relevance, understandability, measurability, non-
redundancy, judgemental independence, balancing completeness and conciseness, 
operationality, and simplicity versus complexity. 
The preliminary set of criteria agrees with Belton and Steward’s guidelines except for a 
lack of judgemental independence between the flexible process and lessons learned 
criteria: an iterative process that incorporates lessons learned while underway is also 
flexible and adaptive. Additional criteria to increase the independence between the two 
(e.g. differentiating between whether the process takes into account lessons learned in 
the past versus during the current process) will however add complexity to the criteria 
set.  
It was decided to rather move the past lessons learned part of the lessons learned 
criterion into the informed process criterion, and combine the remaining parts of the 
flexible process and lessons learned criteria, with the results shown in the definition in 
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4.2.4 Definition of a high quality decision making process  
Following from the above-identified preliminary definition and characteristics of high 
quality decision making, a definition can now be offered that will inform the rest of the 
research: 
High quality decision making results in decisions that lead to the achievement of 
the project’s primary objectives. The characteristics of such decision making 
include that: 
• Objectives, alternatives and risks should be well-considered, acknowledging 
the multi-dimensional nature of most decision making problems 
• The process should be informed with accurate, adequate and unbiased data, 
and take past lessons learned into account 
• The process should be inclusive, taking a wide range of stakeholder opinions 
into account 
• The process should be transparent, with an audit trail to ensure that the 
decisions can be explained and justified. 
• The process should be flexible and able to adapt to the context of the process 
through build-in iterative feedback loops. 
• The process should result in detailed implementation, monitoring and 
contingency plans 
It is worthwhile noting that the above set of decision making characteristics are not 
necessarily complete – due to the extent of the subject analysed that is unlikely. The 
process that led to the identification of this set of characteristics did however attempt to 
follow high quality decision making characteristics, i.e. well-considered, informed, 
transparent etc.  
4.3 Decision aiding to support high quality decision making 
Now that a useful set of characteristics of high quality decision making have been 
identified, the focus will shift towards how decision aiding can help realise these 
characteristics during the decision making process, ultimately assisting in the 
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Literature will firstly be reviewed on the philosophy underlying decision aiding. This 
review, along with three decision aiding case studies in appendix D, will inform the 
identification of a decision quality framework against which to judge the contribution of 
existing decision aiding tools and approaches to high quality decision making.  
4.3.1 The philosophy underlying decision aiding 
4.3.1.1 Definition of decision aiding 
Decision aiding definitions tend to focus on integrating stakeholders’ value systems / 
preferences into the decision making process, while maintaining clarity and objectivity, as 
is illustrated by the following: 
 “Decision aiding is the activity of the person who, through the use of explicit but 
not necessarily completely formalised models, help obtain elements of the 
responses to questions posed by a stakeholder of a decision process. These 
elements work towards clarifying the decision and usually towards 
recommending, or simply favouring, a behaviour that will increase the consistency 
between the evolution of the process and this stakeholder’s objectives and value 
systems.” [Roy 1996] 
“[Decision aiding is] a process which seeks to integrate objective measurement 
with value judgement [and] make explicit and manage subjectivity” [Belton and 
Steward 2002:p3] 
Decision aiding as described by the above definitions improves the quality of the decision 
making process in a number of ways, including that: 
• by focusing on the need to “make explicit and manage [the] subjectivity” which exists 
in the various stakeholders’ objectives and value systems, the likelihood of well-
considered and informed decisions is increased. 
• by using “explicit but not necessarily completely formalised models” decision aiding 
provides a flexible structure to the decision making process. 
• by trying to “obtain elements of the responses to questions posed by a stakeholder” 
decision aiding helps to clarify the decision problem, and increases the likelihood of 
a feeling of process ownership amongst the stakeholders, identified as important 
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However, although the above definitions are valuable they do not directly relate to all the 
characteristics of high quality decision making (e.g. detailed implementation and 
monitoring plans).  A more general definition will therefore be used in this research: 
Decision aiding consists of activities, tools and approaches designed to improve 
the quality of decision making to which it is applied. 
Before the characteristics of decision aiding tools and approaches aligned to this 
definition are identified, some important decision aiding concepts first require further 
introduction.  
4.3.1.2 Multi- versus single-criteria decision analysis  
Literature within the field of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) comments at length 
on the importance of making explicit within the decision making process the multi-
dimensionality of the factors influencing a decision problem: 
“The very nature of multiple criteria problems is that there is much information of 
a complex and conflicting nature, often reflecting different viewpoints and often 
changing with time. One of the principle aims of MCDA approaches is to help 
decision makers organise and synthesise such information in a way which leads 
them to feel comfortable and confident about making a decision, minimising the 
potential for post-decision regret by being satisfied that all criteria or factors have 
properly been taken into account.” [Belton and Steward 2002:p1] 
At this point it is informative to explore the difference between a single- and a multi-
criteria analysis. In a single criterion analysis, the (possibly very heterogeneous) 
consequences of each potential action are quantified in the units of a single significance 
axis chosen beforehand.  
Economic evaluation during the decision making process, proposed in numerous 
references including Khatib [2003] and Willis and Scott [2000], is essentially a single-
criterion approach, where all characteristics of the project are presented in terms of one 
criterion, usually financial costs or benefits.  
The limitation of such a single-criterion approach is that the uncertainties around non-
financial factors are often difficult to quantify into financial costs or benefits. The 
uncertainties around these factors are therefore not made explicit and addressed during 
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A multi-criteria analysis, on the other hand, “aims to make explicit a coherent family of 
criteria (not reduced to a single element at the outset) that will serve as an intelligible, 
acceptable, and exhaustive instrument of communication allowing conception, 
justification, and transformation of preferences within the decision process.” [Roy 1996] 
The site selection process used for the Klipheuwel wind energy demonstration farm is a 
good example of a well-executed multi-criteria analysis process (discussed in detail in 
Appendix E). This analysis acknowledged the multi-dimensionality of the decision 
problem through the use of a family of criteria which covered a wide spectrum of impacts, 
from financial (e.g. wind speed and land ownership), technical and social (e.g. proximity 
to residential areas) to ecological.  
The two approaches must sometimes be combined, for example so that existing single-
criteria tools can be used, as was done by Heinrich [2008] in his proposed Approach to 
electricity investment planning for multiple objectives and uncertainty. During the first 
phase of his approach, where decision alternatives are generated, Heinrich integrates 
multiple objectives into an existing single-objective modelling process by including non-
cost objectives (e.g. environmental) in the form of cost penalties, in effect reducing 
multiple performance measures into a single dimension: cost. However, in the next stage 
where decision makers have to choose between the generated alternatives, Heinrich 
propose the use of a value function-based multi-criteria decision aiding process.  
4.3.1.3 The spirit of recommendation 
Two distinct decision aiding approaches (or spirits of recommendation as defined by Roy 
[1996]) become apparent in literature: the descriptive and constructive approaches 
towards making explicit stakeholder values and preferences.  
With the descriptive approach, the assumption is made that a latent system of 
preference relations exists in the mind of the decision maker before the decision aiding 
commenced. This system is however not explicit to the decision maker. The task of 
decision aiding is to clarify or describe (without influencing) this system of preference 
relations as exactly as possible. 
The descriptive approach is based on utility (value) theory and the assumption of a 
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maximise utility, and will make transitive18 choices (Keeny and Raiffa [1976]). 
Psychological studies however proved that the assumption of the rational person is often 
unrealistic, thereby also shedding doubt on the existence of a single utility function 
representing a decision maker’s preferences.  
The constructive approach, on the other hand, is based on the hypothesis that a 
stakeholder can be led by the decision aiding process to modify his or her preferences, 
either through lack of initial opinions, or through valid arguments presented during the 
process. Roy [1996] is a strong supporter of this perspective.  
An example of the differences between the two approaches is in how statistical and 
structural dependence between two decision criteria are handled. In a descriptive 
approach the analyst might consider replacing two dependant criteria with a new single 
criterion. In the constructive approach the analyst might again prefer to keep both criteria 
separate in the model, as more complete or effective bases for guiding the decision 
process. 
Belton and Steward [2002:p336] strongly advocate an integrated approach that 
incorporates both approaches, allowing the analyst to choose which paradigm is more 
applicable for the particular problem. The approaches and tools developed in this 
research align with this view, although later sections will illustrate that a constructive spirit 
of recommendation is typically better suited to this research’s context. 
4.3.1.4 Optimal vs. compromise solutions 
It is worthwhile noting that decision aiding, within a constructive spirit of recommendation, 
in many cases will only be able to support a compromise solution to the decision problem 
rather than an optimal solution: 
“[The solution to a] decision problem is therefore not searching for some kind of 
hidden truth 7 but rather helping the decision-maker to master the (often 
complex) data involved in his problem and advance towards a solution.” [Roy 
1996] 
Mathematics-based decision aiding tools should be seen within this perspective of 
optimal vs. compromise solutions, as stated by Vincke [1992]: 
                                               
18
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“In general, it is impossible to say that a decision is a good or bad one by 
referring solely to a mathematical model. The organisational, pedagogical and 
cultural aspects of the entire decision process that lead to a given decision will 
also contribute to its quality and success.”  
Vincke also quotes Scharlig [1985], who states that decision aiding is about “putting an 
individual at the centre of the problem, with mathematics around him as peripheral 
instruments, rather than putting mathematics in the centre and reducing the individual to 
what they are capable of understanding of him.” 
Differentiating between an optimal and compromise solution leads to the question of how 
an iterative decision making process should end: a convergence test would not be 
suitable, as this assumes an optimal solution. Rather, the process should end when the 
decision-makers are satisfied with the solution or makes the decision that they have 
enough information about the problem. [Belton and Steward 2002] 
4.3.1.5 Decision aiding that acknowledges uncertainty 
Decision aiding should support the central theme in this research: acknowledgment of 
both the soft and hard uncertainties that might occur in projects.  As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the assumption of the applicability of probability is flawed when dealing with 
hard uncertainty, and the use of only probability to model project uncertainties during 
decision aiding should therefore be avoided. 
4.3.1.6 To which actors are decision aiding given? 
The form of the decision aiding tool or approach might differ according to the actors to 
which decision aiding is given.  
The context of rural electrification decision making is often similar to that of land use 
planning described by Belton and Steward [2002:p23], where “decisions are ultimately 
take at a political level, but this is typically preceded by a process of consultation with 
interested groups, and of analysis and screening of options by consultants and / or state 
officials.” In this research the “political level” referred to in this quote is interpreted as 
representing both government and donor organisations. 
In this context, decision aiding is typically given to one or more of the following three 
groups: 
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2. group forums with representatives from different individual interest groups, to 
“facilitate the reaching of consensus” [Belton and Steward 2002:p23], 
3.  consultants or analysts who wish to identify and present the most suitable 
alternatives to the decision makers at the political level. 
In their discussion of land use planning decision aiding, Belton and Steward highlight the 
importance of an audit trail documenting the rationale behind the preliminary decisions to 
be presented to the political decision makers.  
4.3.2 Lessons learned from three decision aiding case studies 
The author was involved in a number of projects where tools and approaches were 
developed and used to aid decision making. A selection of case studies based on these 
experiences has been presented in Appendix D, to clarify and confirm decision aiding 
concepts introduced in the preceding section on decision aiding philosophy, and to 
inform the identification of a decision quality framework. 
In this section only the lessons learned from these case studies will be presented: for 
details, refer to Appendix D. 
• Multi-criteria analysis greatly improves information transfer between different 
shareholders, and provides a useful framework for discussions.  
• Using qualitative rather than quantitative measurement scales during early project 
stages makes the process more efficient, and avoids the distraction of shareholder 
disagreements about quantitative details that are irrelevant at this stage of the 
decision process.  
• Valuable information is maintained within the decision making process by not 
aggregating criteria ratings too early in a decision process.  
• Information sources / methodologies should be transparent.  
• The choice of criteria family is highly context specific. 
• Even in the case where one alternative is clearly superior to all the rest, the runner-up 
alternative and the process that led to their identification should still be clearly 
communicated. This gives the decision maker confidence in the process, and informs 
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• The sustainability of a project often depends on non-technological factors which 
appear to over-ride the technical preferences of the project initiators.  
• Sharing accurate information and highlighting uncertainties during the problem 
structuring phase of decision aiding can significantly alter the preferences of decision 
makers.  
• Including previous experience / lessons learned in the decision aiding process offer 
significant benefits.  
4.3.3 Criteria to measure the quality of decision aiding tools and 
approaches 
The preceding decision aiding literature review and case studies provide a background 
from which a framework of criteria can now be identified, against which to measure the 
contribution of decision aiding tools and approaches to high quality decision making. This 
framework will be referred to as the “decision quality framework” for the remainder of this 
research.  
This decision quality framework is shown in Table 4-1 below, and attempts to incorporate 
the lessons learned through previous decision aiding experiences, along with important 
concepts that were noted during the literature review, while trying to keep the set of 
criteria usable. The identified framework is basically an extension of the characteristics of 
high quality decision making identified in section 4.2.4, and aligns with Roy [1996]’s idea 
of developing “explicit but not necessarily completely formalised models” to support the 
decision making process. 
 For reasons of simplicity and usability the measurement scale chosen in this framework 
indicate whether the criterion applies to the specific tool or approach, and if so, the level 
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Table 4-1: Decision quality framework to measure the contribution of decision aiding tools and approaches to 
high quality decision making. 
High quality decision 
making characteristics 
Criteria of tools and approaches that aid high 
quality decision making  
Contribution of the 
tool/approach (Negative, 
None, Limited, Strong, Not 
Applicable) 
Well considered 
Decision problem structured (i.e. objectives, 
criteria and alternatives clearly defined)? 
 
Multi-dimensionality acknowledged?  
Soft uncertainties acknowledged?  
Hard uncertainties acknowledged?  
Informed 
Incorporate past lessons learned / experiences?  
Accurate, adequate and unbiased data?  
Inclusive Stakeholder inclusive?  
Transparent 
Transparent data sources / methodologies?  
Audit trail?  
Flexible and adaptive 




Detailed implementation plans as outcome?  
Post-process monitoring plans as outcome?  
4.4 Is high quality decision making sufficient? 
The decision quality framework developed in the previous section now allows the final 
research question to be addressed. This question in essence asks whether a high quality 
decision making process (which has been shown to include uncertainty 
acknowledgement) is sufficient to ensure the achievement of sustainable development 
objectives. 
This section will answer the question by testing the sustainable development contribution 
of what has been identified in Appendix E as a high quality decision making process: the 
site selection process leading to the establishment of the Klipheuwel Wind Energy 
Demonstration Facility (KWEDF). 
4.4.1 Case study: site selection project leading to the KWEDF  
Although the KWEDF project itself falls outside the off-grid electrification context 
considered in this research, the site selection that lead to this project is used as case 
study for the following reasons: 
• The use of renewable energy, and the decision problem addressed (site selection 
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• A large body of information exists in the public sphere on the decision making 
processes that took place in this project.  
• The comparative abundance of available information, along with the high quality 
of decision making employed in this project, offers a unique opportunity to study a 
successfully completed electrification decision making process in South Africa in 
detail. 
4.4.1.1 Evaluation of decision making quality 
The decision aiding process underlying the site selection process was consistently of 
high quality, as shown in the summary of the evaluation (Table 4-2; for details of the full 
evaluation, refer to Appendix E). In this evaluation the decision quality framework 
identified in the previous section served as benchmark against which to compare the 
process.  
    Table 4-2: Summary of the contribution of decision aiding to high quality decision making during the site 
selection project leading to the KWEDF (see Appendix E for details) 
High quality decision 
making characteristics 
Criteria of tools and approaches that aid high 
quality decision making  
Contribution of the 
tool/approach (Negative, 
None, Limited, Strong, Not 
Applicable) 
Well considered 
Decision problem structured (i.e. objectives, 
criteria and alternatives clearly defined)? 
Strong 
Multi-dimensionality acknowledged? Strong 
Soft uncertainties acknowledged? Strong 
Hard uncertainties acknowledged? Limited 
Informed 
Incorporate past lessons learned / experiences? 
Strong 
Accurate, adequate and unbiased data? 
Inclusive Stakeholder inclusive? Strong 
Transparent 
Transparent data sources / methodologies? Strong 
Audit trail? Strong 
Flexible and adaptive 




Detailed implementation plans as outcome? 
Strong 
Post-process monitoring plans as outcome? 
4.4.1.2 Achievement of primary project objectives 
According to the definition of high quality decision making developed in the previous 
sections, if the quality of the decision aiding process during a project was high, the 
decisions made should have resulted in the project achieving its primary objectives. In 
the site selection project this definition can be shown to hold true: 
• In essence, the primary project objectives of the site selection project was to 












p98 – Section 4.4 
rated at around 10 MW in total, for an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
and ultimately to get one of these recommended sites approved by the EIA. 
• The Oliphantskop and Klipheuwel sites were recommended to be most suitable 
for the EIA process, with the Philadelphia site kept in reserve. Klipheuwel was 
ultimately approved by the EIA. 
It is clear that the site selection project’s primary objectives have been achieved. 
4.4.1.3 Contribution to sustainable development 
It appears from the literature that no attempt was however made to align the site 
selection process’s primary objectives with sustainable development objectives.  
It can be argued that in selecting the location of the (K)WEDF, which the site selection 
project defined, sustainable development was irrelevant given that the ultimate objectives 
of the project were technology demonstration and testing. Yet a sizable amount of money 
was spent on sustainable development activities (in the form of local community 
development), which is clearly a function of the location of the site:  
• Eskom committed R1 million into a trust towards building a new school closer to 
the community. [Smit et. al. 2004] 
• Two large containers, donated by Maersk, were converted into an additional 
classroom for the Klipheuwel Primary School, situated 3km from a poor 
community. Eskom and Partners International funded the material and labour. 
Although sustainable development was clearly a part of the outcomes of the project 
through the community development funding described above, it was excluded from the 
formal site selection process primary objectives.  
The impact of this exclusion is difficult to judge after the fact, but the literature reviewed 
up to now supports the likelihood that inclusion (e.g. through the use of a “community 
development opportunities/costs” criterion [Bekker and Gaunt 2005]) might have resulted 
in a greater sustainable development impact for the same expenditure than that which 
actually occurred.  
Excluding community development as an initial project objective also makes the decision 
making process vulnerable to the accusation that the community development 
expenditure was not motivated by a desire for sustainable development, but was driven 
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4.4.2 Alignment between primary and sustainable development objectives 
The above KWEDF site selection project illustrates that even though high quality decision 
making occurred, sustainable development objectives were not explicitly considered 
during the formal decision process. This potentially decreased the sustainable 
development impact of the project, and opened it up to criticism. In essence, these 
problems were caused by non-alignment between the primary project objectives and 
sustainable development objectives. 
Even though this alignment of objectives can easily be added as an additional criterion 
within the decision quality framework developed earlier, in this research it will be kept 
separate. The motivation for this is purely academic, based on the definition of high 
quality decision making as resulting in the achievement of primary project objectives, and 
not specifically sustainable development objectives. 
4.4.3 The second hypothesis tested 
The KWEDF case study highlights that high quality decision making by itself is not 
sufficient to achieve sustainable development objectives: alignment between such 
objectives and the project’s primary objectives is also required.  
This chapter also reached three other conclusions:  
1. differentiating between soft and hard uncertainties offer advantages within the context 
of South African off-grid electrification projects,  
2. high quality decision making per definition leads to primary project objectives 
achievement, and 
3. uncertainty acknowledgement forms an important part of the decision aiding that 
supports high quality decision making. 
The above conclusions provide enough evidence to validate the second part of the 
research hypothesis:  
A high quality decision making process that is capable of acknowledging both 
hard and soft uncertainties will assist off-grid projects in reaching their primary 
project objectives (but not necessarily sustainable development objectives, unless 
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4.5 In summary 
This chapter set out to answer four research questions. The following answers were 
found to these research questions, allowing the second part of the hypothesis to be 
validated: 
What are the advantages of differentiating between soft and hard uncertainties? 
The analyses in section 4.1 highlighted that a single conceptualisation of 
uncertainty risks ignoring those uncertainties that often can’t be represented in 
decision aiding approaches due to their non-probabilistic nature, i.e. hard 
uncertainties. 
An analysis of significant off-grid electrification project uncertainties (identified in 
the previous chapter) showed that almost all of these uncertainties were hard. 
This fact offers a strong motivation for differentiating between soft and hard 
uncertainties within off-grid electrification decision aiding, thereby acknowledging 
the hard uncertainties that previously might have been ignored within the decision 
making process. 
What are the characteristics of high quality decision making? 
A literature review defined high quality decision making, and its characteristics 
(see section 4.2.4).  
What are the criteria of a decision aiding process which supports high quality 
decision making, and do these criteria include hard and soft uncertainty 
acknowledgement? 
The criteria of a decision aiding process that supports high quality decision 
making are listed in Table 4-1.  It became apparent that hard and soft uncertainty 
acknowledgement forms a part of these criteria. 
Is high quality decision making sufficient to ensure that off-grid projects achieve 
sustainable development objectives, and if not, what are the additional 
requirements? 
No, in addition to high quality decision making, alignment between primary project 
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5 Improving decision aiding approaches and tools 
The research has, up to this point, identified that uncertainty acknowledgment forms a 
crucial part of high quality decision making, alongside alignment between sustainable 
development and primary project objectives. This chapter will now apply these findings 
towards improving existing high quality decision aiding tools and approaches, especially 
in three areas:  objective alignment, and soft and hard uncertainty acknowledgement, 
with the aim of testing the final part of the research hypothesis: 
Applying existing high quality decision aiding tools and approaches, with 
improved uncertainty acknowledgment and objectives alignment capabilities, to 
off-grid projects will increase such projects' impact on sustainable development. 
Three research questions will guide this chapter, as shown in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: Conceptual map showing how the different sections of Chapter 5 and the appendixes relate to 
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5.1 Identifying an existing high quality approach and tools 
Ideally the “existing high quality decision aiding approach and associated tools” 
mentioned in the research hypothesis should be chosen from those that have already 
been used within South African electrification projects. Unfortunately, as shown in 
Appendix B, no formal use of decision aiding approaches or tools could be identified in 
any of these projects, with the following exceptions: 
• The Homer and RETScreen renewable energy resource estimation tools, used at 
Lucingweni and Hluleka.  
The Excel-based RETScreen Clean Energy Project Development software 
[RETScreen 2009] can estimate RES-based energy production for a specified 
location, and also offers cost, emissions, financial and risk analyses. 
The Homer Micropower Optimisation Model software [Homer 2009] can optimise 
system component sizing in RES-based projects, either grid-connected or off-grid, 
can do basic cost and financial analyses, and allows some risk analysis by allowing 
the user to specify restraints like “maximum annual capacity shortage (%)”.  
These tools are updated often, and are widely used internationally in off-grid 
electrification projects. They also support high quality decision making to a large 
extent, as shown in Table 5-1, and will therefore be used as example tools within this 
research. 




Criteria of tools and 
approaches that aid high 
quality decision making  
Contribution of the tool/approach (Negative, None, 
Limited, Strong, Not Applicable) 
Well considered 
Decision problem structured 
(i.e. objectives, criteria and 
alternatives clearly defined)? 
Not Applicable   
Multi-dimensionality 
acknowledged? 
Strong: RETScreen and Homer both acknowledge the 
main dimensions of the decision problem they aim to 
aid: technical (energy output), financial (capital and 
ongoing costs and economic viability) and, in the case 
of RETScreen, environmental (emissions). 
Soft uncertainties 
acknowledged? 
Limited: RETScreen includes a financial sensitivity and 
monte carlo risk analysis component, which evaluates 
the sensitivity of important financial indicators in 
relation to key technical and financial parameters. 
Homer includes a powerful sensitivity analysis, 
evaluating the impact on system size and cost for a 
wide range of varying inputs, including climate, 
technical and cost parameters. 
Neither software, however, address uncertainties 
related to the accuracy of the energy estimation models 
on which their calculations are based.  A number of 
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potentially valid for North American climatic conditions, 
might result in significant accuracies in a South African 
context. These assumptions include the use of monthly 
rather than hourly / 5 minute climatic data, simplified 




 Not Applicable 
Informed 
Incorporate past lessons 
learned / experiences? 
Not Applicable 
Accurate, adequate and 
unbiased data? 
Strong: RETScreen and Homer were specifically 
developed to inform decision making processes. The 
results from the programs are however only as 
accurate as the inputs into them (rubbish in, rubbish 
out), and can at worst mislead the decision process 
(negative contribution). If the assumption is however 
made that external uncertainties (e.g. the accuracy of 
the weather data) are managed, the research 
presented by Bekker [2008:p7] indicates that the 
impact of internal uncertainties on accuracy is less that 
10% for the South African locations that were 
investigated, indicating that these two tools can offer 
strong contributions to the decision process. 
Inclusive Stakeholder inclusive? Not Applicable  
Transparent 
Transparent data sources / 
methodologies? 
Strong: The methodologies used in both software 
programs, as well as the default data sources used by 
the programs (e.g. NASA SSE satellite weather data), 
are well documented and fully transparent.   
Audit trail? 
Strong: RETScreen and Homer both allow the user to 
save the input parameter data that was used in the 
project, enabling future reruns of the estimation. Homer 
can also output the input parameters in html format, 
while RETScreen is Excel based, allowing effortless 
inclusion of the simulation inputs and results in the 
project documentation. These factors contribute to a 
high quality audit trail. 
Flexible and 
adaptive 
Process can adapt to context 
through iterative feedback 
loops? 
Strong: The tools are software-based, and therefore 




Detailed implementation plans 
as outcome? 
Not Applicable  
Post-process monitoring plans 
as outcome? 
 
• Banks’ electrification planning tool, used within the SHS concession programme, as 
described in Banks et al [2000].  
Unfortunately little information exists in literature on the application of this tool.  
A potential limitation of the tool is that it quantifies important factors like distance from 
existing grid and accessibility of the area, and then applies a weighted sum of these 
quantities to arrive at electrification priorities for different areas. This mathematical 
process is not transparent, leading to a lack of trust among decision makers about 
the validity of the results of the tool, as stated by a decision maker involved in a 
process where the tool was used [Anonymous 2007]. The developer of the tool, 
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the continued development and support of the tool. For the above reasons this tool 
will not be studied further in this chapter.  
• The multi-criteria approach used for the grid-connected Klipheuwel project.  
This approach was embedded in South African EIA legislation. As this EIA process is 
only required for projects resulting in individual generators above 1MW, it is not 
applicable for most off-grid electrification projects and will therefore not be used as a 
demonstration approach here. The lessons from this approach have however been 
incorporated into the research in Chapter 4. 
South African academic literature and post-implementation project evaluations offer 
further potential sources for the identification of decision aiding approaches and tools. 
Two approaches from these sources are potentially of interest: 
• Heinrich’s proposed ESI investment planning approach for multiple objectives and 
uncertainty.  
As part of his PhD research, Heinrich [2008] developed a framework that policy 
makers and planners can use to analyse and plan for investment in the electricity 
supply industry (ESI). This framework aims to address the decision problem around 
the choice of future power generation technology on a national level.  
An adaptation of Heinrich’s approach might be of value within off-grid electrification 
planning, in the manner in which it integrates multiple objectives into the decision 
making process while acknowledging underlying uncertainties.  
The approach however integrates multiple objectives into an existing single-objective 
modelling process by including non-cost objectives (e.g. environmental) in the form of 
cost penalties, in effect reducing multiple performance measures into a single 
dimension: cost.  
It will be difficult to integrate hard uncertainty acknowledgement into this single-
objective modelling process, and for this reason this approach is considered 
unsuitable for the requirements of this research.   
• The logical framework approach, as used in the evaluation of the National 
Electrification Programme [DME 2001b].  
The logical framework approach (LFA) was used retrospectively to evaluate the 
South African National Electrification Programme (1994-1999). This approach is well 
suited to the aims of this research, as it focuses strongly on project objectives, and 
potentially offers a flexible framework into which uncertainty acknowledgement and 
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In addition, the LFA is popular internationally in developmental projects, with large 
donor organisations like AusAid and EuropeAid mandating the use of this approach in 
many of their projects. 
An evaluation was done in Table 5-2 of the well-documented European Commision’s 
Project Cycle Management (PCM) and LFA [EC 2002], and this indicates that these 
approaches to a large extent support high quality decision making. 
For the above reasons PCM and LFA will be used as the example decision aiding 
approach in this research. For a more detailed description of PCM and LFA, please 
refer to Appendix F. 




Criteria of tools and 
approaches that aid high 
quality decision making  
Contribution of the tool/approach (Negative, None, 
Limited, Strong, Not Applicable) 
Well considered 
Decision problem 
structured (i.e. objectives, 
criteria and alternatives 
clearly defined)? 
Strong: PCM uses LFA during the project design stages to 
structure the decision problem in detail, according to 
different levels of objectives, with outcomes and indicators. 
Alignment encouraged 




Strong: The Integrated Approach used in PCM encourages 
alignment between the overarching national/sectoral 
objectives (policy objectives of the EC within this context) 
defined during the programme phase of the project cycle, 
and the Logframe-defined objectives and results-based 
workplans and budgets defined during the planning and 
appraisal phases.  
Multi-dimensionality 
acknowledged? 
Strong: PCM and LFA encourage the identification of 
“cross-cutting issues” and multiple objectives, and the LFA 
is structured in such a way that the multi-dimensionality of 
the decision problem remains clear, for example through 




Limited: A number of mechanisms encourage decision 
makers to acknowledge the risks involved in the project. 
These include:  
• a PCM-required section in all project documentation on 
“Assumptions and risks”;  
• the inclusion of risk in the quality criteria/questions lists 
used during the programming, identification and 
appraisal phases to ensure well-considered decisions, 
for example the questions “What are the assumptions 
and risks underlying the objectives? How critical to the 
programme’s success are they and how likely is it that 
they will be achieved?” [EC 2002:10] within the 
programming phase;  
• the Assumptions column in the Logframe encourage 
the DM to focus on assumptions or risks outside his/her 
control; 
• these Assumptions/Risks can be monitored in the same 
way as Results, through the use of Indicators and 
Sources of Verification 
In all the above mechanisms the risk exist that uncertainties 
critical to the success of the project are not identified during 
the planning stages, or not at all. The EC [2008:51] 
recognise this risk when it list eight Quality Factors which, 
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term sustainability of project benefits: ownership by 
beneficiaries, policy support, appropriate technology, socio-
cultural issues, gender equality, environmental protection, 
institutional and management capacity, and economic and 
financial viability. The EC suggest that these factors “should 
be kept in mind from the planning stage onwards.”  
Informed 
Incorporate past lessons 
learned / experiences? 
Strong: An evaluation study is required by PCM at the end 
of a project. The lessons learned in this study are available 
to inform later programming and identification stages. The 
standardised documentation required by PCM has a section 
that should include “lessons from past experience, and 
linkage with other donors’ activities” [EC 2002:5] The list of 
eight Quality Factors is also an attempt to inform the 
process with past lessons learned.  
Accurate, adequate and 
unbiased data? 
None: PCM and LFA do not include any mechanisms to 
ensure the quality of the data used in the decision process. 
Inclusive Stakeholder inclusive? 
Strong: PCM requires consulting and involving key 
stakeholders as much as possible. The first activity during 
the analysis phase of the LFA is also a stakeholder analysis 
to identify and characterise different stakeholders. Although 
stakeholder participation is strongly encouraged by the 
PCM and LFA, in the end it is in the hands of the analyst / 
decision makers.   
Transparent 
Transparent data sources 
/ methodologies? 
Strong: The methodologies on which PCM and LFA are 
based is easy to understand and follow, and is well suited to 
a transparent process. The standardised documentation 
required by the PCM also provides a well-documented audit 




Process can adapt to 
context through iterative 
feedback loops? 
Strong: Monitoring and reporting are two of the three major 
principles (along with planning) that are applied throughout 
the implementation phase of the project cycle. This is 
achieved through the Logframe by defining “Objectively 
Verifiable Indicators” and “Sources of Verification” for each 
objective, and is a required section in the standardised 
reporting documentation required by PCM. This 
standardised reporting forms the based of the PCM’s 
integrated approach: “The key principle of reporting is that 
attention is paid to the same important and critical elements 
from the early preparation until the very end, project 




plans as outcome? 
Strong: The Logframe generates clearly defines Results 
and Activities, which is then integrated into Results-based 
Activity and Resource schedules for the implementation 
phase. 
Post-process monitoring 
plans as outcome? 
Strong: The PCM includes an evaluation phase with an 
evaluation study as outcome. The standardised 
documentation required by PCM also includes a “monitoring 
and evaluation” section under the heading of 
“implementation arrangements”   
 
Additional decision aiding approaches and tools might exist that will also be useful within 
this research. The identified approach (the PCM/LFA) and associated tools (RETScreen 
and Homer) should however adequately serve the requirements of this research: of 
acting as examples into which uncertainty acknowledgement and objective alignment can 
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5.2 Improving objectives alignment 
The analyses of Klipheuwel highlighted the impact of a lack of alignment between 
sustainable development and project objectives. This section will look at ways in which to 
address this problem, by utilising the PCM / LFA approach and improving it where 
required to better suit the context of off-grid electrification projects.  
5.2.1 Objectives and the PCM / LFA approach 
One of the core strengths of the PCM / LFA is that it focuses the decision maker’s 
attention on project objectives, from the initial programming stages of the project lifecycle 
up to implementation: 
• During the programming stage of the PCM the focus is on the situation at a national 
or sectorial level, with a Country Strategy Paper defining the main objectives of the 
program in order to offer a relevant and feasible framework within which projects can 
be identified and prepared. Note that the structure of the Country Strategic Paper, 
and all other documentation generated during the PCM process, is informed by a 
standardised PCM document structure as shown in Figure 5-2 (the structure is 
presented in Figure 5-3) 
• During the identification phase the relevance of project ideas are explored within the 
programming framework, with pre-feasibility studies leading to Project Identification 
Sheets. These project ideas are required to align with the framework of programme 
objectives. The focus during this identification phase is largely on project objectives, 
as shown by the fact that the objectives areas of the Logframe (the framework 
generated by the LFA, as explained in Appendix F) need to be completed in full 
during this stage, while the rest of the Logframe only needs to be completed in full 
during the next appraisal stage. 
• During the appraisal phase the project ideas generated earlier is developed into 
project plans as part of a feasibility study. 
5.2.2 Integrating energisation sustainable development objectives 
The standardised structure of all documentation within the PCM offers a useful 
mechanism to ensure alignment between project and sustainable development 
objectives: it is proposed that the energisation framework, developed in section 2.3, be 
integrated into this standard document structure (as originally proposed in [Bekker and 
Gaunt 2007]), to inform the programming and identification stages (as shown in Figure 5-
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sustainable development objectives 
additional section.  
Figure 5-2: The proposed improv
sustainable development 
Figure 5-3: It is proposed that the 
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– the energisation framework will be included in this 
ements of the PCM approach in order to ensure primary project and 
objectives alignment. 
energisation framework be integrated into the existing doc
, under a new section titled “Alignment with sustainable 
development”.  
ion into the standard structure includes that analysts / 
on / audit trail to justify their choice of 
energisation framework which clearly summarise 
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It should be noted that the framework that is proposed here for integration relates to 
energisation, not off-grid electrification: this decision was made in the light of the 
discussion in section 2.4.1, where the limitations of off-grid electrification outside a wider 
energisation strategy was acknowledged.    
5.2.3 Verification through “Quality Criteria” questions 
EuropeAid’s PCM / LFA documentation recommends that the analyst asks specific 
“Quality Criteria” questions during each stage of the PCM process, to ensure that 
essential requirements of that stage have been addressed. A question within the 
identification phase that is relevant in this research context is: “Are the project objectives 
in line with the overarching policy objectives of strengthening good governance, human 
rights and the rule of law, and poverty alleviation?” [EC 2002:p13] Objectives alignment 
is already a focus of the PCM approach through questions like this one, which verifies 
the alignment of the identified project’s objectives within the overarching programme 
objectives.  
It is proposed that a similar “Quality Criteria” question is additionally included in both the 
programming and identification stages, specifically relating to sustainable development: 
“Does the programming / project objectives align to the primary sustainable development 
objectives of energisation?” as shown in Figure 5-2. 
5.3 Improving soft uncertainty acknowledgement 
During the analyses of the uncertainties within completed South African off-grid projects 
it became clear that the majority of the uncertainties could be classified as hard using 
Young [2001]’s definition. There was however a few unacknowledged soft uncertainties 
within these projects: how to acknowledge them will be the focus of this section. 
The “Inaccurate estimation of renewable resource availability” and “Incorrect estimation 
of system consumption” project uncertainties (in the context where they are classified as 
soft – see section 4.1.5) will be used here as examples to illustrate how existing soft 
uncertainty acknowledgement tools can be improved. 
Specifically two sets of tools will be discussed:  
• The first set of tools is the existing Homer and RETScreen renewable resource 
estimation software: these tools will be used to illustrate how the soft uncertainty 
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analyse the accuracy of the estimations produced by these tools and more generally 
the uncertainty introduced by using various South African weather data sets, and 
propose ways in which these findings can be incorporated into the PCM approach.   
• The second tool will be developed as part of this research, and aims to address the 
impact of load and resource estimation uncertainties on the final renewable energy 
system sizing. It is proposed that this uncertainty be managed through the 
introduction of an adequacy confidence index, once again incorporated into the PCM 
approach.  
5.3.1 The applicability and accuracy of resource estimation 
Homer and RETScreen are well suited to estimating the renewable resource availability 
within South African off-grid projects, as described earlier. The accuracy of these tools is 
however crucial: an inaccurate estimate will result in under- or over-designed systems, 
which will either not supply rural households with enough energy, or will cost more than 
is really required (leaving a smaller budget for additional electrification).  
This section reports on the results of a modelling and simulation process that explored 
the impact of various uncertainties on the accuracy of these programs, using as example 
PV systems installed in various climatic regions of South Africa. Only a brief background 
to the process and results will be presented in this section: full details can be found in 
[Bekker and Gaunt 2008]  
A method is also proposed of integrating the results from this process into the example 
decision aiding approach selected for this research, the PCM / LFA approach. 
5.3.1.1 Background to the modelling and simulation process 
Uncertainties impacting PV array energy output estimation can be split into those arising 
from the historical weather data used in the estimation process, and those arising from 
the models used to simulate PV array energy production, as shown in Figure 5-4. This 
section focus on those soft uncertainties whose impacts can be simulated or modelled, 
and is guided by the following research questions: 
• Historical weather data 
o What influence does the use of averaged monthly and hourly, rather than 5-
minute irradiation data sets have on PV array energy output estimation?  
o What uncertainty is introduced when only global solar irradiation data sets are 
used, and diffuse irradiation is estimated?  












o How does the type of electrical 
output impact the accuracy of the estimates?
o How applicable to the South African climatic context is 
is used to calculate the diffuse irradiation on a tilted PV surface? 
• What is the combined i
RETScreen and Homer
Figure 5-4: Indication of what uncertainties, relating specifically to PV array
included within the scope of the modelling and simulation process
Homer and RETScreen uses hourly or monthly global irradiation data sets as inputs, 
estimate the diffuse irradiation component, and 
diffuse radiation models developed for North America / Europe (as shown in 
For this reason they are well
compared to a “best case” 
developed for this research
complex electrical model, and a diffuse radiation model applicable to the South African 
climatic context. SunSim’s user interface is shown in 
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The research questions are answered using weather data sets for four different locations 
representative of South Africa’s climate: Cape Town, Durban, De Aar and Polokwane. 
The weather data sets are used as inputs into the HOMER and RETScreen programs, 
and the resulting PV energy estimates are compared with estimates from SunSim. 
5.3.1.2 Results from the modelling and simulation process 
The results from this research is summarised below, with details of how the research 
questions were answered shown in [Bekker and Gaunt 2008]: 
• What influence does the use of averaged monthly and hourly, rather than 5-minute 
irradiation data sets have on PV array energy output estimation?  
o Software capable of modelling PV systems that are not connected to MPPTs 
(e.g. for water-pumping applications where the panel is connected directly to 
the pump) should avoid the use of monthly weather data inputs, as PV energy 
output might be overestimated by 20-25%  
o The impact on PV energy estimates of using hourly instead of 5-minute data 
sets is insignificant. 
o Assuming a ‘best case’ model like SunSim, use of monthly instead of 5-
minute data sets result in an overestimation of PV energy by around 5% 
• What uncertainty is introduced when only global solar irradiation data sets are used, 
and diffuse irradiation is estimated?  
o The impact of using synthesized instead of measured diffuse irradiation data 
sets is insignificant for locations with high beam-to-diffuse irradiation ratios. 
o Using synthesized instead of measured diffuse irradiation at locations with 
high diffuse irradiation can cause PV energy underestimation of 1-4%. 
• How does the type of electrical model used to calculate PV array energy output 
impact the accuracy of the estimates? 
o The use of PV array performance models that do not take PV cell temperature 
into account, as in Homer, results in underestimation of PV energy output of 
as much as 10%. 
• How applicable to the South African climatic context is the type of model that is used 
to calculate the diffuse irradiation on a tilted PV surface?  
o Isotropic tilted surface diffuse irradiation models cause PV energy 












p114 – Section 5.3 
• What is the combined impact of these uncertainties on the accuracy of using 
RETScreen and Homer software within the South African climatic context?  
o PV energy output is underestimated by 6-9% by Homer, and 0-6% by 
RETScreen for the South African locations simulated, compared to a ‘best 
case’ model like SunSim. Homer’s accuracy should increase if a temperature-
informed PV array performance model is used, and RETScreen’s if an 
anisotropic titled surface diffuse model is used. 
5.3.1.3 Integrating the results into the PCM approach 
The conclusions above, quantifying the soft uncertainties inherent in the use of decision 
aiding tools like Homer and RETScreen, has already been published. An additional step 
is however required where these quantified uncertainties are now integrated into the 
decision aiding process: being noted in a research paper will not sufficiently acknowledge 
the impact of these uncertainties within the actual decision making process. 
It is proposed that the impact of soft uncertainties related to renewable resource 
estimation be acknowledged by incorporating this uncertainty into the documentation 
structure required for the PCM approach. For example, the “Quality factors” section of 
this structure can make reference to a separate document entitled “Renewable energy 
estimation guidelines” as shown in Figure 5-7, which can include the following: 
• Recommendations on which software tools to use to mitigate this uncertainty, for 
example RETScreen and Homer, as well as the impact of the uncertainties 
introduced by using these software tools. 
• Details of South African weather data availability, and the impact of the uncertainties 
introduced by using different types of data. The document should include the main 
sources of weather data in South Africa (e.g. SAWS, Agromet, NASA satellites) along 
with details on where to find the data (contact details etc.) and maps showing the 
location of weather stations. 
• Within this document a weather data classification system is recommended, due to 
the variation between the accuracy of different weather data sources. The 
classification framework in Table 5-3 was developed in [Bekker 2007] and 
acknowledges the variations in accuracy and resolution among irradiation data 
sources. The system identifies the accuracy and resolution of the irradiation data 
using accuracy grades between A and D: for example, satellite-sourced monthly 
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Table 5-3: Accuracy and resolution classification system for South African irradiation data. The data grade is 
written as accuracy: resolution, for example sunshine hour derived 5-minute interval data will be classified as 
B:A [Bekker 2007] 
Accuracy Grading Resolution 
Regularly calibrated ground measurement 
stations, pyranometer accuracy < 1%, data 
accuracy < 10% 
A 
Daily measurements, 5- or 10-
minute intervals 
Estimates from hourly sunshine hour 
measurements 
B 
Daily measurements, 1-hour 
intervals 
Satellite measurements C Monthly average, 1-hour intervals 
Non-calibrated pyranometers or silicon-based 
irradiance meters 
D Daily or monthly average only 
Even when outside consultants are responsible for the renewable resource estimation, 
the above guidelines will still allow the analyst to verify the accuracy and applicability of 
the estimation process. 
 
Figure 5-7: Improving the PCM approach through the integration of renewable energy source estimation 
guidelines. 
5.3.2 Renewable energy system adequacy confidence index  
In the previous section the soft uncertainties around renewable system energy output 
estimation were discussed using the example of a PV system. This section zooms out 
slightly, and looks at soft uncertainty acknowledgment within a larger sub-set of a 
complete power system, which includes intermittent renewable energy sources, energy 
storage and the system load, but still excludes the impact of dispatchable and grid 
energy sources, as shown in Figure 5-8.    
Specifically, an adequacy confidence index will be presented as developed by Gaunt et 
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autonomous solar/wind installation to meet the expected load demand. The Lucingweni 
off-grid project, discussed in detail in Appendix B, will serve as case study. 
 
Figure 5-8: Schematic diagram of a power system with renewable energy 
5.3.2.1 Development of a renewable energy system adequacy index 
The process that derives the adequacy confidence index is described in the flowchart in 
Figure 5-9. As input it requires expected hourly values for one typical year of a) the 
system’s wind turbine energy output, b) PV array energy output and c) load.  
In the case of wind and PV this data can be generated using estimation programs like 
Homer, RETScreen or SunSim. In the case of load data, it was shown in [Herman and 
Gaunt 2008] that the Beta probability distribution is useful for modelling small groups of 
customer loads at any given time interval, with the shape of this Beta pdf dependant on 
the customer class for the specific project. When the number of customers is larger than 
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Figure 5-9: Flowchart indicating the process that leads to 1) an adequacy confidence index versus maximum 
outage hours graph, and 2) a system sizing for a given adequacy confidence index and maximum outage 
hours. 
Variability over different years was then introduced by generating a set of 31 samples for 
each hour from the above-described one year profile, by taking the average power at the 
specific hour, as well as the power for the same hour on 15 preceding and 15 following 
days. Random selection of hourly values from these 31 samples allowed the building of 
numerous synthetic yearly load power data sets. 
A large number of simulations of the full renewable energy power system was then run 











battery, PV panel and wind turbine sizes fixed. For each of these simulations the amount 
of hours per year was recorded during which the load c
Given the large number of simulations (50 simulations were used in this research) a
adequacy confidence index can be defined as to the maximum number of hours per year 
that the system will not be able to supply the load, as
if in 45 of the 50 simulations 
can be made of “90% confidence that 
Figure 5-10: The relationship between the maximum yearly outage hours and the confidence
39kW wind, 37kW PV and 935 kWh battery power system.
5.3.2.2 The index applied to the
Applying the adequacy confidence index
usefulness of this index, and highlight the impact of using a variable load (demand varies 
between hours) rather than a constant load (i.e. averaged hourly/daily load is used, 
calculated by dividing the total yearly load by 8760/365)
scenarios will be explored: 
• a constant load scenario which assumes the same daily energy requirement as the 
original constant-load Lucingweni design (314kWh/day), and
• a variable load scenario, for which the hourly load varies. As a model of the load, the 
load current profiles of 84 customers in a grid
Lucingweni for one year were used (measured as part of the Eskom load research 
program at 5-minute interv
significantly larger than 30, th
taken to build a single load current data set for a year (with hourly variability). This 
data set was then normalis
the constant load scenario. 
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ould not be met by the system. 
 shown in Figure 5
the load outage hours were less than 5 hours, a statement 
load outage will not exceed 5 hours per year”.
 
 Lucingweni project 
 to the Lucingweni project will illustrate the 
 during system sizing
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No wind speed or solar irradiation measurement data are available near the Lucingweni 
site. Resource data was therefore based on hourly measurement data from similar 
locations (Durban for irradiation and East London for wind), provided by the South 
African Weather Service. This data was normalised using NASA satellite-based monthly 
averages for the Lucingweni area. 
Estimation software (Homer and SunSim) was then used to obtain the power output 
profile per kWpeak installed for one year at the Lucingweni village site. Note that the 
motivation of this section is mainly to introduce the concept of the adequacy confidence 
index; the following assumptions were therefore made in order to constrain the 
complexity of the simulations and the results: 
• system inefficiencies and transmission losses reduced the installed power output of 
the wind turbines and PV array by 10%, 
• energy storage losses were taken as 15%, and 
• component reliability was assumed to be perfect.  
The process described in Figure 5-9 was then followed to obtain a variety of 
wind/PV/battery size combinations that would satisfy the adequacy confidence index of 
“90% confidence in less than 5 hours of outage per year”. The results are shown in 
Figure 5-11 (a) for the constant load scenario, and Figure 5-11 (b) for the variable load 
scenario. Figure 5-11 (c) shows the variable load scenario for 80% confidence.  
Five battery sizes were selected, from minimum (the smallest battery should at least 
store PV energy through each night, so one day of average load energy storage was 
chosen, incorporating 15% storage losses) to maximum (14 days of average load energy 
storage with losses).  
The actual system installed at Lucingweni is indicated on Figure 5-11 (a), (b) and (c) as a 
black circle (the installed system size was 56kW PV, 36kW wind and 2.2 MWh energy 
storage, which is reduced to 50.4kW PV, 32.4kW wind and 1.87 MWh energy storage 
after system losses and inefficiencies were included). The position of the black circle 
relative to the different lines indicates that in both the constant and variable load 
scenarios the Lucingweni system was more than adequately sized: in the constant load 
scenario a battery of just less than 313kWh would have been adequate, and in the 
variable load scenario a battery of slightly less than 935kWh, for less than 5 hours of 
outage per year with 90% confidence. This provides evidence that  the main problems at 
Lucingweni was not the size of the power system, but rather the component reliability of 
the system, design faults (the wind energy was not utilised due to system configuration 











Figure 5-11 (a),(b) and (c): Combinations of PV, wind and battery capacity needed to supply a 
(a) and two variable load scenarios
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 (b and c) with not more than 5 hours failure to meet demand per year 
 (a and b) and 80% (c).The black circle represents the Lucingweni system.
PV (kWpeak after 10% losses) 
PV (kWpeak after 10% losses) 
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The risks of assuming constant load in power system design also becomes apparent 
from Figure 5-11, when the constant load scenario (a) is compared with the variable load 
scenario (b): 
• With smaller storage a variable load requires substantially more generating capacity 
to achieve the same adequacy of supply as apparently required for a 
deterministically-modelled constant load. Or stated differently: for the same 
generating and limited storage capacity, the system will be inadequate for a variable 
load more often than expected when modelled as a constant load. The risk of 
assuming a constant load during system design is clear from these results.  
• With very large energy storage (14-days) the variability of the load has negligible 
effect.   
The adequacy confidence index combinations in Figure 5-11 can be used to optimise the 
system from a capital costs perspective, by finding the lowest cost combination, giving 
the same levels of adequacy performance, as shown in Figure 5-12. From this graph it is 
interesting to note that very limited (1 day) storage is has a capital cost premium due to 
the large amount of renewable generation that is required, in the same way that unlimited 
(14 day) storage again has a cost premium because of the cost of energy storage. The 
optimum lies somewhere in between these extremes, in this case at around 3-5 days 
storage. 
Capital cost is an important decision making factor, but so is the lifecycle cost of the 
system over 15 or 20 years. The graph in Figure 5-12 can easily be adapted to show life 
cycle costs: in such a graph wind turbines will become significantly less favourable as a 
technology compared to PV arrays, as PV’s high capital cost is offset by low 











Figure 5-12: The financial optimization results 
5.3.2.3 Including the adequacy confidence index in the PCM approach
The adequacy confidence 
process both to acknowledge and help quantify uncertainties around renewable energy 
system adequacy.  
The results related to this index will be most useful within the project feasibility study, and 
it is therefore proposed to inco
within the appraisal stage of the PCM approach. This can be done in a simila
with the renewable resource estimation uncertainty: by 
factors” section of the PCM documentation structure
“Renewable energy system sizing guidelines”
following: 
• Guidelines on the impact of using probabilistic (variable), rather than deterministic 
(constant) load estimates, along with details on where to find historic load data for 
different customer classes.
• Guidelines on how to calculate the adequacy confidence index.
• The minimum system adequacy confidence indices required for different 
classes (e.g. purely social electrification might have a lower confidence index 
minimum requirement than economic electrifi
                                               
19
 For a more detailed study of social versus economic electrification, refer to Gaunt [2003]
Wind (kWpeak after 10% losses)
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(capital costs only) for the system described in 
 
index described above is useful during the decision making 
rporate this index and the tool with which to 
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 to a separate document entitled 
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Figure 5-13: Proposed improvement of the PCM approach through renewable energy system sizing 
guidelines. 
5.4 Improving hard uncertainty acknowledgment 
This section proposes the use of a degree of surprise tool to acknowledge hard 
uncertainties within the decision making process.  
5.4.1 The degree of surprise tool 
Young [2001] concluded from his critique of popular approaches for dealing with 
uncertainty in decision making that an alternative approach was needed that would deal 
explicitly with hard uncertainty. For this he proposed an application of the Shackle model, 
which will inform the development of the “degree of surprise” tool. 
5.4.1.1 Shackle’s model 
The Shackle model, published in the 1940s, steps entirely outside the expected utility 
and probability frameworks, and offers a solution to the problem of modelling hard 
uncertainty, especially where actions are unique. This is possible because Shackle’s 
model replaces probability as a measure of uncertainty with the measure of the degree of 
surprise, which is a measure of the decision maker’s surprise at a certain hypothetical 
future outcome actually occurring.   
In the first stage of the model, the analyst generates as full a range as possible of 











undesired to highly desired
desired and five undesired outcomes are specified
undesired and a slightly desired outcome are given below.
Highly undesired outcome A
failure and associated discontent amongst the community 
vandalised to such an extent that major investmen
Slightly desired outcome F
somewhat lower than before electrification. The cost of energy per
slightly. 
In the second stage, every decision maker
potential surprises associated with the ten outcomes (A to J) created by the analyst in the 
previous stage, on an arbitrary scale from 0 (low) to 10 (high). 
typical potential surprise function that might be specified by a decision maker. The highly 
undesired outcome A described above, for example, is valued at a potential surprise of 8, 
i.e. the decision maker will be highly surprised if this outcome occurs.
Figure 5-14: A typical potential surprise function
In the third stage, the outcomes / potential surprise pairs (x,y) are wei
suitable ascendancy function 
a set of functional forms the form most consistent with the weightings given by the 
decision makers in response to
property that its partial de
with respect to the degree of surprise y. The result of the ascendancy function therefore 
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, along an arbitrarily chosen -5 to 5 scale
 per action. In illustration, a highly 
 
: A lack of maintenance leads to renewable energy system 
– ultimately the system is 
t is required for repairs.
: The number of injuries caused by fire within the community is 
 household has fallen 
 is interviewed and asked to specify the
Figure 
 
, with the alphabetical numbers representing the different 
outcomes generated by the analyst. 
Φ(x,y). This ascendancy function is found by selecting from 
 weighting-orientated questions. The function has the 
rivative is positive with respect to the outcome x and negative 
. Typically five 
 
ir 
5-14 shows a 
 












focuses the attention of the individual on the outcome with the highest desirability / 
undesirability where the degree of surprise is not high enough to decrease the weighting 
of the outcome significantly. 
defined by Shackle, ax=Φ
shown in Figure 5-15. 
The focus gain outcome is represented by outcome I, and the 
outcome C, and represent
in the project considered, and can 
process on where measures are required to reduce the impacts of hard uncertainties. 
Figure 5-15: A typical ascendancy function
The fourth and final part of Shackle’s model uses the so
map to standardize the focus values 
actions, in order to be able to 
5.4.1.2 Advantages of the Shackle model
Shackle’s model as presented above 
hard uncertainty: 
• the notion of potential surprise is applicable to unique events, u
• potential surprise is defined as non
outcomes, 
• potential surprise is non
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The results of applying one of the ascendancy function
2by− , to the potential surprise function found in stage tw
focus loss outcome by 
 the best to be hoped for and the worst to be feared outcomes 
be used to focus the attention of the decision
, with the alphabetical numbers representing the different 
outcomes generated by the analyst. 
-called gambler’s preference 
found within the set of outcomes among different 
accurately compare the different actions.
 
offers a number of advantages when working with 
-distributional, allowing an incomplete list of 
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• as both the potential surprise and ascendancy functions are separated in desired 
and undesired outcomes, the decision-maker is allowed to consider uncertainty 
aversion to gains and losses separately. 
5.4.1.3 Young’s application of Shackle’s model 
In the application of the Shackle model as proposed by Young, the fourth part of the 
model, used to standardize the focus values in order to allow comparison between 
different actions, each with its own Shackle model and resulting focus values, is 
dispensed with.  
The reason for this is twofold: first the model proposed by Young is focused on the 
procedural rationality of the decision making process, and as such does not attempt to 
explain choices between actions. Secondly, by restricting the application of Shackle’s 
model to finding potential surprise and ascendancy functions, and focus gain and loss 
elements, the problem of stochastic dominance is also sidestepped. This problem occurs 
in the Shackle model when an action A stochastically dominates an action B, yet the 
same focus gain value is found for both. 
5.4.1.4 Development of the degree of surprise tool 
The application of the Shackle model to acknowledge hard uncertainties will never 
require comparison between different actions, and therefore the fourth stage of Shackle’s 
model will also be dispensed with for the purposes of this research.    
An additional requirement is added to Young’s application of Shackle’s model to ensure 
better alignment with a multiple criteria context: only qualitative valuations of the 
desirability / undesirability of each outcome will be presented to the decision maker (e.g. 
slightly or highly). This ensures that the decision maker is not biased by quantitative 
valuations of outcomes that are necessarily based on subjective equivalence rates.   
Lastly, Young’s application of the Shackle model is simplified by dispensing with the 
requirement that the chosen outcomes be arranged from very undesirable to very 
desirable by the analyst, ensuring ease of application as explored in section 2.2.6. 
The proposed degree of surprise tool was developed in MATLAB, informed by the above 
theory (also refer to Bekker and Gaunt [2006]). It will now be briefly described: 
In stage one the decision maker is presented with an interface as shown in Figure 5-16. 
This interface shows the decision maker a selection of project outcomes that are directly 












literature review / project evaluations similar to the process followed in the preceding 
chapters, and uploaded these outcomes 
is required to rate the impact of these outcomes on the success of the project. 
The responses in Figure 5
answered with reference to 
decided that grid encroachment and maintenance deterioration would have a highly 
negative impact on the project’s success.
Shackle model. 
Figure 
In stage two of the degree of surprise tool, the decision maker is asked to rate the same 
outcomes as to the degree of
outcomes becoming a reality, on a scale ranging from not at all surprised to very 
surprised.  
In the example in Figure 5
be surprised if grid encroachment occurred in the project, but would be reasonable 
surprised if the maintenance deteriorated in future.
of the Shackle model.  
During the final stage of the degree of surprise to
is displayed as shown in Figure 
the darker bottom right corner of the graph requires additional focus. 
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into the tool from a text file. T
-16 acts as an example of what a decision maker
a fictional off-grid project: for example this decision maker 
 This stage is equivalent to stag
5-16: The first stage of the degree of surprise tool 
 surprise that the decision maker would feel at these 
-17 the decision maker indicated that he/she would not a
 This stage is the equivalent of stage 2 
ol, the answers from the decision maker 
5-18: the uncertainties associated with the outcomes in 
 
he decision maker 
 
 might have 
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-17: The second stage of the degree of surprise tool 
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The way in which the results are displayed, with the impact of the outcome on the x axis 
and the degree of surprise on the y axis, makes an ascendancy function redundant. This 
is in alignment with the constructive philosophy of decision aiding (section 4.3.1.3), with 
the tool avoiding combining / quantifying decision data wherever possible for increased 
transparency in the decision process. 
From Figure 5-18 it is clear that even though the impacts of grid encroachment and 
maintenance deterioration were rated similarly by the decision maker, the higher degree 
of surprise at maintenance deteriorating than grid encroachment meant that more 
attention would be focussed on the uncertainties around grid encroachment.   
5.4.1.5 Integrating the degree of surprise tool into the PCM approach 
The degree of surprise tool described above can be useful during programme definition 
(to make decision makers aware of the hard uncertainties inherent in the programme), 
the early stages of project decision making and also during the final stages of appraisal 
(to verify that the uncertainties have been adequately acknowledged, and if not, to re-
design the process). 
It is therefore proposed that the tool be used in preparing the Country Strategy Report, 
and twice during the Feasibility Study: at the start to gain an understanding of the 
decision makers’ perceptions around the hard uncertainties present in the project, and 
towards the end to ensure that, in the decision makers’ minds, the identified focus 
uncertainties have been acknowledged by the decision process, without being replaced 
by new focus uncertainties. 
To ensure that the tool is used, a section with the “Quality factors” section of the PCM 
document structure can point towards it, requiring its use as shown in Figure 5-19, and 
documenting the results of its applications. 
The degree of surprise tool will be most effective if the programme and project hard 
uncertainties listed in it are placed within the context of completed off-grid electrification 
projects, and the lessons learned from them. Take the “grid encroachment” uncertainty / 
outcome as an example: a decision maker that is not familiar with the off-grid 
electrification context might have difficulty in understanding why grid encroachment can 
potentially have a negative impact on the project. If, however, the decision maker is fully 
informed about historic projects and the impact that grid encroachment had on these, a 
much better assessment of the impact and degree of surprise will result.  
For this reason it is further proposed that “Lessons learned from completed off-grid 
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example summarised from the project evaluations done in Appendix B. This information 
can either be in the form of a document given to each decision maker as background, or 
can form part of an information session leading up to the use of the degree of surprise 
tool. Evaluation of completed projects within the same programme will inform continuous 
updating of the “lessons learned” information.  
 
Figure 5-19: Proposed improvements to the PCM approach through the use of the “degree of surprise” tool 
and “Lessons learned” information 
5.5 The impact of improved decision aiding 
This section will now briefly revisit two projects, the completed Lucingweni mini-grid 
project and the DME’s SHS concession programme, with the aim of demonstrating how 
using the PCM / LFA decision aiding approach and the proposed improvements might 
have positively impacted on the sustainable development contribution of these projects, 
were they used. 
From the six South African off-grid projects that were evaluated in Appendix B, 
Lucingweni and the concession programme were chosen to demonstrate the impact of 
improved decision aiding based on the following: 
• The technology implemented at Lucingweni and through the concession programme 
respectively represents the two main off-grid options currently considered in South 
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• Although Lucingweni was ultimately supposed to be one of many similar projects 
within a bigger programme, in many ways it was implemented as a stand-alone 
electrification project. In comparison, the concession programme represents a 
programme within which a number of projects were undertaken. 
• In both projects a wide range of causes, across technical, social and institutional 
dimensions, lead to their ultimate failures. 
5.5.1 Improved decision aiding applied to Lucingweni  
As background to the following discussion a cause and effect diagram of Lucingweni’s 
problems is reproduced in Figure 5-20, from appendix B. 
5.5.1.1 The impact of using a decision aiding approach 
No formal decision aiding approach could be identified by this research as having been 
applied during the pre-implementation stages of the Lucingweni project. The use of such 
a formal high quality decision aiding approach, for now ignoring any of the proposed 
improvements regarding uncertainty acknowledgement or objectives alignment, might 
potentially have avoided at least four problems:  
• The fact that electricity was supplied before a revenue collection system could be 
implemented (block 13 in Figure 5-20) appears to have its roots in a disagreement 
between the NER and Shell Solar on whether a community centre was agreed to as 
part of Shell Solar’s implementation contract. The NER withheld payment to Shell 
Solar, and the resulting delays, combined with likely political pressure to complete the 
project, led to premature system activation without a revenue collection system in 
place, and the resulting problems described in Figure 5-20 and Appendix B. 
If a high quality decision aiding process was followed, a clear audit trail should have 
existed of all the decisions made during the identification and appraisal stages: such 
an audit trail might have offered the necessary evidence to resolve any 
disagreements between stakeholders during implementation.  
• One of the primary causes of the theft and vandalism that finally disabled the 
Lucingweni project was a lack of community ownership of the renewable energy 
system (1), which was originally caused by limited community interaction (2) and a 
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The stakeholder participation mechanisms inherit in high quality decision aiding 
approaches might have avoided these community interaction problems, and instilled 
an increased sense of ownership of the system in the community.   
 
Figure 5-20: Factors identified in literature that prevented the Lucingweni project from meeting certain 
primary energisation objectives (reproduced from Appendix B).  
• Energisation rather than electrification was originally an objective of the project, 
apparent through the original promises to the community of LPG-based thermal 
services. The fact that these services were never implemented (5) point to a failure of 
the decision making process to carry the original project objectives through to 
implementation. A high quality decision aiding process might have helped structure 
the project in such a way that these objectives were kept visible throughout the 
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• If the PCM approach was followed from the start during the Lucingweni project, more 
importance might have been extended towards structuring the programming stage of 
the decision process. Although the Lucingweni project was a demonstration project 
meant to inform a wider roll-out of mini-grid systems in South Africa, it appears from 
literature that the programme never extended to include a full off-grid energisation 
action, which included SHSs, mini-grids, grid electrification and other energy sources 
like LPG etc.  
Had such a programme focus been applied, Lucingweni would have been one of the 
many projects within this programme. Such a programme rather than project focus, 
might have prevented the institutional vacuum (22) and no project champion (23) 
problems.  
The fact that Lucingweni was implemented as a demonstration project does not 
change the potential benefit of approaching the project from within a programmatic 
context: the programme in this case could also have been in “demonstration” phase.    
5.5.1.2 The impact of objectives alignment 
From literature it is apparent that the primary project objective for Lucingweni was to gain 
the experience required to inform a wider rollout of mini-grid systems in South Africa. It 
can be argued that the project actually succeeded in this primary objective: possibly as 
many lessons can be learned from a failed project as from a successful one. A failed 
project however does not satisfy any sustainable development objectives. 
If a high quality decision aiding approach was used, with the proposed objectives 
alignment improvements, greater focus might have been placed within the decision 
making process on sustainable development goals. This focus would have been 
introduced from the programming stage onwards, possibly resulting in greater attention 
to objectives in for example the economic dimension mitigating problems like marginal 
community employment opportunities from the project (4), and the social dimension 
through actually providing LPG and potable water during implementation, rather than just 
promising to do so (5).     
5.5.1.3 The impact of soft uncertainty acknowledgement 
The power system at Lucingweni appeared to be more than adequately sized (for both 
the constant and variable load scenarios) based on the estimated load of 314kWh/day, 
as indicated by the adequacy confidence index calculations done in section 5.3.2.2. 
System inadequacy rather appeared to be caused by a number of hard uncertainties. 
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the Lucingweni project [DME 2007b:p39], where inaccuracies in resource estimation are 
partly blamed by energy inadequacy. 
The use of soft uncertainty acknowledgment tools like the adequacy confidence index, 
along with the proposed system sizing and renewable resource estimation guidelines, 
might have increased the accuracy of the alignment between estimated load, system size 
and minimum cost, potentially resulting in a smaller and less costly system.  
Another area where soft uncertainties might have impacted the project was in energy 
provision for additional economic activities within the community (6): this need was not 
actually quantified, but was rather assumed to come from whatever excess energy 
remained after the estimated load has been serviced. The importance of including all 
potential system loads in the initial load estimate would have been stated in the proposed 
system sizing guidelines.  
5.5.1.4 The impact of hard uncertainty acknowledgement 
In applying the degree of surprise tool retrospectively to the two selected projects, almost 
ten additional years of hindsight and lessons learned are available to the analyst from 
which to generate a set of outcomes. Insight from these additional ten years were not 
available when these projects were originally planned, therefore a number of outcomes 
which in hindsight seems obvious might have been “missed” by the analyst. 
By the time Lucingweni was planned some SHS projects like KwaBhaza and 
Maphephethe have already been implemented, so the lessons learned from these 
projects would have been available as uncertainty outcomes. If the degree of surprise 
tool was populated with outcomes based on the experiences in these projects, the 
following possible effects might have resulted: 
• The Lucingweni project never reached a stage where grid encroachment would have 
impacted the project negatively, due to the early failure of the mini-grid system. 
However, the fact that it was within 20km of the grid, and that no thermal services (for 
cooking, space heating etc) were provided, could easily have led to future community 
dissatisfaction about the “inferior” energy provision compared to nearby grid-
electrified villages.  
Awareness of this dissatisfaction, through a “grid encroachment leads to community 
dissatisfaction” outcome might have motivated decision makers to pay more attention 
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• Acknowledging the “Customers unwilling to pay” hard uncertainty, after being 
informed of the impacts of this uncertainty through the “Lessons learned” information, 
might have alerted decision makers to the risks of connecting electricity without 
having revenue collection mechanisms in place, in effect offering free electricity to 
customers initially and then expecting payment later on. 
• The “insufficient energy or power” outcome in the degree of surprise tool, informed by 
the supporting “lessons learned” information, might have alerted decision makers to 
the impact of at least some of the factors which would impact energy sufficiency, 
possibly including factors that caused problems at Lucingweni: lack of effective 
current and energy limiting (12), lack of incentives for energy efficiency (16), illegal 
connections (10) and bypassing of circuit breakers (11). These problems could have 
been avoided through interventions like prepaid meters, instilling a sense of 
ownership among the community etc., but first had to be acknowledged. 
• Acknowledgement of an outcome which highlighted technical design/configuration 
errors / component failure might have focussed attention on, for example, including 
commissioning procedures in the tender documentation, requiring full system testing 
before connecting customers. This might have highlighted the poor wind generator to 
inverter matching (17).  
5.5.2 Improved decision aiding applied to the concession programme 
As background to the following discussion a cause and effect diagram of the SHS 
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Figure 5-21: Factors identified in literature that prevented the SHS concession programme from meeting 
certain primary energisation objectives (reproduced from Appendix B).  
5.5.2.1 The impact of using a decision aiding approach 
The project evaluation in Appendix B could identify no formal decision aiding approach 
as having been applied within the decision making of the concession programme. Had a 
high quality approach been applied, without any improved uncertainty acknowledgment 
or objectives alignment, two characteristics would have been especially of value: an 
iterative nature within the decision process, and increased stakeholder interaction:  
• Lessons learned from early projects within the concession programme (for example 
the Eskom/Shell joint venture which started installing SHSs in March 1999) might 
have been incorporated into later projects (the later four consortia only started 
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feedback systems been pro-actively put in place on a programmatic level. A high 
quality decision aiding approach would have encouraged the use of such iterative 
systems, per definition. The ERC [2004] reports that a platform was later established 
(reactively) among the consortia within which to exchange information, experience 
and know-how.  
Lessons learned early in the programme, and applied to later implementations, might 
have avoided several operational problems including inaccurate information 
dissemination (18), problems with the fee-for-service model (19 and 22), complex 
customer contracts (21), and SHS reliability concerns (12,13 and 15). 
• It is likely that increased stakeholder interaction (a characteristic of a high quality 
decision aiding process) with target communities would have highlighted potential 
problems before they occurred. So, for example, community expectations around grid 
electrification might have become apparent through this interaction, highlighting the 
need to manage the risks to SHS customer confidence (5) from unpredictable and 
non-transparent grid electrification within the concession areas.  
Mitigation could have taken the form of contracts guaranteeing no grid expansion 
within certain concession areas for the medium term (rather than the agreement that 
was actually put in place in some areas: specifying the financial compensation to the 
consortia for each SHS made redundant by grid electrification).    
5.5.2.2 The impact of objectives alignment 
The stated primary objective of the concession programme was to roll out 50 000 SHSs 
per consortia within the 5 year period for which the concession was held. The poor 
performance of the programme, indicated in Table 1-2 with less than 40 000 SHSs 
installed in total, and no further progress after almost six years, is a clear indicator that 
the programme has failed to achieve its primary objective. 
Even if the programme's targets have been met, a number of the objectives within the 
energisation framework might still not have been achieved, for example the objectives 
related to income generation (27), battery and PV disposal (28), and contribution to CO2 
reduction (29). 
If a high quality decision aiding approach was used, with the proposed objectives 
alignment improvements, greater focus might have been placed within the decision 
making process on sustainable development goals within the context of energisation, 
rather than just connection targets. This focus would have been introduced from the 
programming stage onwards, possibly resulting in a greater attention to objectives in for 
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At this point it is important to acknowledge the influence of political objectives: in South 
Africa the area of service delivery (which includes electrification) is a central concern 
during elections. Politicians are often the ultimate decision makers in government-
sponsored electrification programmes like the concession programme, which means that 
these projects are potentially the focus of political objectives. So, for example, connection 
targets (which are easily measured) might serve a more powerful political purpose than 
sustainable development targets (which are complex to calculate and can take many 
years to measure), even though the later would better reflect the success of the 
programme. Another illustration of the interference of political objectives is cause number 
11, where political pressure led to a rushed installation phase (10) and a number of 
problems (12,13). 
The use of a high quality decision aiding tool, which includes objectives alignment, will 
not be capable of overriding possible non-aligned political programme objectives in a 
scenario where the decision makers have the ultimate say in the process. It will however 
ensure that this non-alignment is transparent within the decision process and audit trail. 
Only in the case where political interference blocks the use of a high quality decision 
aiding approach during decision making, specifically to avoid the transparency 
associated with such an approach, will the approach be powerless to impact the quality 
of the ultimate decision. 
5.5.2.3 The impact of uncertainty acknowledgement 
Literature did not report significant impacts from unacknowledged soft uncertainties 
within the concession programme. A large set of problem causes can however be 
grouped under impacts of hard uncertainty non-acknowledgement.  
As discussed with the retrospective application of the degree of surprise tool at 
Lucingweni, at the start of the expanded concession programme in 1999 the current 
large base of South African off-grid project experience would not have been available 
from which to select outcomes.  
Experience gained from for example the earlier Eskom-Shell concession, as well as from 
international projects, could still have been used to identify hard uncertainties for 
inclusion as outcomes in the degree of surprise tool. Early acknowledgement of these 
hard uncertainties might have avoided some of the problems within the concession 
programme, for example: 
• The hard uncertainty of implementation agency non-committal, caused in the case of 
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might have been acknowledged early in the process had the degree of surprise tool 
been used. The outcomes used in the tool might have been informed by international 
experiences of centralised institutional implementation problems like listed by Mason 
(1990) as reported in Zomers [2001:p153] with outcomes like “Long setup delays”, or 
by what Zilberman [1999] calls “Government’s dynamic inconsistency”.   
Mitigation of the impacts of this uncertainty would have been more challenging: 
decisions made within a wider process, over which the decision makers had little 
control, would significantly impact the commitment of the implementation agency. 
However, as in the case of political objectives influencing objective alignment, in this 
case an acknowledgment of the uncertainty would at the least have created 
awareness about it in the decision process, opening the way to potential mitigation.   
• The intermittent flow of capital subsidy to the consortia (4) played a large role in the 
ultimate failure of the concession programme as, according to Niemand and Banks 
[2006:p15], this was the main limiting factor to higher installation numbers: “NuRa can 
quite easily reach installation targets of 3000 to 4000 installations per monthP”   
The long delays and inconsistent FBE subsidies (24) also directly impacted customer 
satisfaction and ultimately non-payment. 
A study of pre-1999 international off-grid projects might have informed a “subsidy 
inconsistency” outcome within the degree of surprise tool – Pokharel [2003] for 
example reports that such problems occurred in Nepal. The uncertainty could then be 
mitigated, for example by requiring/planning for stronger commitment from national 
government on the availability of adequate capital subsidies for a defined period 
through medium term budget provisions, and contractual guarantees for the consortia 
regarding the timely availability of these subsidies.  
The uncertainty regarding FBE subsidies would have been challenging to mitigate, 
given that it is implemented differently among the different responsible local 
governments. Pre-rollout agreements with all the local governments regarding FBE 
might have ensured consistent application of the FBE subsidy (Banks [2007:p118] 
however comments on the complexities of this process), or a restructuring of the FBE 
policy where national government makes the FBE subsidy available directly to the 
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5.5.3 The third part of the hypothesis tested 
The preceding application of an improved decision aiding approach to two representative 
off-grid case studies identified the following: 
• In both cases convincing evidence was found that the proposed decision aiding 
would have increased the impact of the case studies on sustainable development, 
were it applied originally. 
• The proposed approach would be of no value in a scenario where decision aiding 
was actively excluded from the decision process, due to decision makers wanting to 
avoid a transparent process and audit trail. 
• The analyst plays a crucial role during hard uncertainty acknowledgement, as 
he/she needs to identify from literature and experience a limited set of hard 
uncertainties for inclusion in the degree of surprise tool. 
Enough evidence exists to confirm the validity of the third and final part of the research 
hypothesis:  
Applying existing high quality decision aiding tools and approaches, with 
improved uncertainty acknowledgment and objectives alignment capabilities, to 
off-grid projects will increase such projects’ impact on sustainable development. 
5.6 In summary 
This chapter set out to answer three research questions in order to test the third and final 
part of the research hypothesis. The following answers were found to these questions: 
• What decision aiding tools and approaches currently exist that will support high 
quality decision making to a large extent within the context of South African off-grid 
electrification projects? 
The Homer and RETScreen renewable resource estimation tools, and the approach 
followed by the EC’s PCM and LFA were shown to support high quality decision 
making to a large extent. These tools were therefore selected as demonstration 
tools on which to base the remainder of the research. 
• How can the uncertainty acknowledgment and objectives alignment capabilities of 
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The chapter proposed improvements in three areas: objectives alignment, and soft 
and hard uncertainty acknowledgement.  
For objectives alignment it was proposed to include a list of primary energisation 
sustainable development objectives in the document structure of the PCM approach, 
with the use of these objectives verified through “Quality Criteria” questions. 
For soft uncertainty acknowledgement a renewable energy system adequacy 
confidence index was proposed and the accuracy of the Homer and RETScreen 
tools was quantified for South African climatic conditions and different weather data 
grades. Guidelines were also proposed for inclusion into the PCM process, on 
system sizing and the applicability and accuracy of renewable energy resource 
estimation. 
For hard uncertainty acknowledgement the degree of surprise tool was proposed, 
supported by information sharing mechanisms on lessons learned from completed 
off-grid electrification projects. 
• Would these improved decision aiding tools and approaches, if applied originally, 
have increased selected South African case study projects’ impact on sustainable 
development? 
Yes, the results of the retrospective application of improved decision aiding to two 
representative off-grid case studies confirmed that a large percentage of the 
problems that led to the failure of these projects might have been avoided by 
applying a high quality decision aiding process with the proposed improvements.  
The answers to these three research questions offer sufficient support to conclude that 
the third part of the research hypothesis is valid. The full hypothesis of this research has 
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6 Conclusions 
The fundamental hypothesis that this research sets out to test relates to the crucial roles 
that objectives and uncertainties, especially those that were not identified early in the 
planning process, play in the failure of South African off-grid electrification projects to 
achieve sustainable development goals. 
Motivated by this hypothesis, the research showed the usefulness of a structured, formal 
decision aiding process within which decision makers are guided to consider factors 
(objectives, uncertainties, outcomes) that could easily have been missed, with serious 
negative impacts on the project’s success.  
The testing of this hypothesis contributed to both an improved understanding of the 
factors that lead to off-grid project failure and to suggestions on how decision-aiding can 
guide future off-grid projects towards achieving sustainable development objectives.  
6.1 An improved understanding of factors that lead to failure 
The first part of the research hypothesis investigated the correlation between 
unacknowledged uncertainties and failed off-grid electrification projects in South Africa. 
Testing this hypothesis developed an understanding of what actually defines a 
successful off-grid project (sustainable development objectives are met) and how to 
measure whether a project succeeded or failed (through evaluation against the proposed 
energisation framework). The development of the energisation framework, and its 
application in the evaluation of a selection of off-grid projects, lead to the following main 
conclusions: 
• Off-grid electrification should ideally be approached as part of a wider energisation 
programme. In this programme grid and off-grid electrification, and other forms of 
energy supply like LPG, should all be considered within the same programmatic 
structure informed by sustainable development objectives. Doing this offers many 
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community expectations, and increasing institutional project ownership. This 
conclusion is confirmed by a number of sources in literature, for example Banks 
[2007] and Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007]. 
• Unacknowledged uncertainties indeed do correlate strongly to failed electrification 
projects. This is a new perspective on off-grid project failure: instead of focussing on 
the direct causes of project failure, like lack of maintenance or inadequate energy 
supply, this perspective steps back and ask the question why these direct causes 
occurred at all? Such a perspective allows potential causes of failure to be mitigated 
early in the project cycle, and also allows a wider net to be cast to catch these 
causes, especially once different conceptualisations of uncertainty are included.    
The second part of the hypothesis investigated whether the conceptualisation of 
uncertainty as hard or soft within a structured decision aiding process would increase the 
likelihood of a project contributing to sustainable development. The testing of this 
hypothesis contributed to the understanding of off-grid projects in the following ways: 
• When the hard / soft conceptualisation of uncertainty was applied to the uncertainties 
identified during the off-grid project evaluation, it became apparent that most of these 
uncertainties were hard. This conceptualisation has not previously been applied to 
electrification projects, and this result indicates that the application of this 
conceptualisation indeed does add value: a decision aiding process where 
uncertainties could only be represented probabilistically would have been incapable 
of including hard uncertainties, thereby hiding the main causes of failure in the 
evaluated projects.  
• Very little evidence was found of the use of a structured, formal decision aiding 
process in any of the evaluated off-grid projects. This highlighted the problem that 
only focussing on uncertainty acknowledgment would be insufficient: a structured 
underlying decision aiding process should support uncertainty acknowledgment, with 
a scope that includes other equally important criteria towards project success. This 
realisation led to the development of the decision quality framework, against which 
the ability of a decision aiding process to support high quality decisions can be 
measured.  
Although many authors have commented on the characteristics of decision aiding 
processes that support high quality decisions, the wide scope of the proposed 
decision aiding framework and its application as a standard against which decision 
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• The evaluation of the Klipheuwel project, which scored highly when measured 
against the decision quality framework yet still failed in certain sustainable 
development objectives, lead to a further realisation: high quality decision making in a 
project does not necessarily correlate to a contribution to sustainable development. A 
final factor needs to be present; close alignment between project objectives and 
sustainable development objectives. 
6.2 v 
The understanding gained during the testing of the first two parts of the hypothesis led to 
a number of suggestions on how decision-aiding can guide future off-grid projects 
towards achieving sustainable development objectives (answered as part of the third part 
of the research hypothesis). These suggestions are briefly summarised here in the 
format of a step-by-step guideline, which can be applied to future off-grid programmes 
and projects: 
1. Identify and use a structured, formal decision aiding process that supports high 
quality decisions to a large extent, from the inception of the programme/project 
through to post-implementation monitoring and evaluation. 
The process of identification of the PCM and LFA decision aiding process (as 
implemented by the EC [2008]) acted in this research as an example of how the first 
part of this first guideline can be implemented.  
• To identify a suitable decision aiding process, a variety of potential processes 
should be evaluated against the decision quality framework, which will 
highlighted each process’s strengths and weaknesses within the context 
where it will be applied. It became apparent from the research that identifying 
a decision aiding process which satisfies all the criteria of the framework will 
be unlikely: the aim should rather be to select a process which is flexible 
enough for existing weaknesses to be improved through additional tools or 
mechanisms.   
2. Include a mechanism within this decision-aiding process that aligns programme and 
project objectives to sustainable development objectives.  
The PCM and LFA process already included several mechanisms to ensure objective 
alignment between the programme and individual projects within it. To illustrate the 
principles contained in this guideline, additional mechanisms were added to the 
decision aiding process at various programme stages, which ensured that the 
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acknowledged during the definition of programme and project objectives. 
Implementing this guideline should follow the same process: 
• Integrate mechanisms that ensure that programme/project objectives align to the 
energisation framework into all stages of the decision aiding process where 
objectives are defined or revisited.  
3. Identify as wide a list as possible of uncertainties that might hinder achievement of 
sustainable development objectives. From this list, identify the main hard and soft 
uncertainties. 
The process of testing the first and second parts of the hypothesis demonstrated the 
methodology through which such a list of hard and soft uncertainties can be obtained. 
The same methodology can be followed when implementing this guideline. 
• Identify a large list of sustainable development-inhibiting factors by evaluating 
completed off-grid projects against the energisation framework, augmented by a 
literature study of potential lessons learned from these projects. 
• Identify the uncertainties related to these factors from this list, aided by a 
comprehensive literature review and the definition of what uncertainty is (refer to 
Loosemore et al. [2006]). 
• Select the uncertainties that are likely to have the largest impact on the project. 
The decision analyst plays an important role at this stage, in selecting what 
he/she considers to be the main uncertainties impacting the project for inclusion 
in the rest of the decision aiding process. Ideally the decision makers should be 
involved in this selection, but when a decision maker is faced with a large list of 
uncertainties there is the risk of fatigue and unwillingness to again face a subset 
of these uncertainties later in the process.    
• Classify these uncertainties as hard or soft, aided by the classification by Young 
[2005]. 
This research, through a detailed evaluation of six off-grid electrification projects and 
around ten years of experience and hindsight noted in literature, already offers a 
substantial resource from which future projects can draw.   
4. Ensure that mechanisms are in place within the decision aiding process to 
acknowledge and quantify the impact of the identified soft uncertainties.  
In order to demonstrate how the impact of soft uncertainties can be acknowledged 
and quantified, two typical off-grid soft uncertainties were selected: the uncertainties 
pertaining to the estimation of the renewable energy source potential, and to the 
sizing of the power system. 
The soft uncertainties were acknowledged by incorporating two sets of guidelines into 
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for renewable energy system sizing. Within each of these guidelines methodologies 
were proposed to optimally mitigate the uncertainties, while quantifying the remaining 
uncertainties:   
o With regards to source estimation, two popular mitigation tools (Homer and 
RETScreen) were proposed, and their degree of accuracy for PV-array output 
estimation quantified for the South African climatic context. The findings of the 
research indicated that these tools introduced between 0% and 9% 
underestimation compared to an “ideal” estimation tool, thereby validating their 
use within PV-based projects in South Africa. 
The uncertainty introduced by using various South African weather data sets 
was also quantified. The results confirmed the value of using soft uncertainty 
quantification mechanisms: for example, monthly-averaged weather data inputs 
should be used with care, as PV energy output for certain system configurations 
(like water pumping) might be overestimated by 20-25%. 
o With regards to system sizing, a novel adequacy confidence index was 
developed to mitigate and quantify this uncertainty. The value of soft uncertainty 
acknowledgement and quantification was again confirmed through the research 
results: the assumption of a constant load (rather than the reality of a time-
varying load) is not valid during system sizing of deep rural off-grid projects like 
Lucingweni, as the resulting system based on this assumption might be 
significantly undersized.   
Implementation of this guideline will follow the same methodology as used during the 
examples in the research: 
• Identify tools or mechanisms that will optimally mitigate the main identified soft 
uncertainties. 
• Quantify the accuracy / impact on uncertainty of using these mitigation tools or 
mechanisms within the context of the specific project where they will be applied. 
• Integrate guidelines on how to mitigate soft uncertainties, and how to quantify 
their accuracy / impact, into the decision aiding process.   
5. Ensure that mechanisms are in place within the decision aiding process to 
acknowledge and monitor the impact of the identified hard uncertainties. 
The standard PCM and LFA process does not include tools for hard uncertainty 
acknowledgement. A new “degree of surprise” tool was therefore developed in this 
research, based on the implementation of the Shackle model by Young [2005], but 
simplified for ease of application.  
• Add mechanisms to the selected decision aiding process that will ensure that the 
“degree of surprise” tool (populated by the analyst with the selected hard 
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implementation, in order to keep hard uncertainties within the consciousness of 
decision makers throughout the project design stages.       
6.3 Limitations of decision aiding 
The example decision aiding approach, tools and improvements identified and developed 
in this research were finally applied retrospectively to two diverse projects, which 
between them formed a representative sample of the scope of South African off-grid 
projects: the Lucingweni hybrid mini-grid project, and the SHS concession programme. 
Ideally the impact of improved decision aiding should have been validated through 
application in a selection of current/future projects, rather than through retrospective 
application to two completed projects. This was unfortunately impractical, given that off-
grid projects are typically implemented over periods of many years. 
Retrospective application can also benefit from hindsight. This concern was mitigated by 
only using lessons learned from earlier projects that would have been completed by the 
time the validation projects commenced.  
The retrospective application led to the following conclusions: 
• Sufficient evidence was obtained to conclude that the application of existing high 
quality decision aiding tools and approaches, with improved uncertainty 
acknowledgment and objectives alignment capabilities, to off-grid projects will 
increase such projects’ impact on sustainable development. This confirms the third 
and final part of the research hypothesis. 
• Decision aiding can however not be forced upon the decision maker, and it is in this 
that the limitations of the current research lies: political objectives do not always align 
with sustainable development energisation objectives, especially in developing 
countries like South Africa where service delivery represents valuable political capital. 
A decision maker that is positioned within this political landscape might have little 
motivation to implement a decision aiding process that will lead to a more transparent 
decision with an audit trail. 
The research results can still be of value even in this context: although a motivation 
might exist to avoid decision aiding at a programme level, the decision aiding 
proposed in this research when applied at project level (where the political decision of 
whom to electrify has already been made) will still increase the likelihood of a 
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6.4 Wider application of this research 
The preceding research and resulting guidelines were developed and tested specifically 
within the context of off-grid electrification programmes/projects in South Africa. The 
proposed methodology, with its focus on decision aiding for high quality decisions, 
objectives alignment and uncertainty categorisation and acknowledgement, is however 
not restricted to this context. The methodology should be as valuable when applied within 
a wider international context to programmes and projects concerned with sustainable 
development, for the following reasons: 
• The decision quality framework developed in this research can be used to measure 
the quality of any decision aiding process, and is not limited to just off-grid 
electrification or the wider context of energisation. The advantages of a formal, 
structured decision aiding process also applies generally, although the nature of the 
process (complexity, scope etc.) obviously needs to be adapted to suit the specific 
programme or project context.    
• Alignment of project objectives with an overarching set of sustainable development 
objectives is also not limited to the South African or energisation context. Objectives 
frameworks to inform objective alignment within the decision process can be 
developed for other focus areas of sustainable development, for example potable 
water supply, in the same way in which an energisation-specific framework was 
developed in this research. 
• Regarding soft uncertainty acknowledgment, mitigation and quantification, the 
proposed adequacy confidence index is applicable to any power system with 
renewable energy, and not limited geographically. The proposed methodology to 
quantify the uncertainties inherent in estimation tools like Homer and RETScreen, for 
different weather data sets and irradiation and electrical models, was applied to 
South Africa in this research; the same methodology can easily be applied to other 
estimation tools and weather data sets of other countries. 
• The limitations of using a single conceptualisation of uncertainty (where it is assumed 
that probability is always applicable as metric) is relevant in any programme or 
project where social or institutional uncertainties (typically hard uncertainties where 
probability is not applicable) occur. Young’s conceptualisation of uncertainty as hard 
or soft, and the proposed application of the degree of surprise tool, will therefore also 
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Appendix A – Identifying energisation primary 
sustainable development objectives and indicators 
In section 2.3.1 three dimensions were identified as useful for the energisation 
framework: social, economic and environmental.  The IAEA’s energy indicators, a 
literature review and the considerations discussed in section 2.2 will now be used to 
identify themes, objectives, indicators and measurement scales relevant to energisation.  
Social objectives 
The equity theme 
The SA Energy White Paper lists, as one of its main policy objectives, that government 
will “promote access to affordable energy services for disadvantaged households, small 
businesses, small farms and community services.” [DME 1998:p8] This confirms the 
validity, in the context of off-grid energisation projects, of the IAEA’s sub-themes of 
accessibility, affordability and disparities under the theme of equity.  
The objective of accessibility should focus on the adequacy of the customer’s (whether 
it be a household, school or clinic) access to modern energy sources20, rather than just 
whether the customer has access to modern energy sources or not.  
The DME’s evaluation of the first phase of South Africa’s National Electrification 
Programme (NEP), which was strongly connection-target driven, highlights this fact: 
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“Target-setting in future electrification needs to be more comprehensive than 
merely connection targets, in order to maximise impact and cost-effectiveness.” 
[DME 2001b:pviii] 
Adequate access entails enough energy to supply the basic lighting, media, 
communication, cooking, space heating, water heating (especially in clinics) and 
refrigeration needs of the customer. As very few off-grid energisation projects provide 
adequate energy for all these household energy needs, it is suggested that the energy 
indicators (a more accurate description is perhaps performance indicators, which will be 
used from this point forward) measure the adequacy of energy from modern energy 
sources for each of the listed energy needs separately.  
Affordability deals with the ability of the different income groups to meet the cost of 
energy from modern energy sources. Two indicators are suggested: a) whether the 
average customers are able to pay, and b) whether the poorest customers are able to 
pay. Differentiating between the ability to pay of the average versus the poorest 
customers allows the impact of pro-poor policies (as described in Prasad and Visagie 
2006]) to be measured.  
Disparities address disparities in access to or affordability of energy between different 
locations or social groups within the project’s target region. Two indicators are 
suggested: a) whether disparities in access exist between different locations, and b) 
whether disparities in affordability exist between different social groups. 
The South African government’s Free Basic Electricity (FBE) policy is specifically aimed 
at reducing energy affordability disparities. It is interesting to note that differences in the 
implementation of FBE between municipalities actually lead to an increase in 
geographical disparities in affordability, as reported in Banks [2007:p118]. This problem 
will be explored in detail later in this chapter. 
The health theme 
Regarding the health impacts of energisation, the SA Energy White Paper’s policy 
objectives aim to reduce a) fuel-related negative health impacts and b) harmful energy-
related emissions:   
“Government will promote access to basic energy services for poor households, 
in order to ameliorate the negative health impacts arising from the use of certain 
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national targets for the reduction of energy-related emissions that are harmful to 
the environment and to human health.” [DME 1998:p8] 
Within the context of off-grid energisation the fuel-related “negative health impacts” are 
taken to include paraffin poisoning and fire-related injuries (e.g. Banks [2007:p113]), 
which can be classified under the IAEA’s theme of health, as a sub-theme fuel-use 
safety. Suggested indicators for this objective are the occurrence of a) paraffin poisoning 
and b) fire-related injuries within the region targeted by the energisation project. 
The IAEA’s framework in Table 2-1 classifies all air-quality related objectives under the 
environmental dimension, differentiating between climate change and air quality. From 
an off-grid energisation perspective, however, the air quality sub-theme relates better to 
the social dimension under the health theme, as indicated in the SA white paper: 
“Studies have shown that fuelwood users are exposed to extremely high levels of 
particulate emissions from wood smoke, which result in adverse health effects, 
such as Acute Respiratory Illness in children.” [DME 1998:p31] 
A suggested indicator for the air quality objective is the prevalence of particulate 
emission-related illnesses within the region targeted by the energisation project.  
A number of studies, including Magilindane [2003:p91] and DME [2001b:p30], have 
reported on the security benefits derived from energisation, especially exterior lighting 
(both from SHSs and community street lighting) in making customers feel more secure 
and reducing theft. Security can be identified as a sub-theme to the theme of health. The 
suggested indicator simply measures whether adequate exterior lighting has been 
provided by the energisation project. 
SHSs often replace car lead-acid batteries as energy sources for media appliances. 
These car batteries require frequent charging at often-distant charging stations. 
Magilindane [2003:p57] identified in his survey of the Eskom-Shell concession area of 
Mbizana that lighting “as well as relief from the heavy burden of transporting the battery 
to charging facilities located far away, seem to be the most important reasons why the 
householders like the solar.” The physical labour involved in activities like gathering fuel 














“Women involved in this programme confirm that 7 [the availability of biogas has] 
had a beneficial impact in reducing neck-, back- and head-aches, resulting from 
carrying heavy wood or water loads on their heads.” [Sparknet 2003] 
These examples allow the objective of energy-supply related physical labour to be 
identified as a sub-theme to health. A suggested indicator is the extent to which energy-
supply related physical labour has been reduced through energisation. 
Regarding migration, Zomers [2001:p37 and p44] argues that although the reduction of 
migration from rural to urban areas has often been an objective of rural electrification, it is 
not an outcome of electrification per se. Migration is rather influenced by population 
control, economic development and education of individuals and families. For this reason 
the reduction of rural to urban migration is not included as a primary objective within the 
framework, but can be seen as an ultimate objective. 
Table A-1: Social sustainable development objectives and indicators within the context of off-grid 
energisation projects. 
Social dimension 




Adequacy of energy from modern sources for 
basic needs of a) indoor lighting, b) media, c) 
communication, d) cooking, e) space heating, 
f) water heating and g) refrigeration 
Not available 
Available but inadequate 
Available and adequate  
Affordability of 
energy 
a) Average customers’ ability to pay 
b) Poorest customers’ ability to pay 
Not able to pay 
Able to pay 
Addressing 
disparities 
Disparities in access to and affordability of 
modern energy sources between a) different 






The occurrence of a) paraffin poisoning, and b) 
fire-related injuries 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Indoor air 
quality 
The occurrence of indoor particulate emission-
related illnesses 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Security Adequacy of exterior lighting 
Not available 
Available but inadequate 




The amount of energy-related physical labour 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Economic objectives 
The IAEA’s economic themes and sub-themes are aimed at a national level, and not 
directly relevant within the off-grid energisation context. The two themes of supply and 
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The supply theme 
The reliability and, in cases where sensitive electrical equipment are used, the quality of 
energy supply are supporting factors towards realising economic development. These 
factors should however be balanced by the cost of connection, as highlighted by Gaunt 
[2003]: 
“In particular, where the distribution is to reach poor customers with subsidised 
tariffs, there is a significant incentive to reduce costs to a minimum. The issue is 
whether a customer not meeting the full costs of supply is entitled to receive a 
supply of the same quality as customers paying the full costs or even premium 
costs.” [Gaunt 2003:p87] 
Even where energisation is targeted mainly on the poor, as is currently the typical case in 
the off-grid context in South Africa, a minimum level of supply reliability and quality need 
to be maintained. If supply reliability is too low, customers potentially will be discouraged 
from switching to modern energy sources, thereby impacting all the primary objectives of 
off-grid energisation. Too low supply quality again aversely affects the life span of 
electrical appliances like CFL lights. 
Supply quality and supply reliability will not be included in the framework, as it is argued 
that these are not primary objectives of sustainable development, but rather important 
supportive objectives that make realisation of the primary objectives possible. 
Another potential sub-theme of the supply theme might be energy security through 
supply diversity, one of the South African Energy White Paper’s five main supply-side 
energy objectives: “7 government will pursue energy security by encouraging a diversity 
of both supply sources and primary energy carriers.” [DME 1998:p9] The objective of 
supply diversity, however, contributes little to sustainable development within the off-grid 
energisation context, except by potentially increasing the reliability of supply, and will 
therefore not be included in the proposed energisation framework. 
In the light of the above, the supply theme under the economic dimension remains empty 













The productive use theme 
It can be argued that the access to information made possible by television and radio 
can increase economic productivity in rural areas, although no references could be found 
to support or oppose this view. The suggested performance indicators for this objective 
are the level of use of a) radio b) TV and c) Internet within the project’s target area. 
Activities like wood fuel gathering and transporting car batteries to and from distant 
charging stations are time-intensive activities. The use of modern energy sources can 
free the customer from such activities [Green 2003:p165], and through better quality 
lighting increase the amount of time available for potentially productive activities:  
“By far the most appreciated advantage of inside solar lighting is the brightness 
and the possibility of undertaking evening activities previously not possible. Such 
activities included opening the shop for longer hours, reading or doing 
housework.” [ERC 2004b:piv] 
This increased time availability can be identified as a sub-theme of productive use. The 
suggested indicator for this sub-theme is the amount of free time that the average 
customer has per day compared to before energisation. 
In the South African rural context, where off-grid energisation is most likely to occur, 
women are largely responsible for energy-supply related activities like gathering wood 
fuel, as explored in [Green 2003]. Because of this, the benefits brought by the use of 
modern energy source, especially the decrease in energy-supply related time 
expenditure and physical labour, will impact women most, resulting in increased gender 
equality. As this important objective of energisation is however mainly the result of two 
other primary objectives, it will not be included as a separate primary objective, but will 
rather be seen as an ultimate objective.  
Another sub-theme under the productive use theme can be identified as small, medium 
and micro enterprises (SMME) development. A number of studies, for example 
[Borchers & Hofmeyr 1997] and [Prasad and Dieden 2007], have concluded that 
electrification does stimulate the establishment and growth of local businesses, although 
inputs like market access and financing play an even more important role. An indicator 
for this sub-theme is whether the number of SMMEs in the target area of the energisation 
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A final sub-theme can be identified as long-term income generation. The concept of 
job creation, highlighted as a central objective in the South African government’s Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution macro-economic strategy [DME 1998:p7], falls within this 
classification – income generation describes this objective more clearly, as the concept 
‘job’ requires further definition. An indicator for this sub-theme is whether the average 
household income in the target area of the energisation project has increased. 
Table A-2: Economic sustainable development objectives and indicators within the context of off-grid 
energisation projects. 
Economic dimension 





The use of a) radio, b) TV and c) Internet 
within the target area of the energisation 
project 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
Increased time 
availability 
The amount of free time daily compared to 
before energisation 
More than before 
No change 
Less than before 
SMME 
development 
The number of SMMEs within the target area 
of the energisation project 
Less than before 
No change 




The average household income within the 
target area of the energisation project 
Less than before 
No change 
More than before 
Environmental objectives 
The IAEA’s environmental themes and sub-themes are well suited to off-grid 
electrification projects, as will be shown below. 
The atmosphere theme 
The South African renewable energy white paper [2003:pix] states that the government’s 
medium term target is “10 000 GWh renewable energy contribution to final energy 
consumption by 2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-scale 
hydro.” Although part of the objective of this target is economic, its main objective lies 
within the environmental dimension under the theme of atmosphere: impacting climate 
change: 
“7it is the intention of the Government to make South Africa’s due contribution to 
the global effort to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. For this purpose, the 













industry can operate, grow, and contribute positively to the South African 
economy and to the global environment.” [DME 2003:pvii] 
The suggested indicator for the sub-theme of climate change is the contribution of 
renewable energy sources towards the total energy produced by modern energy sources 
in the project. 
The water theme 
Water quality can be negatively impacted by off-grid energisation. A good example of 
this occurred at the Hluleka Nature Reserve (discussed in more detail later), where diesel 
seeped in the local river from the original diesel generator system [NER 2003b:p4]. A 
suitable indicator will basically measure the impact of energisation on water quality. 
The irresponsible disposal of especially batteries at their life end (Hluleka once again can 
act as an example – see [NER 2003b:p4]) can also have a negative impact on the 
environment, with heavy metals like lead and cadmium polluting ground water, and 
battery acid seeping into rivers. Proper procedures to deal with the disposal of waste are 
therefore identified as an important objective within the environmental dimension. It is 
however supportive in nature, and will therefore not be included in the energisation 
framework. 
The land theme  
Regarding land, the sub-themes of deforestation are highlighted in the SA Energy White 
Paper, which expresses concern that “many areas experience an over-harvesting of 
natural woodland resources, resulting in environmental degradation, soil erosion, and 
desertification.” [DME 1998:p31] Energisation that meets the thermal needs of a 
community can dramatically impact this problem, as the results of a survey at 
Maphephethe indicates: 
“7 when the data for women with access to biogas were compared to the 
traditional energy users, there was a significant difference – namely no wood 
collection at all [by women with access to biogas]. “ [Green 2003:p165]  
The objectives of soil erosion and desertification are to a large extent the results of 
deforestation (i.e. ultimate objectives), and will not be considered separately. The 
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Table A-3: Environmental sustainable development objectives and indicators within the context of off-grid 
energisation projects.  
Environmental dimension 




Green house gas contribution from energy 
sources 
Worse than before 
No change 
Better than before 
Water Water quality 
The impact of the use of modern energy 
sources on drinking and general water quality 
Worse than before 
No change 
Better than before 
Land Deforestation 
The impact of the use of modern energy 
sources on deforestation 
Worse than before 
No change 













Appendix B – Evaluation of implemented SA off-grid 
electrification projects 
In this appendix a selection of implemented South African off-grid electrification projects 
will be evaluated against the sustainable development objectives defined in the 
energisation framework.  
Information sources and structure of project evaluations 
The main sources of information on the projects are existing literature, but where these 
sources are not sufficient people who were involved in these projects have been 
interviewed. In addition the author has visited the Hluleka and Lucingweni projects a 
number of times since 2003.  
Each project evaluation will be structured as follows:  
• A background to the project will be presented, which includes the main actors, the 
technology used and the delivery model. 
• Factors that led to the project not reaching the context-specific electrification primary 
objectives, as commented on above, will be explored. In most cases a cause and 
effect diagram will be constructed to add clarity to the discussion. 
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Maphephethe pilot SHS project 
Background 
General information on the project was obtained from [Magilindane 2003], [Bonnet and 
Andrew 2003] and [Sparknet 2003] unless otherwise stated. 
Maphephethe is a rural village some 80km west of Durban, characterised by dispersed 
settlement patterns. The total number of homesteads in the village is estimated at around 
2200, with each homestead housing on average 8 persons in 4 dwellings.  
Grid electrification was available only at the edges of the village, but was extended into 
the village to power the clinic, local authority administration centre and the Kamangwa 
and Myeka high schools by 2003. Prior to grid electrification Myeka high school received 
power from PV arrays supplied by Eskom in 1995 as part of its rural schools 
electrification programme. 
A pilot project commenced in January 1996 with the aim of developing and testing a 
replicable mode of practice for installing SHSs in South Africa. The Solar Electric Light 
Fund (SELF), a US-based NGO, initiated the project and Solar Engineering Services 
(SES), a Durban based service company, was responsible for site identification, project 
management and training. 
SES identified Maphephethe as a suitable site for the pilot SHS project through a limited 
consultation process with various grid electricity distributors and rural communities. The 
village was deemed suitable for SHSs as grid electricity was not scheduled for at least 5 
years, the community leaders showed a co-operative spirit, the density of households 
were low, and it was located in a mountainous area which would have increased the cost 
of electricity distribution.  
The pilot project was completed within two years, having installed 50 SHSs, consisting of 
a 50 to 55Wp solar module, 3 compact fluorescent lights of 9W, a 105Ah battery, battery 
cover and a charge controller fitted with 12 volt DC Monochrome TV or 12 V DC radio 
connection point.  
A number of additional energisation projects were undertaken in this village, including 
projects focussed on solar cooking, the use of biogas digesters, and the establishment of 
a PV/biogas hybrid supply at the Myeka High School, which supported among other the 














A credit-based SHS dissemination model was used, where customers were expected to 
pay the full capital and maintenance costs, repayable at between R57 and R82 per 
month (depending on the interest rate and loan period) through 3- or 4-year loans. The 
KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation (KFC) provided loan funding at 
commercial interest rates, with the US Department of Energy (DOE) providing the 
guarantees for loan funding.  
The SHS was guaranteed for the period of the loan, with replacement subject to the 
customer's account being up-to-date. Interest on the loan guarantee was adequate to 
cover the cost of warranty replacements. In the eventuality of grid becoming available, 
SELF has instituted a guaranteed buy-back scheme for the equipment supplied. 
A small community-based organisation took responsibility for marketing the SHSs and 
provided assistance with the processing of loans. SES procured the SHSs, managed the 
project, prepared marketing materials and monitored quality and trained local community 
members as installers. These installers were responsible for SHS installations and 
ongoing maintenance. 
Green and Zwebe [2006:p12] however reports that maintenance deteriorated after the 
SHS installers moved to Durban or passed away. SES initiated a new project in 2004 
where customers were to pay a monthly fee of R18 in return for maintenance and repair. 
The community was grid-electrified from around 2001, but a number of households 
interviewed by Green and Zwebe continue to use the SHS, and expressed satisfaction 
with it.  
Factors that prevented objectives being met 
Factors in the Maphephethe SHS project that prevented it from meeting certain primary 
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Figure B-1: Factors identified in literature that prevented the Maphephethe SHS project from meeting certain 
primary energisation objectives. 
An important problem identified in the literature was that SHS sales figures remained low 
(1), with only 50 SHS systems installed in households throughout the entire 
Maphephethe village by 2003 [Sparknet 2003], even though a survey conducted in 1995 
indicated very high demand for the systems [Magilindane 2005:p15]. 
Reasons cited in literature for the low SHS sales figures included that a “large proportion 
of the community [were] awaiting the electric grid extension as their source of energy.” 
[Bonnet and Andrew 2003:p148] (2), that uncertainty around the possibility of future SHS 
subsidies caused residents to rather wait [Banks 1998] (3), and that the “cost of 
ownership of the SHS and expanding the capacity of existing systems is very high” 
[Bonnet and Andrew 2003:p148] (4).  
High cost of ownership meant that only the better off households had access to SHSs, as 
was concluded in a community survey conducted by Green [2003:p162] (5). 
Low sales figures and high cost of ownership impacted on the primary objectives of 
removing disparities in energy use between different income groups, and affordability of 
energy. 
An additional problem reported by Myeka high school teachers interviewed on the 













the excess use of electrical appliances other than the computers”  [Green 2003:p163] (6). 
This related to the more general problem reported by Green [2003:p166], that “the 
concept of efficiency in using the technologies was not understood” in the community (7). 
Energy efficiency impacts the adequacy of energy, and therefore the primary objective of 
accessibility. 
Green [2003:p166] further concluded through her survey of the Maphephethe project that 
“very little income generation has resulted from the access to energy technology”, 
caused according to her mainly by a lack of local markets (8). 
After the SHS installers who were supposed to look after maintenance left the village or 
died, maintenance became a problem, as reported by Green and Zwebe [2006], 
necessitating a new project to try and solve the maintenance issues. This indicates that 
the long-term maintenance arrangements were insufficient (9) and (10). 
Lessons learned 
The literature identified a number of lessons learned: 
• A definite correlation between adequate and ongoing maintenance and loan 
repayment was identified in Sparknet [2003]. System maintenance and loan 
repayment were successful, as Bonnet and Andrew [2003:p149] reports that 35 out 
of the 50 installed SHSs were still operational at the end of 2002, while Sparknet 
[2003] reports that although 19 systems have been repossessed due to poor 
payment records, by 2003 30 other systems were fully paid, and 1 in the process of 
being paid. 
• The fact that only one incident of SHS theft has been reported since the project's 
inception, compared to significant theft at the local schools’ PV arrays and Telkom 
installations, is attributed by Sparknet [2003] to personal ownership of the SHS 
systems. In addition, Bonnet and Andrew [2003:p148] attribute the low incidence of 
theft to the fact that the SHS installations are mostly not visible from the public 
access road, and often located in mountainous terrain with very few vehicle tracks. 
• Sparknet [2003] reported positive results from the participative style of project 
management that was used in the SHS pilot project, where key role players were 
engaged in order to solicit their support, and the community participated in 
decisions (e.g. regarding the financing mechanisms) and were involved in the 
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identified as one of the main problems in some of the other Maphephethe 
development projects: 
“Participation and motivation are two closely related concepts. We believe that if 
local people participate in a project at all levels, they will be motivated to make it 
succeed. The opposite is also true.” [Woudstra and Zoller 2004:p6] 
• Raising awareness within the community of the benefits of development 
projects, for example by using promotional materials, surveys and demonstrations, 
leads to increased community project ownership. This was observed at, among 
other places, Maphephethe, by Woudstra and Zoller: 
“It is important that the locals feel the need for water supply, electricity, education, 
income and job creation. Many of the people are not aware of the importance of 
development. 7 When everyone in the community perceives the importance of 
the development projects, the projects will become more sustainable and 
efficient.” [Woudstra and Zoller 2004:p4]  
• One of the reasons listed by Bikam and Mulaudzi [2006] why the Maphephethe 
project was successful was that the responsibilities of the project beneficiaries 
were made clear to them: 
“[The beneficiaries] were made to understand that the cost of maintenance of the 
project was their responsibility. It was also made clear to them that they would be 
responsible for making sure that the project remains sustainable.” [Bikam and 
Mulaudzi 2006:1562] 
Bonnet and Andrew [2003:p148] agrees with this perspective: 
 “developing a shared understanding among all stakeholders as to their legitimate 
vested interests will go a long way in ensuring sustainable infrastructure 
development and usage.“ 
• It was recommended that SHS installations be undertaken as part of a basket of 
development projects in order to share the overhead costs of training, supervision, 
travel, marketing, financing, quality control etc. between the projects [Sparknet 
2003]. 
• The literature highlights the importance of speedy technology and skills transfer 













the providers / sponsors of the technology [Bonnet and Andrew 2003:p150]. 
Green [2003:p163] found that a number of SHS owners reported fixing their systems 
themselves. 
• The fact that important project issues like “the problems of capacity building, 
maintenance and cost implications “ were addressed during the planning stages 
of the project contributed to its success, according to Bikam and Mulaudzi 
[2006:1562] 
KwaBhaza energisation project 
Background 
The information in this section is based on Sparknet [2003] and Kloot [1999] unless 
otherwise stated. 
Eskom first tested the idea of off-grid energisation through PV and LPG in 1997 in the 
settlement of Papendorp, a remote extension of the town of Ebenezer on the Cape West 
Coast. This trail project was however abandoned due to pressure from residents for grid 
electrification. 
Hereafter Eskom embarked on official pilot projects within a framework set out in the 
Energisation Pilot Project Proposal [Eskom 1997]. Six remote rural sites were identified 
for energisation, each matched with the supply division of one of a number of South 
African LPG companies. The identification criteria used included that the site must be 
further than 5km from the existing grid, must not be earmarked for grid electrification in 
the next 5 years, must be accessible by road for a 1-ton LPG delivery truck, and must 
have a PV-electrified school in the area so that residents will have some familiarity with 
PV. 
Due to institutional and financial problems (the REFSA subsidy problem will be discussed 
in more detail below), the energisation pilot project was finally only implemented fully at 
KwaBhaza in KwaZulu-Natal. KwaBhaza is located around 20 km from Tugela Ferry and 
87 km from Dundee, and 10 km from the nearest existing Eskom grid at the time of 
implementation.  
The project was implemented as a joint venture between Eskom, Total and the Liquefied 
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procured SHS products and provided project management and interim finance (and 
subsidy, after REFSA’s failure). Total installed the LPG cage in the village and provided 
training on LPG filling procedures, while LPGSA arranged gas supply, subsidy and 
interim finance. 
A 50Wp SHS for light and media, and a two-plate LPG stove and two 4.5kg LPG 
cylinders were to be supplied to households as a subsidised energisation package. The 
residents had a choice between a pole-mounted and roof-mounted package, with or 
without TV. The Eskom supplied black and white TVs however did not work at 
KwaBhaza, apparently due to the weak signal strength. The TV option was therefore 
removed. 
Installations started in July 1998, and a total of 120 systems have been installed in at 
KwaBhaza through this energisation project. It was anticipated that the project would 
eventually form part of the EDF/Total concession area. 
Delivery model 
The KwaBhaza energisation project tested a credit-based model, where the household 
paid a R140 deposit, and then a monthly fee of R55 or R65 over a 35 or 37-month 
period, depending on the equipment ordered. The monthly fee includes the refill of one 
gas cylinder per month. Additional 4.5 kg gas cylinder refills cost R22.50. The household 
owns the equipment upon completion of payment. Flexible repayment systems were 
used, where if the monthly repayment were not made the household could continue to 
use the SHS but did not receive the free monthly refill of gas. 
Three additional concepts were also tested during this project: that of an energy agent, a 
demonstration house and an energy day. 
The concept of an energy agent involves training a community-appointed member (and 
possibly some part-time assistants) to maintain the energisation packages and provide 
LPG fuel. At Kwabhaza the selected energy agent received training in basic business 
and accounting skills and LPG refilling and safety procedures, and along with four other 
villagers training in the installation and maintenance of the SHSs. The energy agent is 
also responsible for sales, repayment collection and collection of deposits for new 
systems. 
Two demonstration houses were selected, in consultation with the community, at which 













community to the energisation technology. A few weeks after the demonstration systems 
were installed, in mid-April 1998, an energy day was held where the product offering 
was formally introduced to the community in the form of a festive meeting. Information 
exchange and marketing activities, for example the handing out promotional gifts and 
pamphlets, took place on this day, along with the initial signing on of customers. Kloot 
[1999] was sceptical about this marketing exercise: 
“7 the enthusiasm of the suppliers in convincing rural people that energisation is 
the answer to their energy needs may stray into modes of advertising 
inappropriate to the traditional rural context. This may result in people buying into 
the idea of energisation and the glossy presentation of a modern lifestyle that it 
seems to offer rather than a sober assessment of its advantages and 
disadvantages.” [Kloot 1999:p32] 
At the energy day 83 households indicated that they would be interested in the package, 
although this number dropped to around 40 households when the TV was removed from 
the system due to lack of TV signal in the area. 
The energisation process at KwaBhaza, guided by Eskom’s Project Proposal, was 
divided into three phases. During the first phase the project was introduced to the 
community, market research was done within the community, and the energisation 
package was developed and finalised. During phase two the majority of the interaction 
with the community took place, informing them of the benefits of the project and 
convincing them to buy the package. During this phase the energy agent and 
demonstration houses were also identified, and the energy day held. The third phase 
involved the installation of the packages once deposits have been collected. Community 
involvement during the project was seen as a primary focus of Eskom: 
“The process 7 aims to involve the community every step of the way and to get 
their understanding and buy in. In addition, the process checks everything very 
systematically, especially such things as disposable income, affordability, 
customer choice, and gets a commitment at each stage. In this way it minimises 
risk and thoroughly markets the whole energisation package.” [Eskom 1997] 
Factors that prevented objectives being met 
Figure B-2 diagrammatically presents a number of causes identified in literature that led, 
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Figure B-2: Factors identified in literature that prevented the KwaBhaza energisation project from meeting 
certain primary energisation objectives. 
Kloot [1999:p31] suggested that “expectations of grid are the main factor causing the 
rejection of energisation” in the KwaBhaza community (1).  
In addition, the marketing process used at the energy day (2), with promotional gifts etc., 
led to suspicion among some members of the community that the motives behind the 
energisation project were political in nature (3):  
“The energy agent’s wife said that the Anti-energisation Group [a term used by 
the author to group those in the community against energisation] were of the 
opinion that energisation was not really aimed at helping the community but was 
driven by political motives (perhaps 7 Eskom’s marketing strategies at the 
Energy Day precipitated these beliefs). She added that their aim was to expose 
energisation as a ‘canvassing drive’ and questions its legitimacy as a 
development initiative.” [Kloot 1999:p91] 
The fact that the subsidy and loan arrangements applied only to the full energisation 
package, consisting of both LPG and the costly SHS (4), excluded the poor from the 
benefits of energisation (5). Kloot [1999:p83] suggests a more flexible package where 
poor households can opt for an LPG-only option, while allowing more affluent households 













The rejection of energisation by some members of the community, and the inability of 
some households to afford the full package, resulted in lower energisation package sales 
figures (6), which impacted the primary objective of decreased disparities within the 
community. 
At the first community meeting with Eskom, the project leader made it clear that a 
government subsidy of R1500 was available for each package (7), thereby creating 
community expectations (8). This subsidy was to be funded by REFSA (Renewable 
Energy for South Africa). REFSA was established by the DME in 1995 as an 
implementing arm to finance and implement renewable energy projects in South Africa. 
In addition to channelling the R1500 per off-grid household subsidy approved by cabinet, 
REFSA’s role at KwaBhaza would have been to underwrite the community’s loans for the 
energisation packages. 
However, by the end of 1997 REFSA had not yet implemented any projects, as the 
subsidy still had to be ratified by the minister of minerals and energy in order for it to be 
released. As no commitment had yet been received from REFSA, “energisation was 
going ahead on the understanding that Eskom would ‘crisis manage’ when the time 
came.” [Kloot 1999:p56]  
REFSA was put under review in November 1997 (9), and later drafted back into the 
DME, its functionality “marred by bureaucratic power struggles” (10) according to Kloot 
[1999:p69].  Eskom tried to identify other sources for the subsidy, but finally had to 
provide the subsidy themselves and underwrite the loans in order to ensure the 
continuation of the project (11). They further offered the systems at the original price 
quoted at the community meeting even though the cost has increased, leading to a 
subsidy of R1700 per package. If Eskom had not been willing to take over the subsidies 
the energisation package would have been too expensive for most of the community, 
impacting a whole range of primary objectives including affordability. 
A number of SHS component delivery problems occurred at KwaBhaza: lights returned 
for replacement or repairs did not come back, and newly ordered SHSs took around two 
months to arrive (12). The cause of these problems was identified as a reluctance of 
courier companies or other transport service providers to deliver components to remote 
rural areas (13). Asking companies to deliver to nearby Tugela Ferry, from where the 
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System maintenance was paid from the monthly loan repayment. However, no provision 
has been made for maintenance after loans have been repaid (15) – this was left to the 
community: 
“The fee required and the structure for continued maintenance beyond the SHSs 
loan repayment has not been finalised. Despite the lack of a well-planned future 
maintenance programme and the agreement on the associated service-fees, the 
project has the potential to be sustainable over the longer term if the parties 
involved make the necessary arrangements during the next year or two.” 
[Sparknet 2003] 
Maintenance is crucial to maintain the availability of especially the SHSs. A lack of 
availability impacts all primary objectives. 
Lessons learned 
• Kloot [1999] strongly argues for product information sharing rather than 
marketing when introducing a energisation package to a community:  
 “If it is recognised that the community need is education regarding alternative 
energy sources then transparent and informative discussion and learning would 
certainly be more beneficial than marketing.” [Kloot 1999:p100] 
“Building trust between the community and implementers: “Trust is built up 
silently, not with the distribution of free gifts. 7 Awareness of where the power 
lies in the community [the induna and the elders] would probably create a better 
impression.” [Kloot 1999:p89] 
A number of lessons are identified in Sparknet [2003]: 
• Consultation with the relevant role players is important, as is involving them in the 
project process.  
• The energisation packages should be flexible, i.e. include a number of different 
options to cater for a wider range of households in the community, as discussed 
earlier.  
• More than half of the customers who originally expressed interest in the 
energisation package withdrew after the TV was dropped from the package due to 













• A flexible loan repayment method is essential given the erratic nature of income 
in rural areas. Such a flexible system was used at KwaBhaza with positive results: 
Sparknet [2003] reports that in 2003 at least 80% of household repayments were up 
to date, with no SHS having been removed due to non-payment. This is in 
agreement with Kloot [1999]: 
 “In terms of the capital cost repayment, it is recognised that the conditions at 
which credit is provided will influence the sustainability. In particicular, ‘flexible 
payment options’ are a factor that will allow deptors to meet their financial 
obligations.” [Kloot 1999:p38] 
• Sparknet [2003] reports only one incident of panel theft, with the panel returned 
within 24 hours due to community pressure. This low incidence of theft and lack 
of vandalism is ascribed to considerable community ‘buy-in’ in the project, and 
a sense of ownership. 
Folovhodwe project 
Background 
Details about the Folovhodwe project were obtained from [Sparknet 2003] and 
[Magilindane 2003] except where stated. 
Folovhodwe is a village approximately 80 km from both Thohoyandou and Messina in the 
Northern province, which in 1996 contained around 670 households, located around 10 
km from the nearest grid.  
The community was originally approached in August 1995 for interest in participating in a 
SHS pilot project. A project committee was established after 31 households expressed 
interest. However, the community subsequently had discussions with Eskom, which gave 
the community confidence that the village would be electrified within the next few years. 
This grid expectation led to the abandonment of the proposed SHS pilot project [Cowan 
et al 1996]. 
In 1997 the Bavarian government approached the DME with a proposal to establish a 
demonstration Solar Village utilising SHS technology. The Bavarian government was 
willing to fund most of the hardware, if the DME would fund the balance of the system 
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Folovhodwe village was identified as a suitable site, as information about this village was 
available from the 1995 failed project, and as it was (after all) unlikely to receive grid 
electricity in the short- or medium-term. 
A number of stakeholder interaction meetings were held between 1997 and 1998 
between village representatives, local and foreign government representatives, 
manufacturer representatives and other actors. According to Sparknet [2003] these 
meetings created unrealistic expectations within the community:  
“Unfortunately this [stakeholder interaction] process was not well planned. The 
focus of these meetings was on the donation, the benefits thereof and the 
generosity thereof. The over eagerness of some of the government officials and 
manufacturers' representatives in getting the project established, lead to 
unrealistic presentations and promises. The presentations did not cover or stress 
the necessity of paying a service fee, the maintenance of the donation's value, 
product guarantees and what a guarantee really means. The roles, functions and 
responsibilities of the different stakeholders were also not clarified and defined.” 
[Sparknet 2003] 
These unrealistic expectations resulted in great dissatisfaction when the community was 
later informed that they would have to pay for the SHSs. The project went ahead despite 
this community dissatisfaction. The three community schools were the first sites in the 
village to receive solar electricity in October 1998. By February 1999 the previously 
electrified local clinic’s PV system was repaired and upgraded, and all 582 formally 
inhabited houses in the village supplied with 50Wp Solar Home Systems (SHS). The 
official opening of the project took place in March 1999. 
No connection or service fees were received from individual households until November 
1999, when RAPS, on the request of the DME, implemented a second project to try and 
solve the problems related to payment for the SHS service. 
Bikam and Mulaudzi [2006:p1563] reports that by the middle of 2004 only 13 SHSs out of 
the original 582 were still in good working condition 
Delivery model 
The Folovhodwe Solar Village project received infrastructure as a donation from the 













connection fee from all customers, but decided to cancel this fee given that the SHSs 
were already installed without any connection fees having been received.  
A meeting with the community, held in early December 1999, resulted in an agreement 
where customers would start paying a R20 monthly service fee from the beginning of 
December, even though RAPS calculated that at least R35 per month was required to 
cover administration costs, the maintenance of systems and the purchase of replacement 
parts. Customers were expected to sign a service agreement in which they agreed to pay 
the service fee and take proper care of their SHS. The ownership of the SHSs was 
transferred from the DME to the region’s Transitional Local Council (TLC). 
Sparknet [2003] reports that 9 SHSs had their PV modules removed due to non-payment 
in April 2000. 
The community, through a Project Steering Committee, was responsible for the 
maintenance of the SHSs and Solar School Systems, as well as the management of the 
project funds. A payment office was established, staffed by one administrator and one 
technician, selected at random from six villagers who received training in SHS installation 
and maintenance procedures. 
It was agreed that when in the future Folovhodwe village received grid electrification, the 
SHSs would be moved to another location requiring SHSs. 
Factors that prevented objectives being met 
The diagram in Figure B-3 illustrates the factors that prevented energisation primary 
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Figure B-3: Factors identified in literature that prevented the Folovhodwe project from meeting certain 
primary energisation objectives. 
As discussed above, the community originally assumed that they would get the SHSs for 
free, with no monthly service charges (1). This expectation was partly created by 
unrealistic presentations and promises during the initial stages of the project (2), which 
can be blamed on a stakeholder interaction process that was not planned well (3). 
Adequate sharing of information at an early stage by the project team with the community 
could have addressed these unrealistic expectations: 
“The residents in Folovhodwe village wondered why they should pay for the 
maintenance of the facilities when it is the reverse in conventional sources of 
energy supply [i.e. Eskom’s grid, which is maintained by Eskom]. It was not 
explained to them that solar energy supply systems operate differently from 
conventional systems.” [Bikam and Mulaudzi:p1566] 
Customer service agreements were further lacking, even though the installation of the 
SHSs has already been completed (4). The result of all of these factors was 













In addition to the unwillingness to pay, according to Bikam and Mulaudzi [2006:p1565] 
many members within the community could not afford the monthly service payments (6). 
This was partly due to the fact that around 40% of the households were on the 
government pension scheme. Those who could afford to pay did so irregularly (7), for 
reasons such as that “most of the residents depend on the seasonal sale of agricultural 
produce.” The inability of residents to pay should have been made apparent, for example 
through community surveys, early in the planning process (8) 
The provision of SHS maintenance was dependant on the income from the service 
payment, and ground to a halt due to this irregular or total lack of payment (9). For 
example during 2000 40% of the total households paid the maintenance fee, in 2001 
25%, and in 2002 and 2003 only 15% paid [Bikam and Mulaudzi 2006:p1568]. By 2001 
all the members of the maintenance team have left their jobs because of the non-
payment of their salaries.  
This fact, in addition to the fact that little attention was given to end-user training in the 
use and basic maintenance of the SHS (10), led to a steady decline in SHS functionality, 
as shown in Table B-1, with only 13 SHSs out of the original 582 still functioning by 2004.  
Table B-1: The decline in the functionality of the SHSs at Folovhodwe, reproduced from [Bikam and Mulaudzi 
2006] 
 
Bikam and Mulaudzi [2006:p1567] highlight a sharp rise in the total number of SHS 
breakdowns by 2002 to 3189, from 72 in 2000. Apart from normal wear-and-tear, they 
blame this increase on “the slow pace of spare parts procurement from abroad. The 
problem of spare parts procurement was due to the long period of waiting for 
replacement parts to arrive from abroad.” (11) 
As no attention has been given to maintenance agreements during the planning process, 
maintenance of the school PV systems stopped in September 1999 when the one-year 
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Theft was also a problem (13), with Bikam and Mulaudzi [2006:p1568] reporting that 20 
panels were stolen in 2003. They blamed the way that the PV panels were installed for 
the problems (14): 
“The initial installation of the solar panels outside the dwellings on a 3m poles, 
made the facility easy targets for theft and vandalisation. As a result of this, many 
solar modules were stolen. Although the heights of the poles were raised above 
the rooftops to avoid the problem of theft, it continued unabated.” Bikam and 
Mulaudzi [2006:p1568] 
The incidence of panel theft decreased only after actions including the following were 
taken: the panels were moved onto the less accessible roofs of the houses, the panels 
were chained to the mounting pole, all bolts and nuts were welded, or the module was 
stored indoors when not in use. 
Sparknet [2003] highlights the absence in the project of any disposal or recycling strategy 
to deal with end-of-life environmentally hazardous equipment like lead-acid batteries 
(15). The possibility exist that dysfunctional SHS equipment have been disposed of 
irresponsibly (16), as uncertainty exist among project stakeholders on what happened to 
this equipment.   
Lessons learned 
The reviewed literature reported the following lessons learned: 
• The project initiators (in this case the DME and Bavarian Government) should 
clarify, during the initial planning stages of the project, the future role of customers 
in terms of ownership and maintenance, thereby making the customers aware “in 
advance [of] the amount of financial and participation commitment” that they will 
need to invest [Bikam and Mulaudzi 2006:p1569] 
• Sparknet [2003] reports that a number of systems were damaged through incorrect 
repair actions by owners in the absence of trained maintenance technicians. This 
highlights the importance of training SHS customers in basic maintenance 
procedures. 
“The ability to repair the equipment has the potential of empowering the 
beneficiaries of the project facility and also guarantees the sustainability of 













• Sparknet [2003] concludes that community-managed maintenance and 
development funds have “a limited potential for success in South Africa due to 
the political nature of stakeholders, which causes polarisation and mistrust.” 
• A properly documented and implemented disposal or recycling strategy is 
important to minimise the impact of environmental hazards like lead-acid  
• Regarding the ultimate breakdown in relations between the project implementers 
and the project’s beneficiaries due to the problems of unrealistic expectations and 
poor financial planning, Sparknet [2003] notes that “sustainable development is 
not simply about resources but includes the management of relations between 
people and resources.” 
The DME’s SHS concession program 
The literature on which this section is based focuses mainly on three concessionaires 
and their customers: the Eskom- Shell joint venture in the Eastern Cape, NuRa in 
KwaZulu-Natal, and Solar Vision in the Limpopo Province. 
Background 
Towards the end of the 1990s the DME decided to allocate a number of remote rural 
concession areas to private off-grid service provider companies for subsidised SHS 
installations.  
The first implementation of this concession policy involved a joint venture between 
Eskom and Shell International Renewables, announced in October 1998 and launched in 
March 1999, to install SHSs in the Flagstaff region of the Eastern Cape province. The 
joint venture undertook to electrify some 50 000 rural households using SHSs over the 
following 5 years [DME 2001:p94].  
The DME invited submissions in January 1999 for additional off-grid service providers, 
based on which six additional consortia were identified in May 1999. Interim contracts 
between the consortia and NERSA and Eskom (operating under a mandate from the 
DME) were however only signed in May 2002, after extended institutional delays in 
finalising the programme structure, the roles of different stakeholders, contract terms and 
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This allowed the first phase installation of SHSs to commence in concession areas21. 
Two of the six selected consortia never started operations due to a variety of reasons. 
The remaining four companies were expected to connect 50 000 customers per 
concession area over an initial period of 5 years [Banks 2007] 
However, in February 2004 capital subsidy funds were stopped at short notice by the 
DME, halting new SHS installations. Negotiations between stakeholders led to a new 
contract been signed in October 2004 for phase two of the concession program. This 
new contract ended in April 2006 without a new one being in place, again halting new 
SHS installations. In November 2007, after several meetings, the consortia were 
informed by the DME that the contract will not be renewed “at this time” [Banks 2008]. 
From May 2006 to the time of writing (February 2010) no further subsidy funding has 
been received from national government by the consortia [Boussard 2010].  
The total number of SHSs installed by the consortia between March 1999 and October 
2007 are reported in Table B-2. From this table it is evident that not even 40 000 SHSs 
have been installed in total by October 2007, against a target of 50 000 per consortium. 
Table B-2: Consortia, concession areas and total number of installations by June 2004 and October 2007 
Consortia Concession Area 
Total installations by 
June 2004 [Create 
Acceptance 2007] 
Total installations by 
October 2007 [Banks 
2008] 
Nuon-Raps (NuRa) Northern KwaZulu-Natal 6541 10393 
Solar Vision Northern Limpopo 4758 9200 
EDF-Total (KES) Interior KwaZulu-Natal 3300 9000 
Renewable Energy Africa Central Eastern Cape 0 - 
Shell-Eskom (Replaced by the 
3 companies below in 05/06) 
Northern Eastern Cape and 
Southern KwaZulu-Natal 
5800 5800 
Summer Sun  - 1600 
Shine the way  - 1600 
Elita Co-op  - 1700 
Total  20399 39293 
 
In July 2007 KES obtained the concession to electrify the Northern region of the Eastern 
Cape, as shown on the map in Figure 1-3. KES started installing SHSs in January 2009, 
                                               
21
 The NuRa consortia already started installing SHSs in December 2001, with 400 SHSs funded 













and at the time of writing (February 2010) has installed around 3000 SHSs in the 
concession area. KfW, the German development bank, funds the installation of SHSs via 
the DME. 
A number of institutional delays impacted the KfW (KES) concession: negotiations 
leading to the signing of contracts in July 2007 already started in 2005. The contract for 
the interim monitoring consultancy (responsible for auditing the installation numbers) 
expired in December 2009 without a new consultancy and contract being in place (due to 
delays in the tender process), impacting installation progress [Boussard 2010].   
Delivery model 
The DME, in consultation with a variety of stakeholders, decided to base the concession 
programme on a fee-for-service delivery model, where the SHS remains the property of 
the consortia, which are responsible for ongoing maintenance funded by a monthly 
service fee from the customer. The customer would also have to pay a low application 
fee. 
Part of the vision of the DME was that the consortia should adopt an energisation 
delivery model, including LPG gas delivery in the model. In addition it was envisioned 
that the consortia would assume responsibility for maintaining institutional PV systems in 
their area of operation, charging a fee-for-service. According to Banks [2007:p118], one 
concessionaire recently “maintained several hundred school PV systems, but the others 
have not yet been actively engaged in institutional system maintenance.” 
SHS capital cost subsidies were provided through the National Electrification Fund, 
administered by the DME. Each concessionaire received exclusive rights to receive off-
grid electrification subsidies in the identified geographical areas for a pilot period of 5 
years (ending March 2004), although the off-grid service contracts are to remain in place 
for a period of 20 years. [ERC 2004:piii]  
The detailed implementation of the delivery model varied between the consortia, 
influenced by the specific organisational and operational difficulties that each 
concessionaire had to content with during the initial years of operation. An association 
through which the exchange of information, experience and know-how can take place 
was formed later [ERC 2004]. 
Delivery models differ slightly between consortia, but in essence follow the approach of a 
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credit onto their SHS prepaid meter through a card, which can be recharged at their 
nearest energy store. Maintenance technicians are also based at the energy stores, and 
LPG gas can by bought here. In order to shorten the distance customers have to travel to 
get to the energy store, NuRa has also started licensing local agents to sell solar credit 
on a commission basis, envisioning one local agent for every 500 customers in the future 
[Niemand and Banks 2006:p14]. 
According to the DME [2003b], SHS customers are entitled to a monthly FBE grant of 
R48 (later changed to R40). Niemand and Banks [2006:p12] report a number of 
problems with the implementation of the FBE subsidy. Originally the DME undertook to 
pay the subsidies, which it started to do on 1 March 2003, lowering the SHS service rate 
from R58 to R18 per month. However, the funding stopped after 8 months when it was 
decided that local government was responsible to pay for these subsidies. Service rates 
were increased back to R58 per month until such time that the local municipality 
implemented the subsidy. This resulted in dissatisfied customers and a “huge increase in 
non-payment” [Niemand and Banks 2006:p12].  
Bantsijang [2007] states that municipalities currently have the responsibility to give 
energy to the minimum monthly value of R55 to non-electrified households in their area, 
with the amount increasing on an annual basis by the inflation rate plus 1.5%. They 
however have a choice over the fuel and delivery method used. A problem identified by 
Banks [2007:p115] is that “at present there is significant variation in implementation 
methodology, and as far as this author is aware, there are many situations in which the 
FBE grant is not available to indigent rural households.” 
The NER initially provided a subsidy of around R3500 per installation, and has not made 
any revisions to this rate since, despite significant exchange rate variations and high 
inflation indexes. Tariffs for users currently stand at R61 per month [Banks 2007:p117] 
Problems experienced 
Banks [2007:p118] identifies “the question of political will and support for the process at 
national level” (1) as a cause of the long delays (2) in getting the first and second phases 
of the programme up and running, and the current uncertainty whether the third stage of 
the installations will be implemented. The ultimate liquidation of the Eskom-Shell joint 
venture was mainly caused by financial problems, which Afrane-Okese [2003:p43] partly 











“After the first two years of implementation, the company was
costs since they had been waiting a while for the subsidies promised by 
government.”   
The stop-start nature of the process has led to institutional uncertainties for the 
contracting parties (3), 
improvement. In addition, it led to an intermittent flow of the SHS capital subsidy 
(stopped in February 2004, resumed in October 2004, stopped again in April 2006, as 
described earlier), the impact of which can clearly be seen in the n
installations reported by NuRa, as shown in 
reports that this uncertainty around new SHS installations affects customer confidence 
(5), with 1000 outstanding NuRa custo
contracts for the third phase is in place.
Figure B-4: Number of SHSs installed by NuRa. Reproduced from Niemand and Banks [2007:p12]
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[Afrane-Okese 2003:p35] notes that the installation phase of the initial Eskom
venture project was rushed 
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pressures towards service delivery to the deprived people existed” (11). This rushed 
implementation resulted that adequate field-testing of the product was not done before 
roll-out (12), and contractual agreements with suppliers did not protect the joint venture 
from the risk of low product quality (13). This led to an increased likelihood of SHS 
technical faults (14). 
The fact that anti-tampering and anti-theft devices in the SHS introduced a high level of 
technical complexity to the system (15) also increased the risk of failure and limited the 
possibility of onsite maintenance and fault-finding [Afrane-Okese 2003:p40]. 
 














A number of factors in the concession programme led to customer dissatisfaction (16) 
and ultimately non-payment (17): 
• Inaccurate information disseminated (18) by “over-enthusiastic” sales agents and 
installers, along with situations where the customer service contract was not 
properly explained to customers, led to customer dissatisfaction, according to 
Afrane-Okese [2003:p43]. 
• The fee-for-service prepaid system (19) used in the SHS not only denies the 
customer access to SHS energy until credit has been loaded onto the system, but 
also records all non-paid days as ‘negative credit’ against the customer. This 
compulsory payment, even if the SHS is not used, differs significantly from the 
prepaid / pay-as-you-go systems used for grid electricity and cellphone credit, and 
both the ERC [2004:piv], and Afrane-Okese [2003:p38] reports that this model 
causes significant confusion (20) and dissatisfaction among customers. This agrees 
with Prasad and Visagie’s [2005:p34] concern that the customer often does not 
understand the technology and the often-complex agreements (21) that go with it. 
The ERC [2004:piv] cautions that the fee-for-service model can lead to household 
‘energy debt’ (22), a problem especially in impoverished communities. 
• Banks [2007:p118] identifies “the complexities of dealing with several local 
municipalities to set up service agreements, and access the operational subsidy 
(FBE)” (23) as causes that led to delays and geographical and time-based variations 
in the application of FBE subsidies (24). Prasad and Visagie [2005:p36] agrees that 
the reason for the difficulty in implementing the FBE subsidy lies in the fact that 
although national government makes the subsidy available, it has to be administered 
at local government level (in the case of off-grid electrification often impoverished 
rural district municipalities).  
Niemand and Banks [2006:p12] mention as example that only two of the five 
municipalities where NuRa has installations pays FBE subsidies (since the end of 
2005), one paying R40 and the other R30 per month. At the time the literature was 
written, only 57% of NuRa’s customers benefited from an FBE subsidy. These 
geographical variations obviously lead to customer dissatisfaction, and contribute to 
“significant non-payment problems.”  
It is noted by Banks [2007:p122] that rural logistics are a key challenge (25), especially in 
remote areas, with challenges including poor road infrastructure and households that are 
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delays, along with the previously discussed problems of non-payment and increased 
system faults leads to long periods of SHS unavailability, during which none of the 
primary objectives of off-grid electrification are reached. 
A number of individual primary objectives were also impacted by problems experienced 
during the concession programme: 
• The SHS concession programme did not succeed in the objective of income 
generation, as is clearly stated in the following quotation: 
“Hardly any income generation was created by acquiring SHSs. Although 
productive end uses for PV systems are known in other parts of South Africa, the 
concessions programme has failed to initiate income generation among its 
customers.” Prasad and Visagie [2005:p36] 
A possible reason for this, suggested by Prasad and Visagie [2006:p24], is that the 
programme did not include “strategies for productive and income generation 
activities” (27), as it falls outside the responsibility of utilities and energy ministries. 
• Prasad and Visagie [2005:p34] raises the concern that no clear strategy has been 
developed to dispose of old batteries and solar panels (28), which ultimately might 
impact the primary objective of water quality. 
• Afrane-Okese [2003:p46] notes that the emissions caused by the intensive use of 
motor vehicles for operations within the widely-dispersed SHS area, could far 
exceed the reduction in CO2 obtained from using PV as a energy source (29). This 
impacts the primary objective of climate change mitigation. 
Lessons learned 
• Prasad and Visagie [2006:p24] suggest that productive and income generation 
activities should be integrated into off-grid electrification programmes, through 
cooperation between ministries and organizations that have knowledge of these 
activities, and the implementing utilities and ministries. These actions will form part 













• Customers should be adequately represented by an independent body or 
organization [ERC 2004b:pvii]. NERSA currently fulfils this function, but is unknown 
to most rural customers. 
• Prasad and Visagie [2005:p34], Afrane-Okese [2003:p50], ERC [2004b:pvii], ERC 
[2005:piv] and Banks [2003:p5] identify the importance of accurate and adequate 
dissemination of information to potential and current SHS customers, so that the 
characteristics of the technology, the intentions of government, and future gird plans 
are well understood. The level of literacy of the customer should be taken into 
account when drawing up customer manuals. 
• Banks [2003:p5-6] highlights the usefulness of innovative customer service 
enhancements like using GPS coordinates to accurately locate customers, the use 
of motorcycles by maintenance technicians, improved testing and quality assurance 
of components before installation, and a “more formalised fault reporting procedure, 
to facilitate more reliable and precise logging of faults.” 
• Banks [2007:p124] suggest three main strategies to overcome grid planning 
uncertainty: 1) have robust, long-term plans in place so that all parties know 
where the grid will go, 2) “utilise off-grid systems that are compatible with 
subsequent grid electrification”, and 3) “integrate the implementation and 
management of grid and off-grid energy service delivery so that one party 
manages the planning and risks associated.”  
Regarding the first strategy, Banks states that even where clear long-term plans are 
available, “the politics of rural electrification mean that plans will change, and with 
the best will in the world – this author is of the opinion that off-grid installations, their 
consumers, funders and the companies that support them will remain vulnerable to 
bitter sweet risk of grid connection.” 
Regarding the second strategy, Banks identified the current lack of feed-in tariffs 
and standards as a challenge, along with the lack of capital to install renewable 
systems that will comply with grid standards.  
Banks identifies the following challenges regarding the third strategy: regulatory and 
institutional hurdles to integrating grid and off-grid, the risk of establishing 
monopolies for energy services, and the difficulties of accommodating less 
commercially viable activities “within a framework that retains business viability” and 
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be overcome, “a ‘home’ for the implementation and sustainable management of a 
diversity of energy service interventions” can be created. 
• Niemand and Banks [2006:p15] notes that although “a major criticism of solar 
electrical projects is that they fail to address the thermal needs of the customer 7it 
is also rather questionable as to whether grid achieves this” in many rural 
communities: 
“A grid customer using less than the 50 kWh FBE allocation per month 7is, at 
most, using a kettle, iron or hot plate infrequently during the month. It should be 
noted that 56% of ESKOM prepaid customers use less than 50 kWh per month. If 
one considers this as the major benefit of grid electricity compared to solar (the 
ability to infrequently use a thermal appliance) it becomes increasingly difficult to 
justify the huge additional capital expenditure for grid.” [Niemand and Banks 
2006:p15] 
• Niemand and Banks [2006:p15] identifies the main limiting factor of solar roll out 
as ”one of cash flow which is essentially controlled by Government. NuRa can quite 
easily reach installation targets of 3 000 to 4 000 installations per month provided it 
had the right climate under which to operate.” 
• According to Niemand and Banks [2006:p16] the fee-for-service model is 
working, with adequate maintenance and support infrastructure and payment 
levels, in the case of NuRa, of 77% and climbing. 
• The ERC [2005:piv] states that the issue of SHS ownership need to be 
addressed, and suggest an arrangement “whereby the ownership of the solar home 
system passes to the household, coupled with training of local freelance technicians 
with a system of certification may be useful.” 
• The security provided by medium term budget provisions shall “considerably 
assist planning for implementation and appropriate capacity development” according 
to Niemand and Banks [2006:p16]. 
• Social inclusion is an important condition for project sustainability, according 
to Afrane-Okese [2003 P46], as it can easily lead to “community ownership for the 
service, improve customer satisfaction and consequently raise payment levels” and 
would “allay the fears of the community, dispel false and ‘great’ expectations and 













Hluleka and Lucingweni hybrid mini-grid demonstration projects 
The general project information contained in this section is based on [NER 2003b] and 
[Scholle and Afrane-Okese 2007] except where otherwise mentioned. 
Background 
The NER, within the policy context defined by the White Paper on Energy, was mandated 
to investigate and propose a suitable regulatory framework for off-grid electrification. 
Within this context Cabinet requested that the NER and the Independent Development 
Trust (IDT) facilitate the piloting of hybrid mini-grid systems in South Africa, with the aim 
of gaining the experience required to inform a wider rollout of mini-grid systems in the 
country. 
The rural areas of the Eastern Cape province were identified as a suitable area for the 
hybrid mini-grid demonstration projects, as “it was obvious that intervention measures 
need to be applied to increase the economic activity” [NER 2003b:p3]. 
The Hluleka Nature Reserve and adjacent communities were identified as the optimal 
location for the demonstration project after consultation with the Department of Economic 
Affairs, Environment & Tourism and the Wild Coast Strategic Development Initiative. 
Shell Solar South Africa was mandated to identify the most suitable communities within 
this area, and identified 2 villages, namely Lucingweni and Lucingweni 2. Settlement 
density at Lucingweni was highest, and this site was chosen for the demonstration 
project. Shell evaluated the risk associated with the Lucingweni village as follows: 
 “P Lucingweni village appears to be a component of a stable, organized, and well-
structured region. 7 Risk has further been reduced by the wide consultation 
undertaken, and the levels of acceptance received, in the region. The location of the 
equipment, coupled with the proximity of the proposed community centre, further 
reduces risk. The site is on a cul de sac i.e. the road terminates at Hluleka Reserve.” 
[NER 2003b:p7] 
Implementation at the selected Hluleka Nature Reserve and nearby Lucingweni 
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Hluleka 
When identified as a demonstration project location, the Hluleka reserve’s 12 guest 
cottages, offices and guest quarters were already fully reticulated, and connected to two 
75 kW, 220V AC diesel generators. However, a number of problems were being 
experienced with this original system, as reported in [NER 2003b:p4]:  
• The operating cost of the diesel generators was high, as they were running for 10 
hours a day using around 90000 litres of diesel per year. 
• The generators suffered from unreliable maintenance. 
• The original energy system design did not take energy efficiency into account. 
• The location of the diesel generators near the Hluleka River caused a pollution 
problem, due to diesel fuel seepage and irresponsible battery disposal. 
• The water supply was pumped directly from the river without any purification 
process. 
• Telecommunications was problematic. 
As a solution to these problems, a 220V AC hybrid mini-grid energy system was installed 
capable of providing energy for the 12 guest chalets, offices and staff quarters, and water 
pumping and purification. The system consisted of two 2.5kW Proven wind generators, a 
PV array consisting of 56 100W crystalline PV modules and a 141 kWh battery bank 
capable of storing up to 5 days of reserve energy. SMA’s Sunny / Windy Boy inverters 
were used, along with an environmental monitoring system and a GSM-based data 
capturing system.  
Energy efficiency at the reserve was enhanced in a number of ways. Electric geysers 
were replaced with solar water heaters and LPG gas-based instantaneous water heaters, 
and baths replaced with showers utilising water conservation showerheads. Inefficient 
refrigerators and lighting were replaced, and electric stoves were replaced with LPG gas 
models. All 220V sockets were removed in the chalets except for one at the kitchen 
counter to charge cell phones and other small consumer appliances. Finally existing 













Furthermore, the existing three-phase water pumps were replaced with two (one on 
standby) high efficiency single-phase submersed pumps. A micro filter water purification 
system was also installed. 
The Hluleka hybrid mini-grid system was completed by December 2002 [NER 2003c:p18] 
and operated, with a number of often lengthy interruptions due to technical problems, 
until the reserve closed for renovation in mid 2006, by which time the first PV panels 
have already been stolen. By the end of 2006 the Eastern Cape Parks Board requested 
that the remaining PV panels be removed and stored [Nkwentsha 2007] but by June 
2007 the panels, of which a significant number were stolen by this time (see Figure B-6), 
were still mounted outside.  
In an interview in June 2007, a representative of the Eastern Cape Parks Board 
[Nkwentsha 2007] stated that the Board was considering again using diesel generation 
due to the problems experienced with the hybrid system. A new diesel generator has 
already been installed in May 2007, at the same site next to the river where the original 
generators were located. 
At the time of writing (2008) the DME has not yet made any decision regarding 
rehabilitation of the hybrid system.  
 
 
Figure B-6: The PV array at Hluleka, photographed in June 2003 (top left), July 2006 (top right) and May 
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Lucingweni 
The Lucingweni village consisted of 220 dwellings, grouped on the slopes of a headland 
in a manner that facilitates relatively easy electricity reticulation. Before the 
demonstration project was initiated, the community used mostly wood and paraffin as 
energy sources. 
The demonstration hybrid mini-grid system consisted of 560 100W crystalline PV panels 
and six 6kW Proven wind generators, located next to a cabin that holds the 2.2 MWh 
battery bank and control equipment on a North-facing hill in close proximity to the village. 
The system was designed so that the PV array generated onto the DC bus of the system, 
and the wind generators directly onto the AC bus. 
According to the consumption estimates used during the hybrid system design, the 
hybrid generation system had to provide 314kWh of energy per day. This energy were to 
supply 70 street lights, a community centre, water pumping, 4 shop refrigerators and a 
radio, TV, decoder, cell phone charger and 4 lights in each of the 220 dwellings [NER 
2003b:p9].  
The 56kWpeak PV array would have generated roughly 224 kWh / day
22, while the 
36kWpeak wind generators would have generated the required additional 90kWh / day 
operating at a capacity factor of 10.4%23. Any excess energy from the system was to be 
used “for the establishment of off-shoot industries, commercial enterprises, and 
additional connections.” [NER 2003b:p9] 
Each dwelling was supplied with a ready-board and a 2A current limiting device, which 
would trip if high-power devices like irons or hotplates were used. The consumption 
estimates, on which the system sizing was based, allowed 900Wh / day for each 
household, although no devices other than the current limiters (e.g. prepaid meters) were 
installed to enforce this energy limit. 
The Lucingweni mini-grid system was switched on towards the end of 2005, even though 
the project was not fully completed by that stage. According to Scholle and Afrane-Okese 
                                               
22
) The 224kW / day assumes solar irradiation of 1900 kWh / m
2
 / year [NASA 2008], PV system 
(excluding batteries) efficiency of 10%, and 130Wpeak / m
2
 (Banks [2007] calculated 252 kWh / 
day). 
23













[2007:p101] the decision to switch on was taken to instil a sense of system ownership 
within the community, thereby increasing “the security of the system” (presumable 
against theft and vandalism). 
The system operated for a few months, but was quickly overloaded due to reasons 
explored later. Theft started at a slow pace in early 2007, and soon afterwards a large 
percentage of panels were stolen and vandalised in a single evening. The photos in 
Figure B-7 were taken shortly after this event. At the time of writing (2008) the system 
was not in use, with its future being decided by the system owners, the DME. 
 
Figure B-7: The Lucingweni hybrid mini-grid system in May 2007, shortly after it was vandalised. Around 40% 
of the total PV panels were either stolen or inoperable due to vandalism. 
Delivery model 
Hluleka 
Hluleka reserve was electrified in full by the hybrid mini-grid system, with the required 
capital and diesel fuel being an external cost, not carried by the reserve management.  
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Lucingweni 
At Lucingweni, emphasis was placed on stakeholder participation during the planning 
process: 
“A consultative process was undertaken with the community, whereby all 
processes were communicated and agreed upon before implementation.” [NER 
2003b:p7] 
The implementation process was managed through the establishment of work 
committees appointed by the community. These committees allocated labour, and acted 
as communication channels to the community.  
The following recommendations were made by the NER [2003b] report, which was 
published before the completion of the Lucingweni project: 
• That responsibility of the system maintenance is situated fully with the OR Tambo 
District Municipality (ORT). As ORT lacks maintenance capacity, that ORT and Shell 
Solar (Pty) Ltd. (SSSA) should enter into a 5-year duration service contract for 
SSSA to provide the required maintenance, with clauses relating to the quality of 
service. 
• An ownership agreement between ORT and NER/DME. 
• A tariff agreement between NER and ORT 
• A customer agreement. 
• Insurance against lightning or surges, hail, fire, acts of god and theft and civil 
disobedience. 
According to the NER, Shell Solar has not delivered a community centre as was agreed 
contractually (and at the time of writing still has not), and has therefore not been paid in 
full. Before the contract was not completed, handover of ownership to the Oliver Tambo 
municipality was not possible, which means the above agreements could not be 
implemented. 
“The Lucingweni system was never completely commissioned into operation as 














The planned revenue collection approach at Lucingweni was based on a monthly flat rate 
charge per household. This however was not implemented prior to commencement of the 
electricity service. 
The importance of project evaluation, once all the systems and their associated activities 
have been installed and are effectively operational, is also highlighted by the NER 
[2003b] report. Such an evaluation is being completed at the time of writing: a draft 
document [DME 2007b] has been made available to the author, and the conclusions are 
incorporated in later parts of this section. 
Problems experienced 
Hluleka 
According to Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007], the Hluleka system was technically well 
designed and professionally installed. A number of problems however impacted the 
sustainable operation of the system, which will now be discussed. 
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The December 2003 progress report on the demonstration projects [NER 2003b] found 
that the mini-grid system was abused by guests (1), for example through bypassing 
distribution boards in order to power large freezers and portable swimming pool pumps. 
This is blamed on a lack of control by reserve management, and inadequate 
communication between staff and guests regarding information on the operation of 
appliances and energy efficiency, i.e. poor reserve management (2), a cause that affects 
a number of other problems still to be discussed. Human inertia to change (3) also 
played a role: freezers and portable swimming pools were allowed at Hluleka prior to the 
installation of the hybrid system (the original diesel generators supplied sufficient power). 
Energy efficiency was not practiced at the reserve (4), according to both NER [2003b] 
and Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007:p102]: CFL lights were for example replaced with 
standard incandescent lamps. Reasons for this lack of energy efficiency include high 
staff turnover associated with poor hand-over during this process (5), and the fact that 
the reserve management were not incentivised to practice energy efficiency: 
“The Hluleka Nature Reserve hybrid system failed as the operation was not 
appropriately incentivised to control fuel consumption through effective and 
efficient use of the hybrid system. The management opted for switching on the 
diesel generator [which was meant to be used only if PV and wind energy ran out 
due to prolonged periods of no wind or sun] because it was an external cost by 
government to their operations. The reserve was not managed as a proper 
commercial entity that optimises the use of its resources.” Scholle and Afrane-
Okese [2007:p106] 
The problem of an undersized hybrid system was also mentioned (6). Although the 
system sizing was accurate for the load data supplied by the reserve management, the 
reserve was often overbooked (7) (sometimes the system had to cater for 150 people 
instead of the designed-for 90)   
All these problems lead to regular system overload (8), which impacted on the primary 
objective of accessibility: supplying adequate energy to the customers. 
Due to the overload of the system, a 6kVA diesel generator was installed at the solar 
generation site to provide additional power, along with automatic delay timers at each 
chalet to reduce instantaneous start up currents.  
According to Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007:p102] this generator was however 













in an AC bus system of the type installed at Hluleka”). In addition differences existed in 
the frequency-based protocol with which the SMA Sunny Island inverters controlled the 
power delivery of the Sunny Boy PV-array-linked inverters. While the Sunny Island used 
the German grid-based narrow range of frequencies, the Sunny Boy was configured for 
off-grid connection and uses a wider range of frequencies. The effect of this was that PV 
energy was delivered to the system even during no-load, batteries fully charged 
conditions [Jochem 2008]. 
These technical design errors (9) led to inverter failure (10). The manufacturers (SMA) 
replaced the failed inverters in December 2003.  
The NER [2003b] reports that maintenance at the reserve was poor and tended to be 
reactive in nature (11), which impacted system component reliability and energy 
availability. Examples of poor maintenance include not cleaning PV panels regularly, 
erratic water plant dosing and unreliable recording of logs. These problems are again 
blamed on poor management at the reserve: 
“Despite repeated training, it is apparent that poor management exists on site.” 
[NER 2003b:p4]  
In addition, Scholle and Afanre-Okese [2007:p108] blames “a lack of institutional 
ownership (as well as community ownership)” (12) for the fact that sustainable 
maintenance processes were not properly implemented (13). Lack of institutional 
ownership impacts a variety of problems, as illustrated in Figure B-8. 
The above, combined with limited local technical support capability (14), led to long 
periods of system unavailability (15), which impacted all primary objectives of the project. 
The distance of about one kilometre between the location of the hybrid site and the 
reserve buildings (16) increased the risk of panel theft (17) [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 
2007:p102], which indeed started occurring incrementally, increasing system 
unavailability. 
Lucingweni 
A number of problems plagued Lucingweni, as diagrammatically represented in Figure 
B-9. These problems were often interlinked, making an accurate diagrammatic 
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Figure B-9: Factors that prevented the Lucingweni project from meeting certain primary energisation 
objectives.  
According to Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] the Lucingweni community had little 
sense of “buy-in” or ownership in the hybrid system (1), which were possibly the result of 
limited community interaction (2) and a lack of continued community awareness building 
(3) (especially necessary during the first 5 years of operation, according to the 
reference). 
“It is therefore questioned whether sufficient community consultation, participative 
processes and information sharing on envisaged system operation, capabilities 














The Lucingweni community were only marginally involved in the actual project 
construction work (4), and were not provided with LPG-based thermal services and 
potable water from boreholes even though this was originally promised (5).  
In addition system sizing and later system overload made very little energy available for 
economic activities (6), even though expectations within the community with regards to 
the economic outcomes of the project were already raised during the initial site 
identification stages: 
“The committee has emphasized on the community understanding of the potential 
benefit of such a project. Aside from the short-term project implementation 
employment creation possibilities and transfer of skills, they are fully aware and 
encouraged by the future commercial possibilities.”  [NER 2003b:p7] 
The above problems resulted in the community’s expectations not being met (7), which 
ultimately led to dissatisfaction within the community (8). 
Dissatisfaction within the community, and little sense of system ownership, appears to be 
among the main reasons why the community condoned the eventual theft and vandalism 
of the system (9). 
“Since the system is fairly central to the community, this [theft and vandalism] 
must have been heard and possibly observed by community members and 
essentially indicated a conscious rejection of the hybrid system by the 
community.” Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007:p105] 
Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] reports that many illegal connections occurred in 
Lucingweni (10), and that circuit breakers were bypassed to connect for example 
hotplates to the system (11):  
“7if no solution is offered for cooking and space heating then this leads to 
attempts to use the electrical equivalents on the hybrid system.” Scholle and 
Afrane-Okese [2007:p107] 
The lack of effective current and energy monitoring devices made these illegal 
connections and circuit breaker bypassing possible (12). Devices that would have 
prevented these problems includes energy metering that limited the daily energy budget 
per user, monitoring at distributions point to protect against illegal connections, and a 
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The electricity supply to customers was connected before revenue collection systems 
have been implemented (13), to try and minimise community dissatisfaction, as 
previously mentioned. A flat monthly service fee was later considered (14), along with 
applying the Free Basic Electricity policy (15), which allows households 50kWh free 
electricity per month, or around 1500 Wh per day. These factors all took away any 
incentive for the community to practice energy efficiency (16). 
“The notion of free service erodes the value of responsible consumption and 
ownership.” [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 2007:p104] 
Technical design errors (17), specifically the use of the wrong type of inverters to connect 
the wind generators to the hybrid system, resulted in the wind generators contributing 
very little energy to the hybrid system (18). 
This and the rest of the above-mentioned factors, including illegal connections, bypassed 
circuit breakers, lack of proper consumption-controlling devices and no energy efficiency 
incentives, led to regular system overload (19). 
Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007:p108] reports that the “technical capacity at the local 
authority level was not sufficient to support the operations of the systems sufficiently” 
(20). System maintenance therefore depended on outside experts, resulting in high costs 
and long system down-times (21) when faults occurred. 
These long system down-times, regular system overload, and finally theft and vandalism 
resulted in a hybrid system that was regularly unavailable, and therefore could not impact 
any energisation primary objectives. 
Although the above causes and problems all contributed to the ultimate failure of the 
Lucingweni project, Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] identified two overriding causes of 
failure that influenced most of the other smaller problems: 
1. A weak institutional framework (22), caused mainly by lukewarm support from the 
DME and a lack of an “institutional home” for off-grid electrification: 
“7 it is clear that the projects were implemented in an institutional vacuum which 
carries a high risk in complex energy service delivery programmes.” [Scholle and 
Afrane-Okese 2007:p109] 
2. A lack of a project champion (23). The DME originally tasked the NER to implement 













scope of responsibilities, along with a lack of interest in the project in other 
government departments due to the challenges it presented, meant that there was no 
real project champion. 
“NER/NERSA is a regulator and not a project implementer or an electrification 
agent and therefore never assumed the role as the project champion.” [Scholle 
and Afrane-Okese 2007:p105] 
Lessons learned 
Scholle and Afrane-Okese [2007] provides a comprehensive list of lessons learned from 
the Hluleka and Lucingweni projects. This section will group these lessons according to 
three of the four criteria that Scholle and Afrane-Okese identifies as impacting 
“significantly on the sustainable long-term operation of hybrid system”: local socio-
economic realities, energy efficiency and tariffs, and institutional framework. 
Local socio-economic realities 
• Interaction with the community is essential for a number of reasons: 
o to gain an understanding of their needs and priorities, and to ensure affordability, 
o to monitor and increase acceptance of the solution, 
o to create awareness of efficient energy use, and 
o to ensure that some organisational capacity exists or is established in the 
community. 
• The required community interaction processes should occur prior to project 
implementation.  
• The project will have a greater chance of long-term sustainability if the community 
sees the hybrid system as a long-term rather than a pre-grid solution. 
• A focus on energisation rather than just electrification is important, as a lack of 
provision for thermal needs result in attempts to use the electrical equivalents. 
• Ongoing awareness building and information sharing, at least for the first five 
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Energy efficiency and tariffs 
• A key aspect for a sustainable project is to charge revenue for metered 
consumption: 
“The introduction of Free Basic Electricity in conjunction with a flat rate charge 
does not send out the message to the consumer that electricity is a valuable 
service. Therefore, either technical or social means have to be found to 
encourage efficient use of electricity. This approach often leads to dissatisfaction 
by users (inflexibility to use more electricity and voluntary self-restrictions) and 
therefore leads to further challenges 7” [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 2007:p108] 
“The notion of free service erodes the value of responsible consumption and 
ownership.” [Scholle and Afane-Okese 2007:p103] 
“[At Lucingweni] the most essential energy management tool - charging for 
electricity - was therefore rendered ineffectual.” [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 
2007:p108] 
“In the absence of a sensible tariff which reflects electricity as a valuable service, 
a renewable energy system can never be sustainable.” [Scholle and Afrane-
Okese 2007:p106] 
• When using renewable energy-based systems, apply the subsidy on the energy 
efficiency side and rather maintain a cost-reflective tariff. 
• Use a robust technical solution for current and energy limiting, which does not 
allow for simple by-passing, for example limiting the daily energy budget per 
household and monitoring at distribution points to prevent illegal connections. 
Institutional framework 
The institutional framework in which an energy service is delivered is defined by Scholle 
and Afrane-Okese [2007:p109] as including definitions of ownership, subsidy levels, 
tariffs and the roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved in the service 
delivery, primarily in the governance sector.  
• A weak institutional framework undermines the sustainability of hybrid projects 













“A critical aspect in off-grid energy service provision is a clear support from DME 
with regards to either hybrid mini-grid implementation or decentralised solar PV 
supply solutions. As long as off-grid energy services are considered second-best 
by policy makers, this sentiment will be echoed by the local institutional authority 
as well as the community.” [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 2007:p109] 
• A project champion, who takes ownership of the project, ensures effective 
coordination between stakeholders, and project manages the implementation 
process, is an important way of reducing the risk of project failure. 
• Off-grid service delivery needs an institutional “home”, given that it is 
significantly different from rural grid electrification delivery models. 
• PV-based systems should not be seen as compromise solutions; as long as 
governments and beneficiaries hold this perspective, there will be only weak resolve 
for off-grid projects. 
“Only once off-grid supplies are seen as final solutions with no promises of grid 
power will off-grid be able to play a key role in delivering a high value service to a 
remote area.” [Scholle and Afrane-Okese 2007:p105] 
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Appendix C – The structure of the decision process 
Two descriptions in literature of the structure, or different stages, of the decision process 
are presented here to provide background to the decision aiding tools and approaches 
evaluated and developed during this research.  
Roy’s [1996] four levels of the decision process 
Bernard Roy [1996] divides the decision process into four levels, emphasising that these 
levels do not necessarily occur in sequence. Rather, the levels influence each other 
continuously throughout the decision process until such a time that the analyst is 
satisfied that the objectives of the decision process have been reached. 
1. Object of the decision and spirit of recommendation or participation 
The object or essence of the decision is defined at this level, by trying to answer 
questions like “How should the decision be modelled?” and “How can the various 
potential actions be differentiated?” 
During this stage the analyst also defines the spirit of recommendation. Roy 
emphasise that “both the analyst and the decision maker understand that the 
decision maker remains free to act however she wishes, even after the 
recommendation is made.” 
2. Analysing consequences and developing criteria 
The second level tries to answer the following questions: 
• “What consequences of the possible decision could be relevant to the objectives 
and to the value systems of the stakeholders?” 













• “How helpful will each be in clarifying the decision, given the factors of 
imprecision, uncertainty, and inaccurate determination in the process?” 
• “How can criteria be constructed that recognise these consequences and 
factors?” 
The focus at this level is to construct criteria that will give insight and clarify 
comparison between the different actions. 
3. Modelling comprehensive preferences and operationally aggregating performances 
The third level attempts to answer two sets of questions. The first set deals with 
choosing, within the wide range of possible criteria, those that best capture the 
consequences of the potential actions, and can best lead to a well-considered 
decision. 
The differences in paradigm between the descriptive and constructive approaches of 
decision aiding become clear at this level. For example, “should each of the criteria in 
the family be considered as an instrument that will describe the actors’ intangible 
preferences or, on the contrary, that will help unestablished preferences emerge, 
evolve, and perhaps converge?” [Roy 1996].  
The second set of questions tries to map the way in which an action’s performance 
can be compared as better as or worse than another action’s, based on aggregation 
of the various chosen criteria. For example, how should the relative importance of the 
criteria be decided? 
4. Investigating and developing the recommendation 
A variety of procedures is available at this level to process the information obtained in 
the other three levels, leading to a “solution” of the specified decision problem.  
Belton and Steward [2002]: a simplified structure 
Belton and Steward [2002:p6,p14] simplifies the decision process into three stages, once 
again highlighting the iterative relationship between the stages:  
1. Identifying and structuring the problem 
In this stage the various stakeholders need “to develop a common understanding of 
the problem, of the decisions that need to be made, and of the criteria by which such 
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Typically key concerns, uncertainties, goals, stakeholders and actions will be defined 
in this stage, following any of a number of problem structuring techniques, for 
example Kipling’s six thinking men: who, how, where, when, what, why.  
2. Building a model of the decision problem, and using this model 
In this stage formal models need to be developed “of decision maker preferences, 
value tradeoffs, goals, etc., so that the alternative policies or actions under 
consideration can be compared relative to each other in a systematic and transparent 
manner.” 
A wide variety of model-building approaches are available, but they should all include 
the following elements [Belton and Steward 2002:p7,p52]: 
• The alternatives (options, strategies, action plans) to be evaluated. 
• The model of values (criteria, objectives, goals) against which these alternatives 
will be evaluated, along with some reference to the significance or importance of 
the criteria. 
• The most important stakeholders, their opinions, and how this will be taken into 
account. 
• Key uncertainties and how these will be modelled. 
3. Developing an action plan 
Belton and Steward emphasize that “analysis does not ‘solve’ the decision problem”; 
therefore support and insight into translating the analysis into specific plans of action 
is as important.  
The whole decision process is described by Belton and Steward [2002:p6] as moving 
“through complexity to simplicity”. In this view the initial problem structuring phase 
required divergent thinking, “opening up the issue, surfacing and capturing the 
complexity which undoubtedly exists, and beginning to manage this and to understand 
how the decision makers might move forward”.  
The next phase of model building and use required more convergent thinking to extract 
“the essence of the issue from the complex representation in a way which supports more 
detailed and precise evaluation of potential ways of moving forward”, resulting finally in 













Appendix D - Case studies in decision aiding 
The author has been involved in a number of projects where decision aiding was given to 
support high quality decision making. Three case studies based on these experiences 
will now be presented, to clarify and confirm decision aiding concepts introduced in this 
research. 
Case study 1: Strategic Infrastructure Plan for the Western Cape 
In 2006 the Western Cape provincial government prepared a Strategic Infrastructure 
Plan (SIP) to guide infrastructure investment by both the government and the private 
sector over the following five to ten years, and to improve the management and use of 
the state’s existing infrastructure assets. 
The author participated in compiling the section of the SIP that dealt with energy-related 
infrastructure, with energy experts based mainly in UCT’s electrical engineering 
department and UCT’s Energy Research Centre. 
Actors 
The SIP process was similar to a typical rural electrification decision making process in 
that analysts (including the author) interacted with experts and other stakeholders to 
define and model the decision problem and arrive at preliminary decisions.  These 
preliminary decisions were then presented to the political decision makers, along with an 
audit trail (the bulk of the SIP report) on how the preliminary decisions were arrived at. 
Stages of the process 
The stages of decision aiding used in the SIP report closely followed those defined by 
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modelling it, and finally developing action plans. The introduction to the energy section of 
the report defines the stages as follows, with an emphasis on the first two stages [SIP 
2006:p1]:  
• “improve the availability of information to decision-makers within the Western 
Cape provincial government on energy infrastructure options [which includes both 
physical and institutional infrastructure]; 
• present a framework within which these energy infrastructure options can be 
compared with clarity, based on criteria representing the provincial government’s 
future vision; and 
• highlight the energy infrastructure options closest aligned to the provincial 
government’s future vision.” 
The spirit of recommendation of the decision aiding was also defined early in the report, 
by introducing the concepts of multi- and single-criteria analysis and the advantages of 
using a “coherent family of criteria that can be used throughout the decision-making 
process to provide structure and a common language for discussion.” [SIP 2006:p3] 
A family of criteria was then identified, representing the most important characteristics 
identified in policy documents representing the provincial government’s future vision. The 
choice of criteria was informed by Belton and Steward’s guidelines on developing a 
coherent family of criteria, especially balancing the need for a comprehensive / 
exhaustive family with the requirement for simplicity. For this reason only six criteria were 
selected, many containing several sub-criteria that would have over-complicated the 
process were they included as separate criteria.  
A study then identified a list of alternatives to be considered (both on the demand and 
supply sides). The criteria used, and a sub-set of the alternatives considered in the SIP is 













Table D-1: Supply side alternatives considered in the SIP, with weightings given for each criterion. 
 
The impact of each criterion on an alternative was measured on a colour-coded 
qualitative scale from -3 to 3, as defined in Table D-2. The importance of the different 
criteria relative to each other was specifically not defined in the report, as it was felt that 
the SIP report “forms part of the decision-making process regarding infrastructure 
investments, and does not act as a decision maker.” [SIP 2006:p4]  
Table D-2: Rating system used in SIP to represent the value of a criterion for each alternative. Positive 






• Multi-criteria analysis greatly improves information transfer between different 
shareholders, and provides a useful framework for discussions. Originally only the 
energy section of the SIP made use of a multi-criteria approach for comparing 
different alternatives. The compilers of the SIP document, after recognising the 
benefits of this approach in conveying information to the decision makers and 
providing an audit trail of the preliminary decisions, recommended that all the 
remaining sections of the SIP, for example health and transport, also incorporate this 
methodology. The recommendation was not adopted in all sectors, but it clearly 
illustrated the value of using a multi-criteria analysis. 
Rating Number 
Very positive 3 
Positive 2 
Slightly positive 1 
Neutral 0 
Slightly negative -1 
Negative -2 
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• Using qualitative rather than quantitative measurement scales during early project 
stages makes the process more efficient, and avoids the distraction of shareholder 
disagreements about quantitative details that are irrelevant at this stage of the 
decision process. The most accurate manner in which to decide on the rating for 
each alternative’s individual criteria would have been by using a quantitative value 
(i.e. Rand and cents values for the financial impact). Some criteria, for example ease 
of implementation, are however very difficult to measure quantitatively. In addition, 
the effort to arrive at accurate quantitative ratings is often significant (compared to 
asking different experts for their subjective ratings, as was done in the SIP), and often 
does not add much value to informing initial discussions aimed at broadly identifying 
further paths for exploration.   
Literature agrees on the value of qualitative measurement scales: “7in many 
situations decision makers may be much more comfortable in expressing values on 
semantic scales (e.g. moderately important, highly important) rather that in terms of 
numerical scores.” [Belton and Steward 2002:p336]. Vincke [1992] notes that too 
much precision during iterative processes is useless if it is accepted that the decision-
makers might change their minds during the iteration process. He also notes that the 
cognitive strain for each question should also not be too high, as this might lead to 
the decision-maker maintaining answers from previous iterations. 
• Valuable information is maintained within the decision making process by not 
aggregating criteria ratings too early in a decision process. A decision was made not 
to assign a weighting to each criteria and then aggregate the ratings, thereby arriving 
at a “score” value for each alternative. This avoids a situation where the focus is on 
the “score” rather than on the ratings of the different criteria used to calculate this 
value, and aligns with the constructive spirit of recommendation. This approach 
worked well in the SIP: obvious alternatives stood out clearly from the rest even 
without aggregation (e.g. solar water heating in Table D-1), while arguments 
supporting less obvious alternatives could refer to the different criteria, instead of 
referring to an aggregation value of which the detailed arithmetic remained hidden. 
Aggregation of weighted criteria ratings might however be of value during the final 
stages of decision processes, especially where quantitative criteria measures are 
possible. 
• Information sources / methodologies should be transparent. A political decision 
maker on the SIP queried the validity of the criteria ratings for the different renewable 













were the authors’ own opinions. This situation could have been avoided by making 
transparent in the decision aiding process the methodology used to arrive at the 
criteria ratings. 
Case Study 2: Energy storage technologies overview 
Decision aiding to a client building a luxury residential house illustrated the usefulness of 
effective visual design in information transfer, as well as that choosing a set of criteria is 
highly context specific.  
Background 
The client requested an overview of the complete spectrum of available energy storage 
technologies for his own background, and requested assistance in then deciding which 
technology was best suited to his own residential house’s backup power needs and 
potential business opportunities.  
As the client defined the decision problem very clearly along with the scope of the 
investigation, the decision aiding could start with the modelling of the decision. A multi-
criteria decision modelling approach was followed, with no aggregation of the different 
criteria ratings for the same motivations as with the SIP.  
The decision aiding process consisted of a report (the summary page is shown in Figure 
D-1) and a clarification meeting with the client. The report provided illustrated 
descriptions of each storage technology (aimed at a non-technical reader that is 
interested in technology, as shown in Figure D-2), with enough technical detail to clearly 
show the rationale leading to the conclusions.  
Whereas the SIP report rated alternatives against criteria using both desirable and 
undesirable ratings, the energy storage overview used a rating scale that included only 
neutral, less desirable and not recommended, with no additional ratings for desirable 
characteristics. This was done as the client asked for the full range of energy storage 
alternatives to be investigated and presented, including technologies like compressed air 
energy storage (CAES) that are impractical for residential use. Given this wide range, a 
rating scale that would eliminate totally impractical alternatives yet also highlight small 
nuances in desirability between remaining alternatives, would have added too much 
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remaining alternatives once all non-recommended technologies have been eliminated. 
These remaining alternatives were then the subjects of further analysis.    
 














Figure D-2: An example of a typical technology description in the energy storage report 
Lessons learned 
• The choice of criteria family is highly context specific. It is clear from the choice of 
criteria that the client / decision maker in this case study had very different needs to 
those in the SIP case study: labour intensity and contribution to equity, for example, 
was essential in the SIP for political and economic reasons, and totally irrelevant to 
the residential client. 
• Even in the case where one alternative is clearly superior to all the rest, the runner-up 
alternative and the process that led to their identification should still be clearly 
communicated. This gives the decision maker confidence in the process, and informs 
the construction of his/her preferences. The main motivation for this decision aiding 
project was that the client was not convinced that lead-acid batteries, recommended 
by all the contractors on his building project, was indeed the best choice for his 
needs. In this decision aiding it was therefore crucial that the client fully understood 
the rationality of the process that led to the final recommendation, and that 
alternatives (flow batteries) were provided against which the recommended solution 
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Case Study 3: Electricity supply for a rural school in Limpopo 
In 2008/2009 the feasibility was investigated of using renewable energy to supply the 
energy requirements of a newly donated computer centre, which formed part of a newly-
build school in a rural part of the Limpopo province.  
Background 
The client requested advice on how to implement a renewable energy system within the 
following context: 
• the school would be connected to the Eskom grid, with the capacity of the supply 
exceeding the load / demand, 
• no reliability problems have been experienced with the Eskom supply to the original 
school which was been replaced by the new school, 
• the donors did not want to burden the school with additional monthly energy 
expenditures from the extra consumption of the computer centre, and therefore 
decided to supply the computer centre’s energy from renewables,  
• initial capital expenditure did not appear to be a limiting factor to the donors – they 
however wished to walk away from the project financially after implementation, and to 
a certain extent saw renewable energy as a “pay now, free energy for the next 
decade” solution.  
It was apparent from the client’s request that the problem (the additional financial burden 
due to the donated computers’ energy consumption), and to a large extent the solution 
(renewable energy) was already defined from their perspective: all that was expected 
from the analysts was to design the actual renewable energy system.   
As, from the client’s perspective the decision problem was already defined, the problem-
structuring phase of the project had to be approached sensitively. A presentation was 
made to the fiduciary stakeholders (the donors and the architects designing the new 
school) informing them about past experiences with rural renewable energy projects in 
South Africa, highlighting the social and technical uncertainties involved and 
recommending taking a step backwards towards reconsidering the problem in more 














Figure D-3: Extracts from a presentation given to donors during problem structuring on the uncertainties 
around the use of renewable energy in rural areas. 
This presentation, and the facilitated discussions around it, resulted in a shared 
understanding among stakeholders that a more thorough analysis of the problem, and 
potential solutions to it, was required. Problem structuring could now commence, 
informed by the original primary objective, minimising the financial impact to the school of 
additional energy consumption from donated computers, along with the following 
additional primary objectives, defined mostly during the facilitated discussions: 
• Minimise energy consumption of donated computers, and the school in general. This 
objective was informed by lessons that were learned from a similar project in 
KwaZulu-Natal, where energy consumption increased dramatically after the school 
was upgraded. No energy management strategy was implemented at this school. A 
crucial element of successful renewable energy projects were highlighted through this 
objective: due to the restrictive nature of a renewable energy supply, focus firstly on 
managing energy consumption before worrying about the renewable energy supply. 
• Minimise outside support / maintenance for the implemented systems. Apart from the 
financial impacts, the school is also located in a deep rural area making support and 
maintenance logistically challenging. 
• The implemented system should be easy to understand and use by the teachers.  
• The implemented system should provide educational opportunities where possible. 
• Environmental pollution should be minimised, for example battery disposal and light 
pollution.  
Informed by these objectives, the problem structuring process now presented more 
detailed information to the stakeholders (see Figure D-4): 
• the estimated electricity consumption of the computer centre compared to the total 
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• the estimated wind and solar resource availability at the school (the wind resource 
was shown to be poor), 
• the capital and maintenance costs over a 20 year period of wind turbines and PV 
panels and the associated batteries and inverters, compared to energy from the grid 
given future scenarios which included substantial Eskom tariff increased, and  
• energy consumption management options available to the school. 
 
 
Figure D-4: Extracts from presentations sharing information with stakeholders. 
 Further stakeholder deliberation finally led to the following plan of action: 
• A portion of the capital originally allocated for the renewable energy system would 
instead be allocated to a basic but reliable energy management system that 
measured and displayed the energy consumption of different zones of the school in 
real time (as explained in Figure D-5). The system would display the energy 
consumption in the staff room, constantly building awareness among the teachers of 
energy efficiency. Ideally the consumption statistics can also be accessed by pupils 













• The design of the new school would make provision for easily future implementation 
of a renewable energy system, through renewable energy ready wiring and 
distribution board layouts, difficult to reach structures for PV panel mounting, and 
room for an inverter and batteries. The real consumption of the donated computers 
would be monitored for a few months after completion of the school, after which the 
renewable energy system would be sized and installed. 
• The theft uncertainty will be addressed by investigating theft-proofing solutions, for 
example PV panels that are destroyed when removed, as implemented by Telkom. 
• The use of batteries will be avoided as far as possible (the inverter needs a minimum 
amount of batteries to operate) in order to minimise maintenance. 
• The Department of Education will be approached regarding increasing budgets for 
schools with computer centres. 
• The parents of pupils at the school have agreed to a special levy that will be allocated 
specifically for energy-related expenditure.   
 
Figure D-5: Extracts from a presentation explaining the proposed energy consumption monitoring system. 
Lessons learned 
• The sustainability of the project depended on non-technological factors which appear 
to over-ride the technical preferences of the project initiators. Through the problem 
structuring phase it became clear that, with regard to project sustainability, 
uncertainties like uncontrolled consumption, theft and financial management 
capability overshadowed any technical preferences that the clients had. 
• Sharing accurate information and highlighting uncertainties during the problem 
structuring phase of decision aiding can significantly alter the preferences of decision 
makers. By providing adequate and unbiased information during the problem 
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was replaced with a set of informed alternatives with a greater probability of resulting 
in a sustainable implementation. 
• Including previous experience / lessons learned in the decision aiding process offer 
significant benefits. Part of the presentation to the donors and architects included 
photos and statistics relating experiences at previous renewable energy projects. It 
was clear from the reaction of the audience that sharing experiences and lessons 













Appendix E – Evaluation of decision making within the 
Klipheuwel project 
This appendix will evaluate the extent to which decision aiding supported high quality 
decision making in the site-selection decision making process within the Klipheuwel Wind 
Energy Demonstration Facility (KWEDF) project. As measurement standard the decision 
quality framework developed in section 4.3 will be used. 
Background to the KWEDF project 
The South African Bulk Renewable Energy Generation (SABRE-Gen) program was 
initiated in 1998 by Eskom to investigate the viability of utility scale, renewable electricity 
generation as a supply-side option. The SABRE-Gen wind program, launched in 1999, 
focused on the following aims [CSIR 2001]: 
• Understanding the implications of using wind energy on a large scale in an 
African environment 
• Determining the most suitable application for wind energy 
• Determining the most appropriate scale of implementation 
• Obtaining all necessary information for the effective implementation of wind 
energy projects 
• Preparing the market and industry for implementation 
• Investigating the sustainability of wind energy in an African environment. 
These aims led to a high-level request from Eskom for a wind turbine facility satisfying 
the following criteria [Smit et. al. 2004]: 
• Near Cape Town for research purposes 
• Accessible by the public for demonstrations and visits 
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• Variety of wind turbine technologies, including different generator, blade and 
control technologies 
• Variety of wind turbine manufacturers 
The objective informing these criteria were summarised by Eskom in a response to an 
issue raised during the scoping process in 2001 [CSIR 2001:34]: “It is well known in 
commercial, engineering and R&D circles that the premature commitment to a particular 
technology or supplier invariably leads to a non-optimal solution. Eskom has over the 
years learnt that local evaluation of a technology on a pilot or demonstration basis is 
highly desirable prior to the making of firm and costly decisions” 
This high-level request initiated a project in 1999 that ultimately resulted in the 
construction of the Klipheuwel WEDF, around 50 km north of Cape Town. This wind 
farm, the first in South Africa, was completed (except for the ongoing business 
development phase) in February 2003, when the last of three wind generators (660 kW, 
1.75 MW and 750 kW) was commissioned. 
The facility is connected via 2.58 km of 11kV overhead cables to the Klipheuwel 
substation, and maintained mainly by personnel of the nearby gas turbines at Acacia. 
The area around the wind turbines is leased to a farmer for wheat production and 
grazing. 
The decision problems 
Two decision problems can be identified within the KWEDF project: 
• Site selection problem, i.e. where to locate the wind farm. For the purposes of 
this analysis this decision problem is divided into three phases: a preliminary 
phase in which three potentially suitable sites was identified (two for inclusion in 
an environmental impact assessment (EIA) as required by South African 
legislation, and one as backup should the preferred two fail), a scoping phase 
(part of the EIA) identifying the significant issues, alternatives and decision points 
that should be addressed by the EIA process, and a specialist studies phase (part 
of the EIA) addressing the issues and points identified in the scoping phase. 
• Technology choice problem, i.e. which wind turbine technology and 













While the decision aiding process behind the site selection problem has been well 
documented (partly due to South African EIA requirements), little data is available on the 
process behind the technology choice problem, as the tender processes and decision 
structures used by Eskom during this second problem are not publicly documented. For 
this reason only the site selection problem will be analysed further. 
Preliminary phase decision aiding 
Preliminary site selection was carried out towards the end of 2000 by a team from Eskom 
(TSI), wind technologists from CSIR division of Manufacturing and Materials, 
environmental consultants from the CSIR Division of Water Environment and Forestry 
Technology, and the Cape Town electricity directorate. The process is described in the 
CSIR Site Selection Study [CSIR 2000], released in December 2000. 
The aim of the preliminary phase was to identify a number of suitable sites on which to 
erect six to ten wind turbines rated at around 10 MW in total, and recommend two or 
three sites for further assessment in an EIA.  
The criteria used to identify the potential sites were: 
• Technical: 
o Wind energy and climate using existing data sources (speed, direction, 
turbulence and obstructions, data availability). This was defined as the 
primary criterion 
o Geology and soil type 
o Access by road for large construction vehicles and equipment 
o Accessible to researchers and the public 
o Profile 
o Land ownership 
o Compatibility with current planning and zoning 
o Ease of grid integration 
• Environmental: 
o Proximity to socially sensitive sites (e.g. residential areas) 
o Proximity to ecologically sensitive sites (e.g. wetlands, protected areas). 
o Archeologically sensitive sites 
• Other: 
o Electromagnetic compatibility 
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During October 2000, an initial list of 21 Western Cape sites was compiled during 
brainstorming sessions, based on the existing knowledge of the site selection team. The 
21 identified sites were scattered around the Western Cape, but were concentrated 
within the greater Cape Metropolitan Area, due to the alliance between Eskom and the 
City of Cape Town [CSIR 2001] 
The number of these sites was then reduced to 10 by eliminating sites with obvious flaws 
in relation to the above criteria. Table E-1 below indicates the eleven sites that were 
eliminated, along with the reasons for elimination. 
Table E-1: Listing of the 11 sites eliminated from the 21 original sites. Reproduced from [CSIR 2002:30] 
Sites eliminated Reasons for elimination 
Agulhas area Relatively low profile; too far from Cape Town 
metropolitan area 
Athlone power station Relatively poor wind conditions; too close to 
metropolitan area. 
Cape Point Part of a protected area (Cape Peninsula National 
Park) 
Culemborg Too close to metropolitan area; non-alignment with 
existing planning and zoning 
Danger Point / Quoin Point Relatively low profile; too far from metropolitan area 
Darling area A private wind power generation initiative is already 
in progress in this area 
Koeberg power station area Part of a protected area and Natural Heritage Site 
(Koeberg Nature Reserve) 
Lambert’s Bay Relatively low profile; too far from metropolitan area 
Saldanha Too far from metropolitan area; also, suitable site 
could not be located for inclusion in the site 
selection; site excluded from further analysis; 
Somerset West / Gordon’s Bay Relatively low profile; non-alignment with existing 
planning and zoning 
Koeberg Hill Non-alignment with existing planning and zoning; 
possible problems with electromagnetic compatibility 
with beacons on site. 
The site selection team conducted site visits to the remaining sites between 15 and 17 
November 2000. After conducting some further research, each member of the selection 
team was asked to rank the 10 remaining sites according to the site identification criteria. 
This process reduced the number of suitable sites to five. Table E-2 indicates the 
eliminated sites and reasons. 
Table E-2: Sites eliminated during team-members ranking process. Reproduced from [CSIR 2002:30] 













Beacon 426, north of Durbanville Available area too small to accommodate planned 
number of turbines 
Lebanon State Forest, Grabouw Part of a conservation area (Kogelberg Biosphere 
Reserve, core area) 
Red Hill, Simonstown Part of a conservation area (Cape Peninsula 
National Park) 
Rondebossieberg, north of Durbanville Available area too small to accommodate planned 
number of turbines; difficult access over steep farm 
roads 
Steenbras Dam, Grabouw Part of a conservation area (Kogelberg Biosphere 
Reserve, core area). 
Detailed analysis was now done on the five remaining sites, from which a ranking 
preference was obtained in order to identify the top three sites for the EIA study. Table 
E-3 presents the decision matrix and the resulting ranking, while Table E-4 gives more 
details of each site. 
The Oliphantskop and Klipheuwel sites were found to be most suitable for the EIA 
process, with the Philadelphia site kept in reserve. 
Table E-3: Synthesis of detailed site assessment. Reproduced from [CSIR 2001, Appendix 10] 
Criteria Klipheuwel Oliphantskop Philadelphia Strandfontein Wingfield 






















Medium Medium Medium Low Medium 
Grid 
Integration 













Accessibility High Medium Medium Medium High 













None identified Possibility of 
bird strikes 
None identified Possibility of 
bird strike 




To be assessed To be assessed To be assessed To be assessed To be assessed 
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 
Table E-4: The alternatives considered for selection to the final EIA process. Reproduced from [CSIR 
2002:31] 
Site Comments 
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considered to be a very suitable site 
Klipheuwel Telkom farm (Radio 918, Klipheuwel) Preferred site; ranked among the top three sites - 
considered to be a very suitable site 
Philadelphia (Dassenvaley 45/2) Ranked among the top three sites - considered a 
very suitable site except for possible non-alignment 
with planning and zoning and expected difficulties 
with land acquisition; kept in reserve in case either of 
the preferred two sites were eliminated during the 
EIA process. 
Strandfontein coast (Macassar to Muizenburg) Despite extensive research, no suitable locality could 
be identified within the broad ‘Strandfontein’ coastal 
stretch; deep, shifting sands in this area could 
present problems for construction; therefore this site 
was eliminated in the final stage. 
Wingfield Aerodrome Considered a relatively suitable site but due to its 
very close proximity to the central business district, 
and the possibility of problems with bird strikes, this 
site was eliminated in the final stage 
The actors in the decision making process can be identified as follows: 
• Decision maker: Eskom 
• Client: Eskom 
• Analyst: Eskom, CSIR, Cape Town electricity directorate 
• Standard and fiduciary stakeholders: possibly government and municipal 
authorities 
• Silent stakeholders: local residents, community groups and general public 
Scoping phase decision aiding 
Since the construction of a wind energy facility is listed in South African legislation as an 
activity that may significantly affect the environment, it is subject to an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA). Eskom commissioned CSIR Environmentek and Phila 
Development & Communications to undertake an EIA for the proposed WEDF. 
In December 2000 a meeting was held between CSIR and the provincial Department of 
Environmental and Cultural Affairs and Sport (DECAS), the body responsible for 
approving the EIA, to discuss the proposed project, the relevant processes and 
legislative requirements. An application form and screening checklist to undertake an EIA 
of the proposed activity was then submitted to DECAS. 
The first part of this EIA process was the scoping process, defined by the CSIR [2001] as 
“the process of identifying the significant issues, alternatives and decision points that 













informed decision-making by providing information on the potential environment effects 
of developments before decisions are taken.” 
Scoping took place between January and August 2001, and was based around the 
following project alternatives: 
• Do not construct a WEDF, i.e. maintain the status quo. 
• Establish a WEDF on Groot Oliphantskop Farm, Blaauwberg 
• Establish a WEDF at the Telkom site, Klipheuwel 
In January 2001, a plan outlining the proposed process for scoping was submitted to 
DECAS by the CSIR for review. A social probe in the form of telephone and personal 
discussions with key individuals also took place in this month, in order to refine the public 
participation process. 
A number of workshops were held with key stakeholders: on 1 and 5 February 2001 with 
the Durbanville and Blaauwberg municipalities, and environmental groups, and on 22 
and 23 Feb 2001 with residents of Klipheuwel and Oliphantskop. 
Press advertisements were placed in two metropolitan and four community newspapers 
between 12 and 17 February 2001, giving notice of the EIA and dates and venues of the 
scoping workshops and contact details of the public participation facilitator. Signboards 
were also placed at the entrances of both sites for 21 days in March 2001. 
On 21 February 2001 Information Sheet No 1: Background Information Document (BID) 
was send out to all interested and affected parties (I&APs), describing what the WEDF 
was about, and inviting comments and participation in the EIA process. 
The BID and press notices marked the formal start of public involvement in the EIA 
process, with public scoping workshops held between 7 and 14 March 2001 at 
Melkbosstrand, Klipheuwel, Durbanville and Milnerton. 
On 12 June 2001 a Draft Scoping Report and Information Sheet No 2: Summary of Draft 
Scoping Report were released. The report was sent out for public comment to the 
relevant authorities and key interest groups, and the summary to all I&APs. The purpose 
of the report was to present potential environmental impact issues associated with the 
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A public review and comments period of four weeks was allowed after the release of the 
Draft Scoping Report. A wide range of questions and comments were received during 
this period, although only the following comments were found to be potentially relevant to 
this research: 
• The acting CEO of the Cape Metropolitan Council administration expressed 
concern that the preliminary phase had no public or local authority input. 
Comments during this period were synthesized by the CSIR into a Comments Report. 
The Final Scoping Report [CSIR 2001], incorporating all comments received on earlier 
documentation, was submitted to DECAS in August 2001.  
DECAS had to decide, after review of this document, on one of the following courses of 
action: 
• issue authorization for the project to proceed, possibly with conditions attached, 
• require the process to expand into an EIA where certain issues and alternatives 
will be investigated further,  
• or decline the application.  
DECAS advised that an EIA was needed for further investigation of the following 
outstanding issues and alternatives related to the Oliphantskop and Klipheuwel sites: 
• Visual impacts 
• Noise impacts 
• Impacts on bird populations 
• Impact on heritage resources 
• Wind climate at the proposed sites 
• Electromagnetic interference 
The actors in the process can be identified as follows: 
• Decision maker: DECAS 
• Client: Eskom 
• Analyst: CSIR Environmentek and Phila Development and Communication 
• Standard and fiduciary stakeholders: initially government and municipal 
authorities, local residents, and community groups, and later general public 













Specialist studies phase decision aiding 
Eskom now commissioned technical studies of two issues identified in the scoping 
process, namely: 
• wind climate at the proposed sites and 
• electromagnetic interference, 
while the CSIR appointed specialists to investigate the remaining four issues:  
• visual impacts 
• noise impacts 
• birding impacts, and 
• heritage and archaeological impact. 
The CSIR stipulated that the specialist studies should conform to the following 
requirements [CSIR 2001:40]: 
• Quantify wherever possible, the potential direct and cumulative environmental 
effects 
• Assess impacts during all phases of the project: site preparation and construction, 
operation, closure and rehabilitation 
• Assess the impacts with and without mitigation 
Specialists were instructed to use the following criteria to assess the significance of the 
impacts: 
• Extent of impact: immediate areas only, within 5km of development, regional, 
national or international 
• Duration of impact: short-term (shorter than 5 years), medium term (5 to 15 
years), long term (15 years or longer) or permanent 
• Intensity of impact: high, medium, low, and negligible. “The specialist studies 
must attempt to quantify the magnitude of impacts and outline the rationale used. 
Where appropriate, national standards are to be used as a measure of the level 
of impact.” 
• Probability of occurrence: improbable, probable, highly probable or definite  
• Legal requirements: list specific legislation and permit requirements. 
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• Degree of confidence in predictions: based on the availability of information and 
specialist knowledge. 
The CSIR finally required that the significance of the impacts should be aggregated from 
the results of the above criteria, and then described as follows: 
• Low: the impact will not have an influence on the decision or require significant 
accommodation in the project design 
• Medium: the influence on the environment will require modification of the project 
design or another form of mitigation 
• High: where it would have a “no-go” implication for the project regardless of any 
possible mitigation 
By September 2001 these specialist studies were in the process of being peer reviewed. 
The findings of the studies by Eskom and the CSIR-appointed specialists are presented 
in Table E-5. The significance rating given in this table assume that all mitigation 
measures recommended by the specialist studies have been implemented.  
Table E-5: Summary of impact assessments. Reproduced from [CSIR 2002:118] 
Impact category Oliphantskop Klipheuwel 
Visual Low Low 
Noise Effects on humans Low Low 
Effects on livestock Negligible Negligible 
Birds Wild birds Medium Medium 
Racing pigeons Low Low 
Heritage / archaeology Medium Low 
Electromagnetic interference Negligible Negligible 
Other issues that may inform decision-making: 
Wind climate Adequate Adequate 
Compatibility with land use planning Moderate Well-aligned 
The residual impacts (impacts remaining once appropriate mitigation has been 
implemented) at each of the sites are listed below [CSIR 2002:117]: 
• Oliphantskop: 
o Possible, infrequent, bird strikes by large-bodied birds such as cranes and 













o Loss of cultural landscape values related to the integrity of the rural 
agricultural setting in the area, and possible damage to existing historical 
buildings and archaeological sites. 
• Klipheuwel: 
o The main impact of concern is the seasonal pan located on the area 
earmarked for construction of the wind turbines. 
No fatal flaws, or impacts of high significance that would necessitate substantial redesign 
or termination of the project, were identified during the specialist studies within the EIA 
process. 
On 23 November the Draft Environmental Impact Report and associated Information 
Sheet No 3: Summary of Draft EIR was released to key stakeholders and I&APs for 
comment. 
The Final Environmental Impact Report [CSIR 2002], incorporating any comments 
received on earlier documentation, was submitted to DECAS in February 2002. DECAS 
approved the EIA, selecting Klipheuwel as the preferred site, and issued a Record of 
Decision. Eskom communicated this decision to all key stakeholders and I&APs, who 
was given a 30-day appeal period against the decision. 
The actors in the decision making process can be identified as follows: 
• Decision maker: DECAS 
• Client: Eskom and CSIR 
• Analyst: Specialists undertaking studies 
• Standard and fiduciary stakeholders: government and municipal authorities, local 
residents, community groups and general public 
• No silent stakeholders  
Eskom’s involvement in community development 
Eskom was involved in the development of the Klipheuwel community in the following 
ways [Smit et. al. 2004]: 
• Two large containers, donated by Maersk, were converted into an additional 
classroom for the Klipheuwel Primary School, situated 3km from a poor 
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• Eskom also committed R1 million into a trust towards building a new school 
closer to the community. 
Analysis of the quality of the decision aiding process 
The decision aiding process underlying the KWEDF site selection problem, as described 
above, were generally of high quality, as shown in the analysis contained in Table E-6. In 
this analysis the identified characteristics of high quality decision making serves as 
benchmark against which to compare the decision aiding process. It can be argued that 
the South African policy and legislative context, as explored previously, significantly 
informed the quality of this process.  




Criteria of tools and 
approaches that aid high 
quality decision making  
Contribution of the tool/approach (Negative, None, 
Limited, Strong, Not Applicable) 
Well considered 
Decision problem 
structured (i.e. objectives, 
criteria and alternatives 
clearly defined)? 
Strong: From inception the project objectives were clearly 
defined, informed by the objectives of the SABRE-Gen 
program, and during the specialist studies phase by 
objectives/requirements stipulated by the CSIR. These 
objectives guided the development of formal families of 
criteria and ultimately decision alternatives.  
Multi-dimensionality 
acknowledged? 
Strong: Multi-dimensionality is a underlying principle of 
the EIA legislation of South Africa, and this principle has 
been acknowledged throughout the site selection 
process, from the preliminary phase decision criteria 
which ranged from technical and environmental to social, 
to the specialist studies phase’s criteria on the 
significance of the impact of each topic under study.   
Soft uncertainties 
acknowledged? 
Strong: An important reason for the requirement to 
undertake an EIA was to address any possible 
uncertainties associated with the project. A number of soft 
uncertainties were acknowledged during the scoping 
phase of the decision process (e.g. wind climate and 
electro-magnetic interference); these soft uncertainties 
were minimised through specialist studies. 
Uncertainty within the results of these specialist studies 
was managed by including the ‘probability of occurrence’ 
and ‘degree of confidence in predictions’ criteria. 
Hard uncertainties 
acknowledged? 
Limited: Potential hard uncertainties, although not 
specifically identified as such, were addressed in the site 
selection decision process, for example: 
• whether one of the two sites selected for the EIA 
process would be acceptable (acknowledged by 
identifying a third site as backup) 
• whether noise and visual impacts would be perceived 
as unacceptable by people living nearby 
(acknowledged during the preliminary phase by 
including a ‘social’ criteria which specified the 
distance of the site from residential areas, and later 
during the process by including a site far from 
residential areas as one of the two sites put forward 














Incorporate past lessons 
learned / experiences? 
Strong: During the preliminary phase brainstorming 
sessions was used to draw from past experiences of the 
task group members and encourage divergent thinking. 
During the next two phases wide public participation and 
specialist studies was used to inform the decision 
process. The strong emphasis in EIA requirements on 
stakeholder inclusiveness and transparency improved the 
likelihood of accurate, adequate and unbiased data. 
Accurate, adequate and 
unbiased data? 
Inclusive Stakeholder inclusive? 
Strong: Only small task and special interest groups were 
involved in the preliminary phase decision process. This 
cannot be deemed non-inclusive, as the preliminary stage 
involved problem definition, a process that would not have 
benefited from wider stakeholder participation. 
The scoping and specialist studies phases of the process 
attempted to involve a wide range of stakeholders through 
a social probe, workshops with key stakeholders, press 
advertisements, signboards, public scoping workshops 
etc, resulting in an excellent example of a successful 
public participation process. 
Transparent 
Transparent data sources 
/ methodologies? 
Strong: Transparency results from strong stakeholder 
participation and a well-documented audit trail, both 
characteristics of the site selection process. The client 
supplied and described preference scales wherever 
possible, and referenced data sources. 
Although no information is given on the weighing between 
criteria used in the preliminary phase (except that the 
‘wind energy and climate’ criterion was considered 
‘primary’), a simple outranking exercise could have 
indicated the preferred alternative, making weighing 
largely unnecessary. 
The client did not specify the method of aggregation of 
criteria, nor was the rational used for aggregation 
described in any of the specialist studies. 
Audit trail? 
Strong: The site selection process was comprehensively 




Process can adapt to 
context through iterative 
feedback loops? 
Strong: Feedback loops were built into the decision 
process through regular opportunities for stakeholders to 
comment on and question the decision process. These 
comments and answers were documented and 
disseminated to stakeholders throughout the process, 
thereby encouraging a constructive decision aiding 
process where stakeholder preferences and the decision 




plans as outcome? 
Strong: CSIR [2002:114] lists 17 “recommendations for 
design and monitoring” related to visual and noise, bird 
population, and heritage and archaeological impacts. 
These detailed recommendations range from the colour of 
the wind turbine blades for minimum visual impact, to 
monthly bird surveys on site (and bird strike recording). 
These recommendations were incorporated into an 
Environmental Management Plan as required by the EIA 
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Appendix F – Project Cycle Management and the Logical 
Framework Approach 
Project Cycle Management (PCM) and the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) are 
introduced and explained in this appendix. 
A brief overview of PCM and LFA 
A variety of PCM and LFA variants exist. For this research the PCM and LFA described 
in “Project Cycle Management Handbook version 2”, published by the European 
Commission in 2002 [EC 2002], is used. The decision to use this specific interpretation of 
LFA was largely based on the facts that the EC’s PCM approach is well documented in 
the public domain, and focuses strongly on objective alignment. 
Project Cycle Management is used to define the management activities and decision 
making procedures during different stages of the project life. The project cycle also 
provides a structure which is meant to ensure that crucial activities, for example 
stakeholder participation, are engaged in at the required times to ensure “informed 
decisions” [EC 2002:p3]. 
Within the PCM, LFA is the methodology that is followed for planning, managing and 
evaluating. The LFA was developed in 1969 by Rosenberg for USAID, and is used by a 
number of large donor organisations, for example AUSAID, SIDA, UNDP and the EC. 
The product of the LFA is a matrix called the Logframe which summarises what the 
project intends to do and how, what the key assumptions are, and how outputs and 
outcomes will be monitored and evaluated. 
The following two sections introduce PCM and the LFA in more detail, specifically related 
to ways in which they support high quality decision making. For a full explanation of 
these approaches, please refer to [EC 2002]. The diagrams used in these sections have 











The EC’s Project Cycle 
The aim of PCM as defined by the EC [2002:p4] is to try to ensure that:
• “projects respect and contribute to overarching policy objectives of the EC
• projects are relevant to the real problems of target grou
• project objectives are realistically achievable within the project constraints,
• projects deliver sustainable benefits.
In order to try and ensure the above
characteristics: 
• the LFA is used to
and successfully implement them,
• high quality key documents must be produced in each phase
F-1, 
• stakeholder participation is required,
• clear formulation and focus on one project objective, defined in terms of the 
sustainable benefit to the target group(s),
• the incorporation of key quality issues into the design from the beginning.






, the EC’s PCM approach has the following 
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An important part of ensuring high quality documentation is to require that the documents 
used in the various phases of the PCM share a common format based on the core logic 
of the LFA, as shown in Figure F-2. 
Figure F-2: Standard document structure required by the PCM [EC 2002:p5] 
The manner in which high quality decision aiding is ensured within PCM will now be 
explored in more detail, focussing on each individual phase: 
Programming 
In the programming phase problems, constraints and co-operation opportunities on a 
national and sectoral level are identified. The purpose of this phase is to develop a 
relevant and feasible programming framework within which projects can be identified and 
planned.   
This framework is documented in a Country Strategy Paper (CSP), which should be 
drafted on the basis of close discussion and consensus with the partner country 













The EC specify that the CSP must have the following structure, which fundamentally 
reflects the major elements of the LFA: 
1. “A description of the EC co-operation objectives. 
2. The policy objectives of the partner country. 
3. An analysis of the political, economic and social situation, including the sustain-
ability of current policies and medium-term challenges. 
4. An overview of past and ongoing EC co-operation (lessons and experience), 
information on programmes of EU Member States and other donors. 
5. The EC response strategy, identifying a strictly limited number of intervention 
sectors that is complementary to interventions by other donors.” [EC 2002:p6] 
6. A National Indicative Programme (NIP), which is in essence a detailed translation 
of the response strategy. 
The NIP may be an integral part of the CSP document, covers a future period of typically 
3-5 years, and identifies and defines appropriate measures and actions to reach the 
objectives defined earlier in the CSP. The NIP should contain the following: 
• Global objectives which sets out the strategic choices for EC co-operation, based 
on the EU’s and the country’s priorities; 
• Financial requirements for each identified co-operation area, which might include 
indicative timing and size of EC contributions; 
• Co-operation area-specific objectives and expected results, with main 
performance and key outcome indicators which must relate to developments that 
are measurable in the short/medium term; 
• How crosscutting issues are taken into consideration (gender, environment, etc.); 
• Details of programmes to be implemented in pursuit of these objectives, the 
intended beneficiaries and the type of assistance to be provided (e.g. 
macroeconomic support, technical assistance, training, investment, supply of 
equipment, etc). The NIP should also include project ideas, along with general 
criteria for their realisation (such as geographical area, most suitable partners, 
suitable duration of projects). [EC 2002:p7] 
A number of indicators are used in the programming stage, based on the LFA except for 
the input indicators: 
• Input indicators: a measure of the financial, administrative and regulatory 
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between the resources used and the results achieved, which gives an indication 
of the efficiency of the actions carried out. 
• Output indicators: a measure of the immediate and concrete consequences of the 
measures taken and resources used. Within the LFA these indicators will 
measure direct consequences of activities implemented.  
• Outcome indicators: a measure of short-term results at the level of beneficiaries. 
Within the LFA these indicators correspond to results level indicators. 
• Impact indicators: a measure of the long-term consequences of the outcomes, 
which measure the general objectives in terms of national development and 
poverty reduction. Within the LFA impact indicators are measures at the level of 
the Purpose and the Overall Objectives. [EC 2002:p8] 
The EC suggest that the following questions should be asked to provide guidance when 
checking the quality of an Indicative Programme: 
• “Are the objectives of the indicative programme clear and unambiguous? Do they 
cover aspects of good governance, poverty alleviation, environmental protection 
and gender equality? 
• Are the sectoral objectives clearly linked to the objectives of the indicative 
programme? 
• Are the objectives clearly defined? Are the indicators appropriate? 
• What are the assumptions and risks underlying the objectives? How critical to the 
programme’s success are they and how likely is it that they will be achieved? 
• Have the goals and objectives been clearly understood and accepted by all 
relevant partner country institutions?” [EC 2002:p10] 
Identification 
During the identification phase the relevance of project ideas generated during the 
programme phase are analysed within the framework established by the CSP. This 
phase includes analysis of stakeholders, likely target groups and beneficiaries (who they 
are, the problems they face, and identification of options to address these problems).   
The expected outcomes of the identification stage are [EC 2002:p10]: 
• Pre-feasibility studies, to be done when required to identify or clarify specific 
ideas, and to identify what further studies might be required to formulate a project 











schedule, which outline the timing for the major elements of further preparation 
and implementation.
• A project identification sheet 
examines the alignment between 
objectives. 
• A decision whether or not to take a specific project idea further, along with a 
priority list which indicates which projects to implement first.
Figure F-3 indicates which parts of the Logical Framework should be completed by 
the end of the identification stage: the 
project description informing the 
should therefore go through the Analysis Stage and parts of the Planning Stage of 
the LFA, including Stakeholder Analysis, Problem Analysis, Analysis of Objectives, 
and Strategy Analysis. 
Assumptions for the preferred option
possible Indicators, especially at the level of the Projec
Figure F-3: The parts of the Logframe
The EC provides questions and assessment criteria to check the quality of the pre
feasibility study generated in this phase. In essence this verifies that the project ideas are 
likely to be relevant and feasible: 
Relating to relevance, questions include: 
• “Are the project objectives in line with the overarching policy objectives of 
strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law, and poverty 
alleviation?” [EC 2002:p




based on the pre-feasibility stu
the proposed project and the CSP/NIP 
 
pre-feasibility study should 
Intervention Logic and the Assumptions. 
Typically a rough elaboration of the Intervention Logic and the
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t Purpose and the Results.
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• “Will the Project Purpose contribute to the Overall Objectives (if the Assumptions 
hold true)? 
• Are Results products of the implementation of Activities? 
• Will the Project Purpose be achieved if the Results are attained?  
• Have important external factors been identified?  
• Is the probability of realisation of the Assumptions acceptable?” [EC 2002:p14]  
Appraisal 
During the appraisal phase project ideas that have proven feasible and relevant are 
developed into detailed project plans. The EC stresses a focus on feasibility and 
sustainability / quality in these plans, while checks need to ensure stakeholder 
participation and consideration for cross-cutting issues and overarching objectives. 
A feasibility study is used in this stage to inform a decision on whether or not to continue 
with the project, drawing up a formal financing proposal and seeking funding. 
The expected outcomes of the Appraisal phase are: 
• A feasibility study to establish whether the project identified in the pre-feasibility 
study is relevant, feasible and likely to be sustainable, and to detail the technical, 
economic and financial, institutional and management, environmental and socio-
cultural and operational aspects of the project. A detailed Logical Framework 
should form part of this study, covering all aspects of the framework as shown in 
Figure F-4. In addition an outline of an Activity and Resource Schedule should be 
prepared, along with a first draft financing proposal. [EC 2002:p15] Holding a 
planning workshop focussing on eliciting final agreement between various 
stakeholders on the various parts of the Logical Framework is strongly 
recommended by the EC, as this improves ownership by the target groups / 
beneficiaries. 
• A decision taken by the EC and the partner country to either prepare a financing 
proposal based on the study, reject the proposal, or to further study certain 











Figure F-4: The parts of the 
A number of quality criteria
preparing the feasibility study, to ensure that the project
be sustainable.  
Questions relating to feasibility include:
• “Have important external fac
• Is the probability of realisation of the Assumptions ac
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The expected outcomes of Financing are: 
• A final version of the financing proposal in the defined format, which must include 
the following [EC 2002:p20]: 
o A complete Logical Framework  
o Stakeholder analysis, problem and objectives analysis  
o Implementation Schedule and Overall Activity Schedule  
o Environmental Integration Form  
o Gender Integration Form  
o Economic and Financial Analysis  
• A decision taken by the EC and the partner country to either fund, redesign or 
reject the project. 
• If accepted, a signed financing agreement or memorandum signed by the EC and 
the partner country. 
Implementation 
The implementation phase aims to achieve the project purpose and contribute to the 
overall objectives, typically through contracts for studies, technical assistance, works or 
supplies. The progress of the implementation is monitored and reported on, in order to 
enable adjustment to changing circumstances. 
The expected outcomes of Implementation are: 
• A project that meets its purpose and contribute to its overall objectives. 
• Evidence that shows that project resources have been used in an “efficient, 
effective and transparent” way. [EC 2002:p21] 
Three principles apply throughout the implementation process: 
1. Planning and replanning: ensuring that the initial Implementation Schedule, 
Logframe and Activity and Resource schedules are regularly reviewed, refined 
and updated. 
2. Monitoring: ensuring that the project stays on track. Monitoring is defined by the 
EC [2002:p22] as “the systematic and continuous collection, analysis and use of 
information for management control and decision-making. Implementation is a 
continuous learning process where experience gathered is analysed and fed back 













3. Reporting: progress reports, typically submitted on a quarterly basis, aims to 
check the state of advance of the project in light of its objectives, including details 
of budget implementation and future budgetary provisions. 
Evaluation 
Evaluation is a systematic and objective assessment of a project, and aims to determine 
“the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, 
impact and sustainability” of such a project. The outcomes of an evaluation should 
provide information that enables the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision 
making processes of future projects. 
Evaluations can take at any stage of a project: 
• Ex ante evaluations: typically studies done during the preparatory phases of the 
project cycle, for example pre-feasibility or feasibility studies. 
• Mid-term and final evaluations: done during and at the end of implementation. 
These evaluations are distinct from monitoring during the implementation phase, 
in that it analyses the efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and 
sustainability of aid policies and actions, compared to monitoring which mainly 
measures actual vs. planned project deliverables.  
• Ex post evaluation: done a number of years after completion, often focusing on 
the impact of the project. 
Evaluations under EC funds follow evaluation criteria [EC 2002:p28] that are closely 
linked to the Logframe, as shown in Figure F-5: 
• Relevance: how closely project objectives aligned with the problems it set out to 
address, and with the physical and policy environment within which it operated. 
• Efficiency: how well project means have been converted into results, in terms of 
quality, quantity and time. 
• Effectiveness: how much the project results contributed to achievement of the 
project purpose, and the influence of assumptions. 
• Impact: what the effect of the project was on its wider context, including its 
contribution to Overall Objectives and the overarching policy objectives of the EC. 
• Sustainability: the likelihood that project benefits will continue to flow after 
external funding has ended, focussing specifically on factors of ownership by 
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aspects, gender equality, appropriate technology, environmental aspects, and 
institutional and management ca
Figure F-5: Linking evaluat
The EC’s implementation of the
As with PCM an overview of the
Logframe has already been discussed in some detail in the previous section;
methodology can be found in a number 
The Logical Framework Approach (LFA)
planning and management
analyse a given situation, and to then define objectives and activities that can be 
undertaken to improve on this situation. During implementation the LFA is a key 
management tool that informs activity scheduling and monitoring, and after 
implementation provides a
It should be noted that the LFA is supported by a range of other tools during PCM, 
including Environmental Impact Assessment, Gender Impact Analysis, and Financial and 
Economic Analysis. The advantages of using the LFA inclu
objectives of programmes/projects and indicates whether they have been achieved, and 
monitors factors outside the scope of the programme/project which influences its 
success.  
The logical framework matrix (
aspects of a project, resulting from the LFA process. The structure of the
shown in Figure F-6, summarising:
• “why a project is carried out (Intervention Logic)
• what the project is expected to
 
nt and the Logical Framework Approach
pacity. 
 
ion criteria to the Logframe [EC 2002:p29]
 LFA and Logframe 
 LFA will be given here. The overview will be brief, as the 
of sources, for example [EC 2002]
 is an important tool within the PCM for project 
. During project planning the LFA is used to identify and 
 project evaluation framework.  
des that it structures the 
Logframe) is used to summarise the most important 
 
 

















• how the project is going to achieve it (Activities, Means)
• which external factors are crucial for its success (Assumptions)
• where to find the information required to assess the success of the project 
(Sources of Verification)
• which means are required (Means)
• what the project will cost (Cost)
• which pre-conditions have to be fulfilled before the project can start (Pre
conditions)” [EC 2002:p33]
Figure 
The LFA is evolutionary and iterative in nature, and starts with a comprehensive
of the existing situation, which is then used to inform
the Logframe is split into these two phases: analysis and pla
The analysis phase consists of four steps, designed to
1. Stakeholder analysis, where major stakeholders, target groups and beneficiaries are 
identified and characterised.
2. Problem Analysis, where key problems, constrai
and cause-and-effect relationships are developed.
3. Analysis of Objectives, where an 
by generating objectives from the identified problems with the help of means to end
relationships. 
4. Analysis of Strategies, where the most appropriate strategy to achieve the objective 
is identified 
During the planning phase the results from the analysis phase is translated into an 










F-6: The logical framework matrix [EC 2002:p33] 
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